Subpoena power and informational lobbying

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-27 DOI:10.1177/0951629819892339
Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him verifiable evidence about the desirability of implementing reforms they care about. The policymaker is access-constrained, that is, he lacks time/resources to scrutinize the evidence owned by all interest groups. The policymaker may also be agenda-constrained, that is, he may lack time/resources to reform all issues. We find that if a policymaker is agenda-constrained, then he is better off by having subpoena power. On the other hand, if a policymaker is not agenda-constrained, he can be worse off by having subpoena power. The key insight behind these findings is that subpoena power, while it increases the policymaker’s ability to acquire information from interest groups, it also alters the amount of information they voluntarily provide via lobbying, and that the net effect differs depending on whether or not the policymaker is agenda-constrained.
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传讯权和信息游说
本文研究了传讯权在使决策者做出更明智决策中的作用。我们特别考虑了传讯权对利益集团自愿提供的信息以及决策者通过传讯程序获得的信息的影响。为此,我们开发了一个信息游说模型,在这个模型中,利益集团寻求接触政策制定者,以便向他提供可验证的证据,证明实施他们所关心的改革的可取性。政策制定者是受限的,也就是说,他缺乏时间/资源来审查所有利益集团所拥有的证据。政策制定者也可能受到议程限制,也就是说,他可能缺乏时间/资源来改革所有问题。我们发现,如果政策制定者受到议程限制,那么他最好拥有传唤权。另一方面,如果政策制定者不受议程限制,那么拥有传讯权可能对他更不利。这些发现背后的关键见解是,传票权虽然增加了政策制定者从利益集团获取信息的能力,但也改变了他们通过游说自愿提供的信息量,而且净效应取决于政策制定者是否受到议程限制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Theoretical Politics
Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
10.00%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.
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