Sarah Leveaux, Kenzo Nera, Pierre Fagnoni, P. Klein
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Social and Political Psychology (JSPP) is a peer-reviewed open-access journal (without author fees), published online. It publishes articles at the intersection of social and political psychology that substantially advance the understanding of social problems, their reduction, and the promotion of social justice. It also welcomes work that focuses on socio-political issues from related fields of psychology (e.g., peace psychology, community psychology, cultural psychology, environmental psychology, media psychology, economic psychology) and encourages submissions with interdisciplinary perspectives. JSPP is comprehensive and integrative in its approach. It publishes high-quality work from different epistemological, methodological, theoretical, and cultural perspectives and from different regions across the globe. It provides a forum for innovation, questioning of assumptions, and controversy and debate. JSPP aims to give creative impetuses for academic scholarship and for applications in education, policymaking, professional practice, and advocacy and social action. It intends to transcend the methodological and meta-theoretical divisions and paradigm clashes that characterize the field of social and political psychology, and to counterbalance the current overreliance on the hypothetico-deductive model of science, quantitative methodology, and individualistic explanations by also publishing work following alternative traditions (e.g., qualitative and mixed-methods research, participatory action research, critical psychology, social representations, narrative, and discursive approaches). Because it is published online, JSPP can avoid a bias against research that requires more space to be presented adequately.