Book reviews

Abstract

An examination of the origins of Gallipoli, or rather, the Dardanelles operation, is long overdue. Most Anglophone histories have focused on the fighting and dying on the beachheads, notably the Anzac experience, the failure of the campaign and its consequences. Although the planning of the operation has received some attention, its origin and motivations have seldom been analysed. This study by naval historian Nicholas Lambert is therefore welcome. Lambert’s book of 2012, Planning Armageddon, caused quite a splash in the calm waters of the history of British strategy. Many reviewers were fulsome in their praise. Some, however, raised serious doubts about the consistency of Lambert’s central thesis and his methodology. Above all, his argument that Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and the Admiralty believed that economic warfare would be a ‘fast-acting’ strategy to defeat Germany – a ‘British Schlieffen Plan’ – has come in for sustained criticism, not only for its lack of cogency, but also its lack of historical evidence. If such a plan for a lightning strike existed, no one in authority, such as the Prime Minister or the First Sea Lord, knew of it. Moreover, several arguments were flawed by internal contradictions, for example, in relation to policy towards neutral states, and misinterpretations based on misreading of sources. Portions of documents are quoted when they support his thesis; other portions of the same document that contradict it are omitted. The assertion that the