Game-Theoretic Models of Coopetition in Cournot Oligopoly

Abstract

Coopetition means that in economic interactions, both competition and cooperation are presented in the same time. We built and investigated analytically and numerically game theoretic models of coopetition in normal form and in the form of characteristic function. The basic model in normal form reflects competition between firms in Cournot oligopoly and their cooperation in mutually profitable activities such as marketing, R&D, and environmental protection. Each firm divides its resource between competition and cooperation. In the model in normal form we study Nash and Stackelberg settings and compare the results. In cooperative setting we consider Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan versions of characteristic functions and calculate the respective Shapley values. The payoffs in all cases are compared, and the respective conclusions about the relative efficiency of different ways of organization for separate agents and the whole society are made.