Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2023.2248645
Oded Stark
ABSTRACTI study attitudes towards risk taking in cases where a person relates to others positively, namely altruistically. This study is needed because it is unclear how altruism influences the inclination of an altruistic person to take risks. Will this person’s risk-taking behavior differ if the utility of another person does not enter his utility function? Does being altruistic cause a person to become more reluctant to take risks because a risky undertaking turning sour will also damage his ability to make altruistic transfers? Or does altruism induce a person to resort to risky behavior because the reward for a successful outcome is amplified by the outcome facilitating a bigger transfer to the beneficiary of the altruistic act? Specifically, holding constant other variables, I ask: is an altruistic person more risk averse or less risk averse than a comparable person who is not altruistic? In response to this question, using a simple model in which preferences are represented by a logarithmic utility function, I show that an altruistic person who is an active donor (benefactor) is less risk averse than a comparable person who is not altruistic: altruism is a cause of greater willingness to take risks. The finding that the altruism trait causes greater willingness to take risks has not previously been noted in the existing literature.KEYWORDS: AltruismAltruistic transfersRelative risk aversionIntensity of altruism AcknowledgmentsI am indebted to a referee for illuminating comments and kind words, and to Zack Almquist for advice and guidance.Disclosure statementThe author reports no conflict of interest of any type.Notes1 To the best of my knowledge, texts on altruism spanning from the collection of studies in Phelps (Citation1975) to Bourlès et al. (Citation2021) did not address this question. When altruism and risk-taking behavior were linked, the context was the perception of the recipients of the altruistic transfers that altruism provides them with a form of insurance.
{"title":"Can altruism lead to a willingness to take risks?","authors":"Oded Stark","doi":"10.1080/0022250x.2023.2248645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2023.2248645","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTI study attitudes towards risk taking in cases where a person relates to others positively, namely altruistically. This study is needed because it is unclear how altruism influences the inclination of an altruistic person to take risks. Will this person’s risk-taking behavior differ if the utility of another person does not enter his utility function? Does being altruistic cause a person to become more reluctant to take risks because a risky undertaking turning sour will also damage his ability to make altruistic transfers? Or does altruism induce a person to resort to risky behavior because the reward for a successful outcome is amplified by the outcome facilitating a bigger transfer to the beneficiary of the altruistic act? Specifically, holding constant other variables, I ask: is an altruistic person more risk averse or less risk averse than a comparable person who is not altruistic? In response to this question, using a simple model in which preferences are represented by a logarithmic utility function, I show that an altruistic person who is an active donor (benefactor) is less risk averse than a comparable person who is not altruistic: altruism is a cause of greater willingness to take risks. The finding that the altruism trait causes greater willingness to take risks has not previously been noted in the existing literature.KEYWORDS: AltruismAltruistic transfersRelative risk aversionIntensity of altruism AcknowledgmentsI am indebted to a referee for illuminating comments and kind words, and to Zack Almquist for advice and guidance.Disclosure statementThe author reports no conflict of interest of any type.Notes1 To the best of my knowledge, texts on altruism spanning from the collection of studies in Phelps (Citation1975) to Bourlès et al. (Citation2021) did not address this question. When altruism and risk-taking behavior were linked, the context was the perception of the recipients of the altruistic transfers that altruism provides them with a form of insurance.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135829339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2023.2217324
J. Dijkstra, Brent Simpson, Dieko M. Bakker
{"title":"Everybody herds, sometimes: cumulative advantage as a product of rational learning","authors":"J. Dijkstra, Brent Simpson, Dieko M. Bakker","doi":"10.1080/0022250x.2023.2217324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2023.2217324","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41866755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-27DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2023.2179999
S. Sushanth Kumar, Apurba Dabgotra, Diganta Mukherjee
{"title":"Latent class analysis of multigroup heterogeneity in propensity for academic dishonesty","authors":"S. Sushanth Kumar, Apurba Dabgotra, Diganta Mukherjee","doi":"10.1080/0022250x.2023.2179999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2023.2179999","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-09DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2022.2124246
Beth M. Stokes, Samuel E. Jackson, Philip Garnett, Jing Luo
{"title":"Extremism, segregation and oscillatory states emerge through collective opinion dynamics in a novel agent-based model","authors":"Beth M. Stokes, Samuel E. Jackson, Philip Garnett, Jing Luo","doi":"10.1080/0022250x.2022.2124246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2022.2124246","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48836219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2021.2003795
J. Angle
ABSTRACT The Inequality Process (IP) has been tested and confirmed against data on incomes that are approximately gamma distributed. The IP’s gamma pdf (probability density function) model expresses statistics of IP particle wealth algebraically in terms of IP parameters for the subset of IP parameters that generate approximately gamma distributions of particle wealth, a serious limitation, one leaving statistics of the many empirical distributions of income and wealth with heavier-than-gamma distribution right tails beyond algebraic expression in terms of IP particle parameters. This paper shows that an IP variance-gamma (VG) pdf model can do for the entire interval on which IP particle parameters are defined, (0,1), what the IP’s gamma pdf model does for only a subset. This paper thus generalizes the IP’s gamma pdf model, and it does so with no loss of parsimony since the IP’s VG pdf model is, like the IP’s gamma pdf model, expressed in terms of IP particle parameters.
{"title":"Generalizing the Inequality Process’ gamma model of particle wealth statistics","authors":"J. Angle","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2021.2003795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2021.2003795","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Inequality Process (IP) has been tested and confirmed against data on incomes that are approximately gamma distributed. The IP’s gamma pdf (probability density function) model expresses statistics of IP particle wealth algebraically in terms of IP parameters for the subset of IP parameters that generate approximately gamma distributions of particle wealth, a serious limitation, one leaving statistics of the many empirical distributions of income and wealth with heavier-than-gamma distribution right tails beyond algebraic expression in terms of IP particle parameters. This paper shows that an IP variance-gamma (VG) pdf model can do for the entire interval on which IP particle parameters are defined, (0,1), what the IP’s gamma pdf model does for only a subset. This paper thus generalizes the IP’s gamma pdf model, and it does so with no loss of parsimony since the IP’s VG pdf model is, like the IP’s gamma pdf model, expressed in terms of IP particle parameters.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43753018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-20DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2021.2012668
S. Amadae, Christopher J. Watts, J. M. Sakoda, Cailin O’Connor, Justin P. Bruner
ABSTRACT What endogenous factors contribute to minority (Red Queen) or majority (Red King) domination under conditions of coercive bargaining? We build on previous work demonstrating minority disadvantage in non-coercive bargaining games to show that under neutral initial conditions, majorities are advantaged in high conflict situations, and minorities are advantaged in low conflict games. These effects are a function of the relationship between (1) relative proportions of the majority and minority groups and (2) costs of conflict. Although both Red King and Red Queen effects can occur, we further show that agents’ increased initial propensity toward conflict advantages majorities.
{"title":"Red Queen and Red King Effects in cultural agent-based modeling: Hawk Dove Binary and Systemic Discrimination","authors":"S. Amadae, Christopher J. Watts, J. M. Sakoda, Cailin O’Connor, Justin P. Bruner","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2021.2012668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2021.2012668","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What endogenous factors contribute to minority (Red Queen) or majority (Red King) domination under conditions of coercive bargaining? We build on previous work demonstrating minority disadvantage in non-coercive bargaining games to show that under neutral initial conditions, majorities are advantaged in high conflict situations, and minorities are advantaged in low conflict games. These effects are a function of the relationship between (1) relative proportions of the majority and minority groups and (2) costs of conflict. Although both Red King and Red Queen effects can occur, we further show that agents’ increased initial propensity toward conflict advantages majorities.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42876213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-05DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2021.2021513
Garry Sotnik, T. Shannon, W. Wakeland
ABSTRACT New theoretical agent-based model of population-wide adoption of prosocial common-pool behavior with four parameters (initial percent of adopters, pressure to change behavior, synergy from behavior, and population density); dynamics in behavior, movement, freeriding, and group composition and size; and emergence of multilevel group selection. Theoretical analysis of model’s dynamics identified six regions in model’s parameter space, in which pressure-synergy combinations lead to different outcomes: extinction, persistence, and full adoption. Simulation results verified the theoretical analysis and demonstrated that increases in density reduce number of pressure-synergy combinations leading to population-wide adoption; initial percent of contributors affects underlying behavior and final outcomes, but not size of regions or transition zones between them; and random movement assists adoption of prosocial common-pool behavior.
{"title":"A new agent-based model offers insight into population-wide adoption of prosocial common-pool behavior","authors":"Garry Sotnik, T. Shannon, W. Wakeland","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2021.2021513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2021.2021513","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT New theoretical agent-based model of population-wide adoption of prosocial common-pool behavior with four parameters (initial percent of adopters, pressure to change behavior, synergy from behavior, and population density); dynamics in behavior, movement, freeriding, and group composition and size; and emergence of multilevel group selection. Theoretical analysis of model’s dynamics identified six regions in model’s parameter space, in which pressure-synergy combinations lead to different outcomes: extinction, persistence, and full adoption. Simulation results verified the theoretical analysis and demonstrated that increases in density reduce number of pressure-synergy combinations leading to population-wide adoption; initial percent of contributors affects underlying behavior and final outcomes, but not size of regions or transition zones between them; and random movement assists adoption of prosocial common-pool behavior.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46929283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-30DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004596
Albin Mathew, T. Shijin, Roshni T. Roy, P. Soorya, Shahul K. Hameed, K. A. Germina
ABSTRACT In this paper, by defining two types of signed detour distances and corresponding detour distance matrices, we introduce the notion of detour distance compatibility for signed graphs and later applying these concepts, we give yet another characterization of balance in signed graphs. Further, we discuss signed detour spectra of certain classes of unbalanced signed graphs.
{"title":"Social balance - a signed detour distance analysis","authors":"Albin Mathew, T. Shijin, Roshni T. Roy, P. Soorya, Shahul K. Hameed, K. A. Germina","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004596","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, by defining two types of signed detour distances and corresponding detour distance matrices, we introduce the notion of detour distance compatibility for signed graphs and later applying these concepts, we give yet another characterization of balance in signed graphs. Further, we discuss signed detour spectra of certain classes of unbalanced signed graphs.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41751958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-07DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004597
Matteo Alpino, Halvor Mehlum
ABSTRACT We propose a model that reconciles two aspects of social capital: social capital as reciprocal sharing of favors within a selected group vs. social capital as trust that lubricates transactions in societies. The core assumption is that individuals have productive potentials, e.g., innovations, that can not be put at use autonomously. However, individuals can associate in a club to match productive innovator-implementor dyads among the members. For a given club, allowing one new member has the effect of a) an increased pool of innovations and b) an increased pool of potential implementers. Whether a particular member supports the expansion of the club depends on whether she expects to be an implementor or an innovator. When expansion of membership is decided by vote, both small exclusive clubs and open clubs encompassing the whole society can emerge. The outcome depends both on the voting protocol, on the distribution of innovator and implementer skills, and on the maximal potential club size. Moreover, identical environments may generate multiple equilibrium club sizes. In which of these the society ends up depends on the initial conditions and on the voting protocol.
{"title":"Two notions of social capital","authors":"Matteo Alpino, Halvor Mehlum","doi":"10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.2021.2004597","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We propose a model that reconciles two aspects of social capital: social capital as reciprocal sharing of favors within a selected group vs. social capital as trust that lubricates transactions in societies. The core assumption is that individuals have productive potentials, e.g., innovations, that can not be put at use autonomously. However, individuals can associate in a club to match productive innovator-implementor dyads among the members. For a given club, allowing one new member has the effect of a) an increased pool of innovations and b) an increased pool of potential implementers. Whether a particular member supports the expansion of the club depends on whether she expects to be an implementor or an innovator. When expansion of membership is decided by vote, both small exclusive clubs and open clubs encompassing the whole society can emerge. The outcome depends both on the voting protocol, on the distribution of innovator and implementer skills, and on the maximal potential club size. Moreover, identical environments may generate multiple equilibrium club sizes. In which of these the society ends up depends on the initial conditions and on the voting protocol.","PeriodicalId":50139,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Sociology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47892273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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