‘Tribal balancing’: exclusionary elite coalitions and Zambia’s 2021 elections

Abstract

ABSTRACT Presidents have access to a range of resources unavailable to challengers, and often the most important are derived from control of the state. This allows incumbents to build more inclusive elite coalitions, distribute clientelist resources to their political base and co-opt opposition politicians. Cabinet and government appointments are some of the most visible, direct and identifiable indications of elite accommodation, and African presidents are more likely to build inclusive coalitions to ensure their survival. In Zambia, balanced regional representation – popularly known as “tribal balancing” – has held an important place in the public imagination. But between 2015 and 2021, rather than using incumbent advantage to build an ethnically inclusive alliance, President Lungu used cabinet appointments and senior government positions to shore up his base. This was bolstered by an exclusionary campaign that focused on the opposition leader’s ethnicity to push the PF’s base to vote against the opposition. This article uses an analysis of cabinet appointments and coverage of the election campaign to illustrate how Lungu sought to build an exclusionary coalition and exacerbate ethnic cleavages. This contributes to debates on when and why elites might use exclusionary strategies, and when they might fail to produce the desired outcome.