Pub Date : 2024-08-09DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241273948
P. Nicolaides
{"title":"Non-contractual liability of the EU: Need for a ‘diligent’ administrator test","authors":"P. Nicolaides","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241273948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241273948","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"42 45","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141924271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-13DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241259311
Stefano Montaldo
The annotation analyses the recent CJEU preliminary ruling in the GN case, the latest chapter of the EAW effectiveness vs fundamental rights protection saga. The Court confirms that, in principle, considerations related to the best interests of the child can justify denial of execution of an EAW. However, this limitation can be triggered solely through the demanding Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. By taking this stance, the Court refuses to add a new category of exceptions to mutual recognition. In addition, based on its ever-refined case law, the Court fine-grains the obligations incumbent upon the national judicial authorities with respect to the conduct of direct exchanges of information and seems to advocate for a new obligation for the issuing judicial authority to refrain from using the EAW system when the circumstances of a case make refusal of surrender a highly likely option.
注释分析了欧盟法院最近在 GN 案中的初步裁决，该案是欧洲逮捕令有效性与基本权利保护传奇的最新一章。法院确认，原则上，与儿童最大利益相关的考虑因素可作为拒绝执行逮捕令的正当理由。然而，这一限制只能通过苛刻的阿兰约西（Aranyosi）和卡尔德拉鲁（Căldăraru）测试来触发。通过采取这一立场，法院拒绝为相互承认增加新的例外类别。此外，根据其不断完善的判例法，法院细化了国家司法当局在进行直接信息交流方面的义务，并似乎主张在案件的具体情况使拒绝移交成为极有可能的选择时，签发引渡令的司法当局有新的义务避免使用引渡令制度。
{"title":"The European Arrest Warrant and the protection of the best interests of the child: The Court's last word on the limits of mutual recognition and the evolving obligations of national judicial authorities","authors":"Stefano Montaldo","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241259311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241259311","url":null,"abstract":"The annotation analyses the recent CJEU preliminary ruling in the GN case, the latest chapter of the EAW effectiveness vs fundamental rights protection saga. The Court confirms that, in principle, considerations related to the best interests of the child can justify denial of execution of an EAW. However, this limitation can be triggered solely through the demanding Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. By taking this stance, the Court refuses to add a new category of exceptions to mutual recognition. In addition, based on its ever-refined case law, the Court fine-grains the obligations incumbent upon the national judicial authorities with respect to the conduct of direct exchanges of information and seems to advocate for a new obligation for the issuing judicial authority to refrain from using the EAW system when the circumstances of a case make refusal of surrender a highly likely option.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"95 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141347711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-13DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241260739
Nozizwe Dube
In OP v. Commune d’Ans, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that exclusive neutrality policies in public administrations do not constitute indirect religious discrimination provided that the policies are appropriate, necessary and proportionate in light of the context and interests at stake. This is the first headscarf case concerning a public administration. Consequently, the state neutrality principle was of importance in this judgment. Additionally, OP v. Commune d’Ans reawakened the urgent question of intersectional discrimination as the CJEU was asked whether exclusive neutrality policies constitute indirect gender discrimination, seeing as they disproportionately affect women. In Parris, the CJEU rejected the possibility of acknowledging intersectional discrimination. Though headscarf cases raise the intersectionality question, the CJEU has not revisited it. This case note discusses how while the CJEU managed to accommodate different iterations of the state neutrality principle by introducing a margin of discretion for diverse neutrality policies in OP v. Commune d’Ans, it fell short in safeguarding the general framework for equal treatment by disregarding how the conceptualization of state neutrality also impacts gender equality. A different reading of Directive 2000/78 that foregrounds this instrument's connection to the EU's gender equality directives would have enabled such an intersectional approach.
在 OP v. Commune d'Ans 一案中，欧盟法院（CJEU）认为，公共行政部门的排他性中立政策并不构成间接宗教歧视，条件是这些政策在相关背景和利益方面是适当、必要和相称的。这是第一起涉及公共行政部门的头巾案。因此，国家中立原则在本判决中具有重要意义。此外，OP v. Commune d'Ans 案唤醒了交叉歧视这一紧迫问题，因为欧盟法院被问及，鉴于排他性中立政策对妇女的影响过大，这些政策是否构成间接性别歧视。在 Parris 案中，欧盟法院拒绝承认交叉歧视的可能性。尽管头巾案提出了交叉性问题，但欧盟法院并未重新讨论这一问题。本案例说明讨论了欧盟法院是如何通过在 OP v. Commune d'Ans 一案中为不同的中立政策引入自由裁量权来适应国家中立原则的不同迭代的，但却忽略了国家中立的概念化也会对性别平等产生影响，从而未能保障平等待遇的总体框架。如果对第 2000/78 号指令进行不同的解读，强调该文书与欧盟性别平等指令之间的联系，就可以采用这种交叉方法。
{"title":"OP v. Commune d’Ans: When equality, intersectionality and state neutrality collide","authors":"Nozizwe Dube","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241260739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241260739","url":null,"abstract":"In OP v. Commune d’Ans, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that exclusive neutrality policies in public administrations do not constitute indirect religious discrimination provided that the policies are appropriate, necessary and proportionate in light of the context and interests at stake. This is the first headscarf case concerning a public administration. Consequently, the state neutrality principle was of importance in this judgment. Additionally, OP v. Commune d’Ans reawakened the urgent question of intersectional discrimination as the CJEU was asked whether exclusive neutrality policies constitute indirect gender discrimination, seeing as they disproportionately affect women. In Parris, the CJEU rejected the possibility of acknowledging intersectional discrimination. Though headscarf cases raise the intersectionality question, the CJEU has not revisited it. This case note discusses how while the CJEU managed to accommodate different iterations of the state neutrality principle by introducing a margin of discretion for diverse neutrality policies in OP v. Commune d’Ans, it fell short in safeguarding the general framework for equal treatment by disregarding how the conceptualization of state neutrality also impacts gender equality. A different reading of Directive 2000/78 that foregrounds this instrument's connection to the EU's gender equality directives would have enabled such an intersectional approach.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"56 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141347778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241237688
Diana Dimitrova, P. De Hert
Directive 2016/680 provides for two procedures for the exercise of the rights of access to one's data: a direct one (that is, directly against the law enforcement authority) and an ‘indirect’ one, in which the responsible Data Protection Authority (DPA) exercises the right of access of the data subject against the law enforcement authority which refused the direct access, including by carrying out a legality check on the data processing of the personal data of the individual requesting access. The recent judgment in Ligue des droits humains ASBL treated the question of the powers of DPAs in the framework of this procedure, amongst others, as a matter of DPA independence. Existing literature has observed that the implementing laws of three Member States – Belgium, France and Germany – severely restrict the powers of the DPAs when these perform the ‘indirect’ right of access, for example to carry out the legality check and inform the individuals of the results of the check. In the this article we will argue that these national restrictions constitute an unjustified interference with the requirement on DPA independence in EU data protection law, including in Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
{"title":"DPA independence and ‘indirect’ access – illusory in Belgium, France and Germany?","authors":"Diana Dimitrova, P. De Hert","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241237688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241237688","url":null,"abstract":"Directive 2016/680 provides for two procedures for the exercise of the rights of access to one's data: a direct one (that is, directly against the law enforcement authority) and an ‘indirect’ one, in which the responsible Data Protection Authority (DPA) exercises the right of access of the data subject against the law enforcement authority which refused the direct access, including by carrying out a legality check on the data processing of the personal data of the individual requesting access. The recent judgment in Ligue des droits humains ASBL treated the question of the powers of DPAs in the framework of this procedure, amongst others, as a matter of DPA independence. Existing literature has observed that the implementing laws of three Member States – Belgium, France and Germany – severely restrict the powers of the DPAs when these perform the ‘indirect’ right of access, for example to carry out the legality check and inform the individuals of the results of the check. In the this article we will argue that these national restrictions constitute an unjustified interference with the requirement on DPA independence in EU data protection law, including in Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140655233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241239019
Mohor Fajdiga
In the famous case of Baka v. Hungary, Judge Sicilianos proposed that the European Court of Human Rights should recognize a subjective right for judges to have their individual independence safeguarded and respected by the State. Such a reading of Article 6 of the Convention would enable national judges to claim a violation of that provision each time their individual independence is interfered with. It would also allow the Court to address one of the critical blind spots in the Convention system. However, the Court left the proposal dormant until recently. It is now put before the parties in three pending cases. This article argues that the Court should seize the opportunity to enhance the protection of judicial independence, but not by employing the proposed subjective right approach. Instead, it should rely on the better alternative: the chilling effect. Such an approach would enable the Court to fill the gaps in the Convention while remaining faithful to the text and avoiding the impression that judicial independence is a privilege of judges.
{"title":"Chilling effect: Turning the poison into an antidote for fundamental rights in Europe","authors":"Mohor Fajdiga","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241239019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241239019","url":null,"abstract":"In the famous case of Baka v. Hungary, Judge Sicilianos proposed that the European Court of Human Rights should recognize a subjective right for judges to have their individual independence safeguarded and respected by the State. Such a reading of Article 6 of the Convention would enable national judges to claim a violation of that provision each time their individual independence is interfered with. It would also allow the Court to address one of the critical blind spots in the Convention system. However, the Court left the proposal dormant until recently. It is now put before the parties in three pending cases. This article argues that the Court should seize the opportunity to enhance the protection of judicial independence, but not by employing the proposed subjective right approach. Instead, it should rely on the better alternative: the chilling effect. Such an approach would enable the Court to fill the gaps in the Convention while remaining faithful to the text and avoiding the impression that judicial independence is a privilege of judges.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"42 39","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140656955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-22DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241248474
Christine Carter
Automated decision-making systems are commonly used by human resources to automate recruitment decisions. Most automated decision-making systems utilize machine learning to screen, assess, and give recommendations on candidates. Algorithmic bias and prejudice are common side-effects of these technologies that result in data-driven discrimination. However, proof of this is often unavailable due to the statistical complexities and operational opacities of machine learning, which interferes with the abilities of complainants to meet the requisite causal requirements of the EU equality directives. In direct discrimination, the use of machine learning prevents complainants from demonstrating a prima facie case. In indirect discrimination, the problems mainly manifest once the burden has shifted to the respondent, and causation operates as a quasi-defence by reference to objectively justified factors unrelated to the discrimination. This paper argues that causation must be understood as an informational challenge that can be addressed in three ways. First, through the fundamental rights lens of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Second, through data protection measures such as the General Data Protection Regulation. Third, the article also considers the future liabilities that may arise under incoming legislation such as the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive proposal.
{"title":"Why the algorithmic recruiter discriminates: The causal challenges of data-driven discrimination","authors":"Christine Carter","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241248474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241248474","url":null,"abstract":"Automated decision-making systems are commonly used by human resources to automate recruitment decisions. Most automated decision-making systems utilize machine learning to screen, assess, and give recommendations on candidates. Algorithmic bias and prejudice are common side-effects of these technologies that result in data-driven discrimination. However, proof of this is often unavailable due to the statistical complexities and operational opacities of machine learning, which interferes with the abilities of complainants to meet the requisite causal requirements of the EU equality directives. In direct discrimination, the use of machine learning prevents complainants from demonstrating a prima facie case. In indirect discrimination, the problems mainly manifest once the burden has shifted to the respondent, and causation operates as a quasi-defence by reference to objectively justified factors unrelated to the discrimination. This paper argues that causation must be understood as an informational challenge that can be addressed in three ways. First, through the fundamental rights lens of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Second, through data protection measures such as the General Data Protection Regulation. Third, the article also considers the future liabilities that may arise under incoming legislation such as the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive proposal.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"29 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140677636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-22DOI: 10.1177/1023263x241226748
{"title":"Withdrawn —Administrative Duplicate Publication— Judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy by the ECtHR and the (re)negotiation on the accession of the EU to the ECHR","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/1023263x241226748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x241226748","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"6 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140677945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-17DOI: 10.1177/1023263x231220897
Javier Escobar Veas
In de Legé v. the Netherlands, a decision characterized as a key case, the ECtHR addressed once again the problematic relationship between the right against self-incrimination and the compelled production of real or physical evidence. In its judgment, the Court held that the use of the evidence submitted by the defendant to the authorities does not fall within the scope of the right against self-incrimination when the evidence in question concerns pre-existing documents of whose existence the authorities were already aware. By developing this argument, the European Court has adopted a line of reasoning similar to the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine of the United States Supreme Court. This article aims to critically analyse the decision of the ECtHR. It will be argued that the ECtHR does not sufficiently support its reasoning. Moreover, it does not take into account the rationale of the right against self-incrimination, which, as will be stated, can be considered opposed to the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine, at least in the European context.
在 de Legé 诉荷兰案这一被称为关键案件的裁决中，欧洲人权法院再次讨论了免于自证其罪的权利与强制提供实物或物证之间的关系问题。法院在判决中认为，如果有关证据涉及当局已经知道其存在的先前存在的文件，则使用被告向当局提交的证据不属于免于自证其罪的权利的范围。通过提出这一论点，欧洲法院采用了与美国最高法院的 "前定结论 "理论类似的推理思路。本文旨在对欧洲人权法院的裁决进行批判性分析。本文将论证欧洲人权法院没有充分支持其推理。此外，它没有考虑到反对自证其罪权利的基本原理，正如本文将指出的，至少在欧洲范围内，反对自证其罪权利可被视为与 "前定结论 "理论相对立。
{"title":"De Legé v. the Netherlands: The ECtHR adopts a line of reasoning similar to that of the United States Supreme Court on compelled production of real or physical evidence","authors":"Javier Escobar Veas","doi":"10.1177/1023263x231220897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231220897","url":null,"abstract":"In de Legé v. the Netherlands, a decision characterized as a key case, the ECtHR addressed once again the problematic relationship between the right against self-incrimination and the compelled production of real or physical evidence. In its judgment, the Court held that the use of the evidence submitted by the defendant to the authorities does not fall within the scope of the right against self-incrimination when the evidence in question concerns pre-existing documents of whose existence the authorities were already aware. By developing this argument, the European Court has adopted a line of reasoning similar to the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine of the United States Supreme Court. This article aims to critically analyse the decision of the ECtHR. It will be argued that the ECtHR does not sufficiently support its reasoning. Moreover, it does not take into account the rationale of the right against self-incrimination, which, as will be stated, can be considered opposed to the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine, at least in the European context.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"356 2‐3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138966578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-15DOI: 10.1177/1023263x231217107
Remgijus Jokubauskas
A fresh start is the essence of personal insolvency proceedings. In the last few decades, policymakers in the United States of America and European countries have focused on establishing effective and efficient insolvency proceedings which would address the particular needs of insolvent natural persons. Previously, personal insolvency proceedings aimed to address the social and economic problems of insolvent debtors (consumers) which were not able to meet their financial obligations in time. However, the latest developments in this area reveal that specific rules should be established in insolvency law to tackle the insolvency problems of individuals who incur most of their debts from economic activities (entrepreneurs’ insolvency). The adoption of the Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency is the first attempt in European Union law to counter the challenges of the insolvency of entrepreneurs. This article analyses the main elements of a fresh start in European Union insolvency law, how this phenomenon has evolved and whether the European Union insolvency law provides an effective fresh start for insolvent entrepreneurs.
{"title":"The concept of a fresh start in the discharge of debt procedure in European Union insolvency law","authors":"Remgijus Jokubauskas","doi":"10.1177/1023263x231217107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231217107","url":null,"abstract":"A fresh start is the essence of personal insolvency proceedings. In the last few decades, policymakers in the United States of America and European countries have focused on establishing effective and efficient insolvency proceedings which would address the particular needs of insolvent natural persons. Previously, personal insolvency proceedings aimed to address the social and economic problems of insolvent debtors (consumers) which were not able to meet their financial obligations in time. However, the latest developments in this area reveal that specific rules should be established in insolvency law to tackle the insolvency problems of individuals who incur most of their debts from economic activities (entrepreneurs’ insolvency). The adoption of the Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency is the first attempt in European Union law to counter the challenges of the insolvency of entrepreneurs. This article analyses the main elements of a fresh start in European Union insolvency law, how this phenomenon has evolved and whether the European Union insolvency law provides an effective fresh start for insolvent entrepreneurs.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"49 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138995924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-10DOI: 10.1177/1023263x231217984
E. Kassoti
The coming of age of the EU as a global actor and the proliferation of its activities on the international plane entail that its courts are increasingly faced with complex and politically laden questions pertaining to territorial entities whose international legal status is far from clear. The EU's engagement with Kosovo is a salient example. Due to strong opposition by some Member States, the EU has not recognized Kosovo as an independent State, but it has developed a policy of engagement therewith. However, this pragmatic approach does not resolve the underlying political tensions and legal questions arising from the EU's dealings with non-recognized territorial entities, as Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo) attests to. The judgment is significant: (a) for the EU's growing engagement with non-recognized territorial entities since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of ‘third country’ and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies; (b) for the EU's engagement with Kosovo – particularly in the light of Kosovo's 2022 bid for EU membership; and (c) more broadly, for answering institutional questions pertaining to third-country participation in EU agencies.
{"title":"The EU and non-recognized territorial entities – the CJEU's judgment in Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo","authors":"E. Kassoti","doi":"10.1177/1023263x231217984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231217984","url":null,"abstract":"The coming of age of the EU as a global actor and the proliferation of its activities on the international plane entail that its courts are increasingly faced with complex and politically laden questions pertaining to territorial entities whose international legal status is far from clear. The EU's engagement with Kosovo is a salient example. Due to strong opposition by some Member States, the EU has not recognized Kosovo as an independent State, but it has developed a policy of engagement therewith. However, this pragmatic approach does not resolve the underlying political tensions and legal questions arising from the EU's dealings with non-recognized territorial entities, as Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo) attests to. The judgment is significant: (a) for the EU's growing engagement with non-recognized territorial entities since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of ‘third country’ and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies; (b) for the EU's engagement with Kosovo – particularly in the light of Kosovo's 2022 bid for EU membership; and (c) more broadly, for answering institutional questions pertaining to third-country participation in EU agencies.","PeriodicalId":39672,"journal":{"name":"Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law","volume":"21 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138982117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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