Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered

IF 0.5 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2021-05-04 DOI:10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989
K. Büttner
{"title":"Truth in Virtue of Meaning Reconsidered","authors":"K. Büttner","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Papers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1969989","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
重新思考意义中的真理
摘要实证主义者仅凭意义将分析性定义为真理,并主张这样定义的分析性概念与先验真理和必要真理的概念都是广泛的。由于许多原因,这种分析性的概念如今被认为是站不住脚的,关于先验真理和必要真理的相关学说几乎被一致拒绝。反对这一共识,我认为,如果正确理解,实证主义者对分析/综合区别的说法是可以辩护的。此外,我将对他们关于先验真理和必要真理的语言学说提出部分和有条件的辩护。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Philosophical Papers
Philosophical Papers PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: Philosophical Papers is an international, generalist journal of philosophy edited in South Africa Original Articles: Articles appearing in regular issues are original, high-quality, and stand-alone, and are written for the general professional philosopher. Submissions are welcome in any area of philosophy and undergo a process of peer review based on initial editor screening and refereeing by (usually) two referees. Special Issues: Topic-based special issues are comprised of both invited and submitted papers selected by guest editors. Recent special issues have included ''Philosophy''s Therapeutic Potential'' (2014, editor Dylan Futter); ''Aging and the Elderly'' (2012, editors Tom Martin and Samantha Vice); ''The Problem of the Criterion'' (2011, editor Mark Nelson); ''Retributive Emotions'' (2010, editor Lucy Allais); ‘Rape and its Meaning/s’ (2009, editor Louise du Toit). Calls for papers for upcoming special issues can be found here. Ideas for future special issues are welcome.
期刊最新文献
Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy Sartrean Magic and the Impossibility of Death Decolonising Philosophy Hostile Scaffolding Development and Modernity in Africa: An Intercultural Philosophical Perspective
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1