Richard Rorty's realism

IF 0.4 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY METAPHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-23 DOI:10.1111/meta.12623
William James Earle
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Abstract

An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K.

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理查德·罗蒂的现实主义
对晚期罗蒂的考察表明,他并没有放弃对外部世界的信念,我们能够,而且确实必须,获得关于这个世界的知识。他对对应真理理论的反对并不包括除了当地天气以外的任何事物都可以证伪有关当地天气的评论。只是,一旦我们看完窗外,或者如果我们在外面,感觉到正确的水滴与我们的皮肤接触,我们就没有别的办法,没有更好的办法,让自己更确定,更认知安全。我们可以从促成科学进步的细致工作中看到这一点。科学通过做更多相同的事情来改进自己。摩尔(G. E. Moore)著名的开放性问题一直存在,只是为了提醒我们,我们的错误永远不会消失,我们的认知安全性永远不会比事前更好。作为一个忠实的实用主义者和非教条主义的改良主义者,罗蒂认为这完全没问题
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来源期刊
METAPHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
期刊最新文献
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