首页 > 最新文献

Roczniki Filozoficzne最新文献

英文 中文
Odsłonić źródłowe doświadczenie nadziejności 揭开希望的源头体验
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.9
Michał Płóciennik
{"title":"Odsłonić źródłowe doświadczenie nadziejności","authors":"Michał Płóciennik","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"36 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception 天真现实主义在罗素不断变化的知觉论中的地位
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.2
Leopold Stubenberg
In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version ‎of representative realism.  (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎
在本文中,我描述了天真现实主义在罗素不断变化的知觉论述中的地位。我论证了以下结论:(1)早期,1898-1910 年:我倾向于认为,罗素早期热情拥抱的天真现实主义可能并不是作为关于知觉的天真现实主义,而是作为形而上学或语义学的论题。(2) 《哲学问题》(1912 年):罗素放弃了天真的现实主义(如果事实上他曾经坚持过的话),提出了代表现实主义的感性数据版本。 (3) 《论物质》(1912 年):在这里,我们看到了罗素为捍卫某种非常接近于天真现实主义标准学说的东西所做的最佳尝试。感知的对象--"日常的物质对象,如毛毛虫和凯迪拉克"--当然经过了严格的重构。但最终的画面确实体现了这一学说的精神。(4) 从1914年到1927年:虽然罗素关于知觉的思想在这一时期发生了一些重大变化--感觉基准论被中性一元论所取代--但我试图表明,物理学问题与常识问题之间的区别是罗素不断变化的观点的一个恒定特征。我认为,我们的知觉关系--常识之物(如罗素在逻辑上重建的那样)--可以被视为一种有限的天真现实主义。(5) 1927 年之后的时期:常识之物不再是罗素关于我们对世界的感知通路的论述的特征。我们感知的事物是位于我们私人空间中的知觉。这些感知的唯一物质对象是我们的大脑。所有其他的物质对象都超出了我们的感知范围,只能通过推理才能获得。这就是罗素关于知觉的论述中任何类似于传统的天真现实主义观点的终结。
{"title":"The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception","authors":"Leopold Stubenberg","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.2","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version ‎of representative realism.  (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"13 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140375623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Get Real! Editorial Introduction 真实!编辑导言
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.1
J. Jarocki
{"title":"Get Real! Editorial Introduction","authors":"J. Jarocki","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"20 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140375591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What is Real in Virtual Reality? 虚拟现实中的真实是什么?
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.5
P. Grabarczyk
The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they should be treated as models or simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization.
本文讨论了戴维-查尔默斯(David Chalmers)在其论文《虚拟与现实》(2017)中提出的虚拟现实论。在此,我提出了一个更强有力的版本,我称之为 "虚拟物理主义"。根据这一观点,虚拟对象不仅是真实的,而且是物理的,因为它们与运行 VR 软件的计算机的物理状态相同。我认为,虚拟物体应具有与玩具类似的本体论地位--它们应被视为普通物体的模型或简化。就像玩具一样,虚拟物品有时也可以很好地替代普通物品。在这种情况下,虚拟物体开始被视为同类物体的实例。在本文的最后一部分,我使用约翰-惠给加(Johan Huizinga)的 "魔力圈 "概念来说明不同的物体如何能够成功地 "虚拟化",即移动到数字领域,同时保持与其非虚拟对应物的同类物体。我认为,一旦虚拟现实成为永久性的,并与非虚拟现实产生因果联系,这种情况就会发生。在本文的最后,我列举了自然类物体和个人的例子,它们似乎是最难成功虚拟化的。
{"title":"What is Real in Virtual Reality?","authors":"P. Grabarczyk","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.5","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they should be treated as models or simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140377602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Czy mówienie o „demokracji” ma sens? O inżynierii pojęciowej w praktyce 谈论 "民主 "有意义吗?关于实践中的概念工程
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.8
Artur Kosecki
{"title":"Czy mówienie o „demokracji” ma sens? O inżynierii pojęciowej w praktyce","authors":"Artur Kosecki","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"58 27","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology 激进的传统主义和铰链认识论
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.4
Adam Grobler
In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges.
在本文中,我探讨了在阿吉杜凯维奇的激进传统主义的更新版本中可以找到的一些提示,这些提示可能有助于解决铰链认识论中的一些争议,铰链认识论是援引维特根斯坦关于知识的无根据的观点的一系列立场。特别是,我对铰链的实用性和超验性证明之间是否存在真正的区别提出了疑问,我反对认识论上的不相干主义,我主张在由特定铰链决定的语境中对真理进行反现实主义的解读,同时保留真理的经典概念,将其作为知识的规范性理念,支配着铰链的可能修正。
{"title":"Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology","authors":"Adam Grobler","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.4","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"53 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Realność wolnej woli 自由意志的现实
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.6
Saul Smilansky
Is free will real? Is there really free will? That of course depends on what “free will” is. And, on what “real” is. I begin from the free will problem as it appears in the contemporary free will debate, and set out to explore how my view on it affects various senses of reality. The picture that emerges is complex, pluralistic, multi-faceted, and paradoxical. In some sense free will is real, in another sense it is not, and both greatly matter. The sense that is unreal creates a reality of shallowness and tragedy. Finally, both ethically and pragmatically, we require illusion in order to create reality, in creating our moral and personal selves.
自由意志是真实的吗?真的存在自由意志吗?这当然取决于什么是 "自由意志"。而 "真实 "又是什么。我从当代自由意志辩论中出现的自由意志问题入手,探讨我对这个问题的看法如何影响对现实的各种感知。由此产生的图景是复杂的、多元的、多面的和矛盾的。在某种意义上,自由意志是真实的,而在另一种意义上,它又是不真实的,两者都非常重要。不真实的意义造成了现实的肤浅和悲剧。最后,无论从伦理还是从实用的角度来看,我们都需要幻想来创造现实,创造我们的道德和个人自我。
{"title":"Realność wolnej woli","authors":"Saul Smilansky","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.6","url":null,"abstract":"Is free will real? Is there really free will? That of course depends on what “free will” is. And, on what “real” is. I begin from the free will problem as it appears in the contemporary free will debate, and set out to explore how my view on it affects various senses of reality. The picture that emerges is complex, pluralistic, multi-faceted, and paradoxical. In some sense free will is real, in another sense it is not, and both greatly matter. The sense that is unreal creates a reality of shallowness and tragedy. Finally, both ethically and pragmatically, we require illusion in order to create reality, in creating our moral and personal selves.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"22 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Putnam’s Natural Realism and Its Problems 普特南的自然现实主义及其问题
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.3
Tadeusz Szubka
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.
希拉里-普特南(Hilary Putnam,1926-2016 年)很容易在各种哲学问题上改变主意,几乎不断地修改自己的观点。他哲学发展的最后一个阶段被称为常识或自然现实主义阶段,他在 1994 年的《杜威演讲》中雄辩地阐述了这一阶段。本文主要从三个方面论述他的立场,并试图找出其遇到的三个难题。首先,普特南声称,在当代现实主义争论中,我们一方面有奢侈的形而上学现实主义的支持者,另一方面也有各种版本的不负责任的反现实主义的倡导者。遗憾的是,对这场争论的划分过于粗略,因为形而上学现实主义有多种形式,把各种反现实主义混为一谈会造成混淆,于事无补。其次,普特南在知觉哲学中的天真直接现实主义似乎与他关于知觉的交易论述不相容。第三,普特南一度被维特根斯坦式的静默主义所迷惑,扭曲了其哲学思想的真实特征。
{"title":"Putnam’s Natural Realism and Its Problems","authors":"Tadeusz Szubka","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.3","url":null,"abstract":"Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"7 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē 亚里士多德论 Philia 和 Aretē 的真实对象
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.18290/rf24721.7
Maciej Smolak
In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē—the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē—qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.
亚里士多德在《尼各马科伦理学》第八章第一节的开篇语中指出,下一步将讨论philia,因为它是某种aretē或与aretē相关(《尼各马科伦理学》第八章第一节 1155a 1-2)。本文试图从亚里士多德的观点出发,确定philia的真正对象与aretē之间的关系。作者的研究分为两部分。第一部分侧重于分析 aretē 及其各种类型,尤其是人类类型。第二部分集中于 philia 的类型学,即友谊及其特殊类型。作者指出,philia 和 aretē 之间的关系可以用两种方式来描述:如果 "友谊 "和 "友谊 "在追求美好生活的过程中都起着至关重要的作用,那么 "友谊 "就是 "友谊论",而 "友谊 "则是 "人性论",即 "友谊 "由完整意义上的 "性格 "和 "实践智慧 "组成,条件是 "友谊论 "的朋友将 "美好生活 "等同于以政治或实践活动为重点的生活,甚至等同于理论智慧,只要他们将 "美好生活 "等同于最高形式的 "美好生活",即理论生活。然而,如果philia是一个多义词(pleonachōs legetai),而aretē应从广义上理解,即 "擅长某事",那么philia可以指各种友谊,即享乐主义的、功利主义的友谊,而aretē--使这些友谊很好地发挥其功能的资格或技能。第一种可能是,philia 和 aretē 之间的关系仅限于aretological 友谊,而把 aretē 的含义缩小到人类友谊。第二种可能是,每一种友谊都被视为功能性的东西,因此,由其适当的功能来定义。从这一观点出发,所有的友谊都伴随着适当的 "aretai",即保证完美实现其适当功能的资质或技能,因此,也就保证了有关的两个人实现既定目标。
{"title":"Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē","authors":"Maciej Smolak","doi":"10.18290/rf24721.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.7","url":null,"abstract":"In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē—the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē—qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"9 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Jacka Wojtysiaka krytyka probabilistycznego argumentu ze zła za nieistnieniem boga 雅切克-沃伊蒂亚克对 "上帝不存在 "的 "从恶概率论证 "的批判
Q2 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.18290/rf23714.10
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
W artykule rozważam sformułowaną przez Jacka Wojtysiaka krytykę probabilistycznego argumentu z istnienia wielkiego faktu zła za nieistnieniem Boga. Sugeruję, że proponowana przez J. Wojtysiaka krytyka tego argumentu powinna zostać zmodyfikowana w taki sposób, aby nie prowadziła ona do wniosku, że Bóg jest przyczyną zła. Proponuję korektę dotycząca koncepcji Bożej przyczynowości. Wskazuję również na inny sposób osłabienia argumentu probabilistycznego ze zła niż ten wybrany przez J. Wojtysiaka. Proponuję podważyć przesłankę głoszącą, że zło istnieje, przy założeniu naturalizmu. Sygnalizuję krótko trudności naturalistycznego realizmu moralnego i wskazuję na ewolucyjne argumenty podważające moralny realizm. W kontekście tych trudności rozważam stanowisko Paula Drapera, pioniera probabilistycznego (Baysowskiego) argumentu ze zła za ateizmem, i staram się pokazać niektóre słabości jego poglądów. Następnie formułuję teistyczny argument dedukcyjny z istnienia zła i sugeruję, że ze względu na prostotę należy preferować argumentację dedukcyjną, a nie probabilistyczną na rzecz teizmu.
在本文中,我考虑了 J. Wojtysiak 对从邪恶这一重大事实的存在来论证上帝不存在的概率论证提出的批评。我建议修改 J. Wojtysiak 对这一论证提出的批判,使其不至于得出上帝是罪恶之因的结论。我建议对神圣因果关系的概念进行修正。我还指出了比沃伊蒂夏克所选择的方法更能削弱 "从恶概率论证 "的另一种方法。我建议在自然主义假设的基础上削弱宣称邪恶存在的前提。我简要地指出了自然主义道德现实主义的困难,并指出了破坏道德现实主义的进化论论据。在这些困难的背景下,我考虑了保罗-德雷珀(Paul Draper)的立场,他是为无神论提出从恶论证的概率论(贝叶斯论)先驱,并试图说明他的观点的一些弱点。然后,我提出了一个从恶的存在出发的有神论演绎论证,并建议为了简单起见,有神论的演绎论证比概率论证更可取。
{"title":"Jacka Wojtysiaka krytyka probabilistycznego argumentu ze zła za nieistnieniem boga","authors":"Dariusz Łukasiewicz","doi":"10.18290/rf23714.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18290/rf23714.10","url":null,"abstract":"W artykule rozważam sformułowaną przez Jacka Wojtysiaka krytykę probabilistycznego argumentu z istnienia wielkiego faktu zła za nieistnieniem Boga. Sugeruję, że proponowana przez J. Wojtysiaka krytyka tego argumentu powinna zostać zmodyfikowana w taki sposób, aby nie prowadziła ona do wniosku, że Bóg jest przyczyną zła. Proponuję korektę dotycząca koncepcji Bożej przyczynowości. Wskazuję również na inny sposób osłabienia argumentu probabilistycznego ze zła niż ten wybrany przez J. Wojtysiaka. Proponuję podważyć przesłankę głoszącą, że zło istnieje, przy założeniu naturalizmu. Sygnalizuję krótko trudności naturalistycznego realizmu moralnego i wskazuję na ewolucyjne argumenty podważające moralny realizm. W kontekście tych trudności rozważam stanowisko Paula Drapera, pioniera probabilistycznego (Baysowskiego) argumentu ze zła za ateizmem, i staram się pokazać niektóre słabości jego poglądów. Następnie formułuję teistyczny argument dedukcyjny z istnienia zła i sugeruję, że ze względu na prostotę należy preferować argumentację dedukcyjną, a nie probabilistyczną na rzecz teizmu.","PeriodicalId":35732,"journal":{"name":"Roczniki Filozoficzne","volume":"349 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139149151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
Roczniki Filozoficzne
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1