Appeasement, ad infinitum

R. Kelemen
{"title":"Appeasement, ad infinitum","authors":"R. Kelemen","doi":"10.1177/1023263X221097648","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Never underestimate the European Commission’s willingness to appease Europe’s pet autocrats. While the EU has made an impressive show of unity in standing up to the murderous dictator Vladimir Putin in response to his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders continue to refuse to stand up to the softer autocrats in their own ranks. The capacity of the von der Leyen Commission (and of Commissions before it) to contrive excuses for refusing to enforce the EU rule of law norms that all Member States have committed to respect is something awesome to behold. The excuses keep changing, but the procrastination and appeasement are consistent. Over the past decade we have seen successive Commissions draw – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – on an impressive panoply of excuses for their failure to defend the rule of law more robustly. These have included: lacking the necessary ‘tools’ to defend rule of law, needing to allow more time for ‘dialogue’ with backsliders, having to produce reports on rule of law in all Member States to show all were being treated equally, waiting for critical ECJ rulings and waiting for the resolution of a major crisis that must take priority over defending the rule of law – first it was the eurozone crisis, then the refugee crisis, then Brexit and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To be clear, all of these excuses were bogus: the EU had robust tools in place to defend rule of law all along and the creation of new tools was mostly used as excuse to delay action; producing toothless reports on rule of law in all Member States was pointless, and scofflaws claimed they were treated unequally in any case; suspending the application of EU regulations pending the outcome of ECJ rulings (i.e. in annulment actions such as Cases C-156/21 Hungary v. Parliament and Council and C-157/21 Poland v. Parliament and Council) is unlawful, and political crises are no excuse for suspending law enforcement. Indeed, it is deeply ironic that while Ukrainians are fighting and dying to defend democracy and the rule of law, the Commission is using the crisis as an excuse to abandon the defence of those very values.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"29 1","pages":"177 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X221097648","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Never underestimate the European Commission’s willingness to appease Europe’s pet autocrats. While the EU has made an impressive show of unity in standing up to the murderous dictator Vladimir Putin in response to his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders continue to refuse to stand up to the softer autocrats in their own ranks. The capacity of the von der Leyen Commission (and of Commissions before it) to contrive excuses for refusing to enforce the EU rule of law norms that all Member States have committed to respect is something awesome to behold. The excuses keep changing, but the procrastination and appeasement are consistent. Over the past decade we have seen successive Commissions draw – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – on an impressive panoply of excuses for their failure to defend the rule of law more robustly. These have included: lacking the necessary ‘tools’ to defend rule of law, needing to allow more time for ‘dialogue’ with backsliders, having to produce reports on rule of law in all Member States to show all were being treated equally, waiting for critical ECJ rulings and waiting for the resolution of a major crisis that must take priority over defending the rule of law – first it was the eurozone crisis, then the refugee crisis, then Brexit and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To be clear, all of these excuses were bogus: the EU had robust tools in place to defend rule of law all along and the creation of new tools was mostly used as excuse to delay action; producing toothless reports on rule of law in all Member States was pointless, and scofflaws claimed they were treated unequally in any case; suspending the application of EU regulations pending the outcome of ECJ rulings (i.e. in annulment actions such as Cases C-156/21 Hungary v. Parliament and Council and C-157/21 Poland v. Parliament and Council) is unlawful, and political crises are no excuse for suspending law enforcement. Indeed, it is deeply ironic that while Ukrainians are fighting and dying to defend democracy and the rule of law, the Commission is using the crisis as an excuse to abandon the defence of those very values.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
无休止的绥靖政策
永远不要低估欧盟委员会安抚欧洲宠儿独裁者的意愿。尽管欧盟在对抗凶残的独裁者弗拉基米尔·普京无端入侵乌克兰时表现出了令人印象深刻的团结,但欧盟领导人仍然拒绝对抗自己队伍中较为温和的独裁者。冯德莱恩委员会(及其之前的委员会)为拒绝执行所有成员国都承诺尊重的欧盟法治规范找借口的能力令人敬畏。借口不断变化,但拖延和绥靖是一致的。在过去十年中,我们看到历届委员会——有时明确,有时含蓄地——为未能更有力地捍卫法治找了一系列令人印象深刻的借口。这些问题包括:缺乏捍卫法治的必要“工具”,需要留出更多时间与倒退者进行“对话”,必须编写关于所有会员国法治的报告,以表明所有会员国都受到平等对待,等待欧洲法院的关键裁决,等待必须优先于捍卫法治的重大危机的解决——首先是欧元区危机,然后是难民危机,然后英国脱欧,现在是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。需要明确的是,所有这些借口都是假的:欧盟一直以来都有强有力的工具来捍卫法治,而新工具的创建大多被用作拖延行动的借口;编写关于所有会员国法治的无效力报告毫无意义,藐视法律者声称他们在任何情况下都受到不平等待遇;在欧洲法院裁决结果出来之前暂停适用欧盟法规(即在C-156/21匈牙利诉议会和理事会案和C-157/21波兰诉议会和委员会案等废除行动中)是非法的,政治危机不能成为暂停执法的借口。事实上,极具讽刺意味的是,当乌克兰人正在为捍卫民主和法治而战斗和牺牲时,委员会却以这场危机为借口,放弃捍卫这些价值观。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊最新文献
Non-contractual liability of the EU: Need for a ‘diligent’ administrator test The European Arrest Warrant and the protection of the best interests of the child: The Court's last word on the limits of mutual recognition and the evolving obligations of national judicial authorities OP v. Commune d’Ans: When equality, intersectionality and state neutrality collide DPA independence and ‘indirect’ access – illusory in Belgium, France and Germany? Chilling effect: Turning the poison into an antidote for fundamental rights in Europe
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1