Leo Strauss on Religion as the Fundamental Alternative to Philosophy

Q2 Arts and Humanities Roczniki Filozoficzne Pub Date : 2023-06-28 DOI:10.18290/rf237102.15
W. Wood
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Abstract

Leo Strauss is well known for his thesis that there is an irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and “revelation,” i.e. monotheistic revealed religion, which cannot be harmonized. The philosopher qua philosopher cannot be a believer, while the believer qua believer cannot be a philosopher. However, it is less widely recognized that Strauss’ thought about religion as the fundamental alternative to philosophy follows two divergent trajectories. The first emphasizes the unique importance of revealed religion, while the other emphasizes the conflict between philosophy and what he calls “religion in general.” Sometimes, Strauss suggests that revelation poses a unique “challenge” to philosophy, such that the philosopher must refute the mere possibility of revelation in order to justify the legitimacy of philosophy itself. Sometimes, however, he suggests rather that revelation is a religion like any other, not essentially different from e.g. ancient polytheism, which would seem therefore to pose no unique “challenge.” I argue that Strauss ultimately fails to reconcile these two strands of this thought and that this failure is related both to tensions internal to his positive conception of philosophy itself as a middle path between dogmatism and skepticism and to the fact that he begs the question by assuming, rather than proving, that it follows necessarily from “the very idea of revelation” that it cannot be harmonized with philosophy.
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李奥。施特劳斯论宗教是哲学的基本替代
利奥·施特劳斯以他的论点而闻名,他认为哲学与“启示”之间存在不可调和的冲突,即一神论的启示宗教,这是无法调和的。哲学家作为哲学家不能成为信徒,而信徒作为信徒不能成为哲学家。然而,很少有人认识到,施特劳斯关于宗教作为哲学的基本替代的思想遵循着两条不同的轨迹。前者强调启示宗教的独特重要性,而后者则强调哲学与他所谓的“一般宗教”之间的冲突。有时,施特劳斯认为,启示对哲学提出了独特的“挑战”,因此,哲学家必须驳斥启示的纯粹可能性,以证明哲学本身的合法性。然而,有时他更倾向于认为,启示是一种宗教,就像其他宗教一样,与古代的多神教没有本质上的不同,因此似乎没有独特的“挑战”。我认为施特劳斯最终未能调和这种思想的这两条线,这种失败既与他将哲学本身作为教条主义和怀疑主义之间的中间道路的积极概念内部的紧张关系有关,也与他通过假设(而不是证明)必然遵循“启示的概念”来回避问题的事实有关,即它不能与哲学协调一致。
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来源期刊
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Roczniki Filozoficzne Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Annals of Philosophy is one of the oldest philosophical journals in Poland (since 1948). It is published four times per year in both the online and traditional ways. The journal aims to publish the best original research papers in philosophy, as well as translations, reviews, accounts and polemics.
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