Does Information Disclosure Reduce Drinking Water Violations in the United States?

IF 3.1 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI:10.1086/722619
J. Baker, Lori S. Bennear, Sheila M. Olmstead
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Abstract

The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments required community water systems to disclose violations of drinking water standards to their customers in annual water quality reports. We explore the impact of three methods of disclosure on health-based drinking water quality violations using a matching and differences-in-differences framework with a national data set of drinking water quality violations from 1990 to 2001. We find that this information disclosure requirement reduced drinking water violations significantly and that the primary effect of disclosure on violations persists for at least four years after policy implementation. We find no evidence, however, that water systems trade these potentially more salient violation reductions for potentially less salient reductions in violations of other standards, nor do we find any evidence that water systems responded differentially to disclosure based on the demographic or political characteristics of their customers.
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信息披露减少了美国的饮用水违规行为吗?
1996年《安全饮用水法修正案》要求社区供水系统在年度水质报告中向客户披露违反饮用水标准的行为。我们利用1990年至2001年全国饮用水质量违规数据集的匹配和差异框架,探讨了三种披露方法对基于健康的饮用水质量违法行为的影响。我们发现,这一信息披露要求显著减少了饮用水违规行为,并且披露对违规行为的主要影响在政策实施后至少持续四年。然而,我们没有发现任何证据表明,供水系统用这些潜在的更显著的违规减少来换取潜在的不太显著的违反其他标准的减少,我们也没有发现任何迹象表明,根据客户的人口统计或政治特征,供水系统对披露的反应不同。
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CiteScore
5.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
55
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