Pub Date : 2024-07-25DOI: 10.1177/09516298241266268
Carlo M. Horz, Jonghoon Lee
Sometimes, countries target immigration policies to citizens of authoritarian regimes with the goal of influencing these regimes’ politics. Which kinds of immigration rules are optimal anti-authoritarian policies and which trade-offs do policy-makers face? We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a destination country, an autocrat, and a citizen interact. The citizen can engage in protest and emigrate while the autocrat can redistribute and repress to counter these threats. A revolution occurs if the autocrat does not repress and the citizen protests. Policy-makers in destination countries anticipate that in equilibrium, a more permissive immigration policy reduces repression but also reduces protesting. Therefore, the optimal policy strikes a balance between these two effects. A concern for improving the citizen’s welfare renders policy more permissible while the desire to punish the autocrat has an ambiguous effect. Finally, we show that a revolution and large-scale emigration are difficult to achieve at the same time.
{"title":"A visa for a revolution? A theory of anti-authoritarian immigration policy","authors":"Carlo M. Horz, Jonghoon Lee","doi":"10.1177/09516298241266268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241266268","url":null,"abstract":"Sometimes, countries target immigration policies to citizens of authoritarian regimes with the goal of influencing these regimes’ politics. Which kinds of immigration rules are optimal anti-authoritarian policies and which trade-offs do policy-makers face? We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a destination country, an autocrat, and a citizen interact. The citizen can engage in protest and emigrate while the autocrat can redistribute and repress to counter these threats. A revolution occurs if the autocrat does not repress and the citizen protests. Policy-makers in destination countries anticipate that in equilibrium, a more permissive immigration policy reduces repression but also reduces protesting. Therefore, the optimal policy strikes a balance between these two effects. A concern for improving the citizen’s welfare renders policy more permissible while the desire to punish the autocrat has an ambiguous effect. Finally, we show that a revolution and large-scale emigration are difficult to achieve at the same time.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141803237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-23DOI: 10.1177/09516298241266267
Hun Chung, Brian Kogelmann
This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.
{"title":"Formal models in normative political theory","authors":"Hun Chung, Brian Kogelmann","doi":"10.1177/09516298241266267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241266267","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141812380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-03DOI: 10.1177/09516298241237218
Jack Paine
Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.
{"title":"A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing","authors":"Jack Paine","doi":"10.1177/09516298241237218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241237218","url":null,"abstract":"Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140747087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-27DOI: 10.1177/09516298241232655
Robert Powell
Democratic transitions, franchise extensions, and civil war settlements can often be seen as power-sharing agreements in which opposing factions try to use institutional structures to ‘lock in’ the terms of a settlement. But the commitment power inherent in institutions varies. When the institutional environment is weak and credibility is low, it is difficult for a powerful elite to tie its hands and give up power. This article studies a window-of-opportunity model in which an enfranchised elite faces a periodic threat. Institutional weakness is parameterized in terms of the elite’s marginal return to trying to undermine a power-sharing agreement. The analysis shows that (i) bargaining breaks down if the overall institutional environment is too weak and why it does; (ii) equilibrium agreements share more power with the opposition when the institutional environment is weak; (iii) there is a non-monotonic relation between power sharing and how often the opposition poses a threat; and (iv) power sharing is path dependent.
{"title":"Power sharing with weak institutions","authors":"Robert Powell","doi":"10.1177/09516298241232655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241232655","url":null,"abstract":"Democratic transitions, franchise extensions, and civil war settlements can often be seen as power-sharing agreements in which opposing factions try to use institutional structures to ‘lock in’ the terms of a settlement. But the commitment power inherent in institutions varies. When the institutional environment is weak and credibility is low, it is difficult for a powerful elite to tie its hands and give up power. This article studies a window-of-opportunity model in which an enfranchised elite faces a periodic threat. Institutional weakness is parameterized in terms of the elite’s marginal return to trying to undermine a power-sharing agreement. The analysis shows that (i) bargaining breaks down if the overall institutional environment is too weak and why it does; (ii) equilibrium agreements share more power with the opposition when the institutional environment is weak; (iii) there is a non-monotonic relation between power sharing and how often the opposition poses a threat; and (iv) power sharing is path dependent.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140375292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-24DOI: 10.1177/09516298241237209
P. Bils, Robert J. Carroll, Lawrence S. Rothenberg
Informal, ‘notice-and-comment’, rulemaking is the prototypical mechanism employed by US regulators. However, agencies frequently claim their actions exempt from the process, and courts typically agree. Agencies thus face an important strategic choice between informal rulemaking and avoidance. To study this choice, we analyze a model of rulemaking with exemption and empirically analyze agency avoidance. Our model implies that more biased agencies engage in less avoidance, as they face more skepticism from the courts and, thus, require support from group comments to have their rules upheld. Empirically, we find support for this prediction. As for policy implications, we show it is more beneficial to allow exemptions when the agency is more biased.
{"title":"Strategic avoidance and rulemaking procedures","authors":"P. Bils, Robert J. Carroll, Lawrence S. Rothenberg","doi":"10.1177/09516298241237209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241237209","url":null,"abstract":"Informal, ‘notice-and-comment’, rulemaking is the prototypical mechanism employed by US regulators. However, agencies frequently claim their actions exempt from the process, and courts typically agree. Agencies thus face an important strategic choice between informal rulemaking and avoidance. To study this choice, we analyze a model of rulemaking with exemption and empirically analyze agency avoidance. Our model implies that more biased agencies engage in less avoidance, as they face more skepticism from the courts and, thus, require support from group comments to have their rules upheld. Empirically, we find support for this prediction. As for policy implications, we show it is more beneficial to allow exemptions when the agency is more biased.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140386166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-28DOI: 10.1177/09516298241232654
Katsuzo Yamamoto
How close does a nation come to the brink of war with an opponent during the process of crisis bargaining? The present study constructs a new formal model focused on a challenger’s incentive to intensify military provocations against a defender that involve a trade-off between securing a more profitable bargaining outcome and increasing the risk of accidental war. This model identifies the conditions under which the defender’s threat of military coercion effectively deters the challenger from engaging in his payoff-maximizing level of provocations. The numerical simulations suggest that a military buildup by a nation can cause counterintuitive results, namely, the armament dilemma, depending on the balance of the marginal benefits and costs for participants and the effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile, a state’s military buildup always strengthens its own bargaining power relative to its opponent’s regardless of the occurrence of this dilemma; that is, the paradox of power does not arise.
{"title":"A new formal model analysis of deterrent to brinkmanship and the causes of the armament dilemma","authors":"Katsuzo Yamamoto","doi":"10.1177/09516298241232654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241232654","url":null,"abstract":"How close does a nation come to the brink of war with an opponent during the process of crisis bargaining? The present study constructs a new formal model focused on a challenger’s incentive to intensify military provocations against a defender that involve a trade-off between securing a more profitable bargaining outcome and increasing the risk of accidental war. This model identifies the conditions under which the defender’s threat of military coercion effectively deters the challenger from engaging in his payoff-maximizing level of provocations. The numerical simulations suggest that a military buildup by a nation can cause counterintuitive results, namely, the armament dilemma, depending on the balance of the marginal benefits and costs for participants and the effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile, a state’s military buildup always strengthens its own bargaining power relative to its opponent’s regardless of the occurrence of this dilemma; that is, the paradox of power does not arise.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140419297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1177/09516298231208419
Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, Hans H. Tung, Wen-Chin Wu
The emerging political economy literature on dictatorial media politics rationalizes the cross-country variation in media freedom by dictators’ demand for truthful information. Since a dictator can always punish the media for their truth-telling ex post, concerns of being punished could induce self-censorship and undermine the dictator’s promise to media freedom. We study a formal model that brings the dictator’s commitment problem to the fore, and characterize situations in which the commitment problem is especially severe. Our analysis suggests that neglecting self-censorship would lead to underestimating the amount of missing information in autocracies as well as overestimating the autocrats’ level of tolerance for criticisms and authoritarian responsiveness. Based on the comparative statics, we contend that the variation in media outlets’ quality and penetration can be leveraged to recover missing information due to self-censorship.
{"title":"Tell me the truth? Dictatorship and the commitment to media freedom","authors":"Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, Hans H. Tung, Wen-Chin Wu","doi":"10.1177/09516298231208419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231208419","url":null,"abstract":"The emerging political economy literature on dictatorial media politics rationalizes the cross-country variation in media freedom by dictators’ demand for truthful information. Since a dictator can always punish the media for their truth-telling ex post, concerns of being punished could induce self-censorship and undermine the dictator’s promise to media freedom. We study a formal model that brings the dictator’s commitment problem to the fore, and characterize situations in which the commitment problem is especially severe. Our analysis suggests that neglecting self-censorship would lead to underestimating the amount of missing information in autocracies as well as overestimating the autocrats’ level of tolerance for criticisms and authoritarian responsiveness. Based on the comparative statics, we contend that the variation in media outlets’ quality and penetration can be leveraged to recover missing information due to self-censorship.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136262765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1177/09516298231208412
Yohei Yamaguchi, Ken Yahagi
Why is criminal law enforcement increasingly punitive, despite that the situation has improved for decades? This paper investigates this question from the perspective of political misinformation. To this end, we develop a law enforcement model with political competition and examine how political parties’ campaigns affect voters’ perceptions of crime and equilibrium law enforcement policy. In a political campaign stage, we show that one political party has an incentive to overstate the severity of crime, while the other party has an incentive to correct voters’ beliefs. However, although the two parties attempt to change voters’ beliefs in opposite directions, we find that the total effect of a political campaign is more likely to drive both parties’ policies in a harsh direction.
{"title":"Law enforcement and political misinformation","authors":"Yohei Yamaguchi, Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1177/09516298231208412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231208412","url":null,"abstract":"Why is criminal law enforcement increasingly punitive, despite that the situation has improved for decades? This paper investigates this question from the perspective of political misinformation. To this end, we develop a law enforcement model with political competition and examine how political parties’ campaigns affect voters’ perceptions of crime and equilibrium law enforcement policy. In a political campaign stage, we show that one political party has an incentive to overstate the severity of crime, while the other party has an incentive to correct voters’ beliefs. However, although the two parties attempt to change voters’ beliefs in opposite directions, we find that the total effect of a political campaign is more likely to drive both parties’ policies in a harsh direction.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135730724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1177/09516298231203318
Stephane Wolton
Miscalculations due to lack of information are often seen as one of the main causes of war. Yet, a privately informed country has multiple channels to share information and avoid a costly conflict. I study three ways information can be transmitted – sunk cost signals, audience costs, and military build-up. In a fully decentralised setting, where the uninformed country can perfectly adjust its response to the information it learns, the three channels produce very different outcomes. Sunk cost signals never transmit any information. Information transmission is possible with audience costs when the uninformed country sufficiently values peace. With military build-up, information transmission occurs by accident. It is a by-product of the privately informed country’s attempt to increase its strength. I contrast these findings with the case of a constrained uninformed country that can only choose between a limited number of offers.
{"title":"Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict","authors":"Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.1177/09516298231203318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231203318","url":null,"abstract":"Miscalculations due to lack of information are often seen as one of the main causes of war. Yet, a privately informed country has multiple channels to share information and avoid a costly conflict. I study three ways information can be transmitted – sunk cost signals, audience costs, and military build-up. In a fully decentralised setting, where the uninformed country can perfectly adjust its response to the information it learns, the three channels produce very different outcomes. Sunk cost signals never transmit any information. Information transmission is possible with audience costs when the uninformed country sufficiently values peace. With military build-up, information transmission occurs by accident. It is a by-product of the privately informed country’s attempt to increase its strength. I contrast these findings with the case of a constrained uninformed country that can only choose between a limited number of offers.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135146528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1177/09516298231202424
Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber
Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model. Most importantly, our analysis is based on a novel concept of equilibrium that avoids the (often arbitrary) use of predetermined protocols. This allows us to endogenously predict not only the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, but also the order in which they will be addressed.
{"title":"(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns","authors":"Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber","doi":"10.1177/09516298231202424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231202424","url":null,"abstract":"Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model. Most importantly, our analysis is based on a novel concept of equilibrium that avoids the (often arbitrary) use of predetermined protocols. This allows us to endogenously predict not only the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, but also the order in which they will be addressed.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134958009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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