What Do We Need to Know?

Q1 Arts and Humanities The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Pub Date : 2018-08-08 DOI:10.5325/JAYNRANDSTUD.18.1.0118
R. Campbell
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

ABSTRACT:How We Know is intended as a summary (and a modest extension) of Objectivist epistemology. Binswanger’s treatment of a wide range of epistemological issues is examined. Because his theory of propositions is inadequate and his philosophy of mind is an extreme form of dualism, Binswanger has added little to previous efforts by “official” Objectivists. As a work of epistemology in the broad sense, Binswanger’s effort is fatally impaired. It is undone by his bifurcation between consciousness and the physics of the brain, which, if accepted, would largely deprive psychology and even computer science of their subject matter.
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我们需要知道什么?
摘要:《我们如何知道》是对客观主义认识论的总结(以及适度的延伸)。宾斯旺格对广泛的认识论问题的处理进行了审查。因为他的命题理论是不充分的,他的心灵哲学是二元论的一种极端形式,宾斯旺格对“官方”客观主义者之前的努力几乎没有贡献。作为广义的认识论著作,宾斯旺格的努力受到了致命的损害。他把意识和大脑的物理学分开,如果被接受,这将在很大程度上剥夺心理学甚至计算机科学的研究对象。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Arts and Humanities-Literature and Literary Theory
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
期刊介绍: The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Foundation has entered into an electronic licensing relationship with EBSCO Publishing, the world"s most prolific aggregator of full-text journals, magazines, and other sources. The full text of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies can be found on EBSCO Publishing"s databases. A nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of Ayn Rand and her times. The journal is not aligned with any advocacy group, institute, or person. It welcomes papers from every discipline and from a variety of interpretive and critical perspectives. It aims to foster scholarly dialogue through a respectful exchange of ideas. The journal is published semi-annually, in the fall and the spring.
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