Effect of Composition of Board and Promoter Group Retained Ownership on Underpricing of Indian IPO firms: An Empirical Study

Abstract

Abstract The present empirical investigation is an addition to the existing extant literature available on the issue of initial public offering (IPO) which sees its inherent anomaly of underpricing by linking it to some of under-researched dimensions of corporate governance in the emerging economy of India. This study incorporates about 443 Indian IPO firms with their board composition and ownership retained by promoter group post IPO being primary variables of focus which are obtained from respective prospectuses of such firms. Like many previous studies, this study also keeps signalling theory as base, and findings show that only interlocking of directors among all the board variables has a significant and negative relation with underpricing. Significant relation of ownership concentration in hands of promoter group with underpricing shows that it is considered as a signal by investors assisting them in gauging safety of their minority interests. Findings show that too high insiders’ ownership alignment of interest between promoters and minority holders turn into risk of entrenchment by initial investors, that is, promoters as perceived by investors.