Francisco Costa, Marcelo Sant ’ Anna, Teevrat Garg, Juliano Assunção, J. Scheinkman, Rafael Araujo
: One-fi fth of the Amazon has vanished, with global consequences for carbon emissions and “ local ” consequences for rainfall patterns on a continental scale. The agricultural sector is both the cause and victim of deforestation. As farmers deforest to increase land supply, rainfall decreases else-where. In a model with endogenous climate, rainfall and land use in fl uence each other, creating winners and losers in agriculture (chap. 1). Additionally, with decreasing rainfall, hydropower plants generate less electricity. A map that speci fi es regions of deforestation affecting hydropower plants allows policymakers to focus conservation and restoration efforts (chap. 2). The decision to deforest is not an atomistic process. Brazil made the decision to cut through the forest with large infrastructure projects, assessing (when assessing) the deforestation footprint based solely on distance to the projects. A trade model provides more realistic deforestation scenarios post-infrastructure
{"title":"Wallace E. Oates Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award","authors":"Francisco Costa, Marcelo Sant ’ Anna, Teevrat Garg, Juliano Assunção, J. Scheinkman, Rafael Araujo","doi":"10.1086/728967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728967","url":null,"abstract":": One-fi fth of the Amazon has vanished, with global consequences for carbon emissions and “ local ” consequences for rainfall patterns on a continental scale. The agricultural sector is both the cause and victim of deforestation. As farmers deforest to increase land supply, rainfall decreases else-where. In a model with endogenous climate, rainfall and land use in fl uence each other, creating winners and losers in agriculture (chap. 1). Additionally, with decreasing rainfall, hydropower plants generate less electricity. A map that speci fi es regions of deforestation affecting hydropower plants allows policymakers to focus conservation and restoration efforts (chap. 2). The decision to deforest is not an atomistic process. Brazil made the decision to cut through the forest with large infrastructure projects, assessing (when assessing) the deforestation footprint based solely on distance to the projects. A trade model provides more realistic deforestation scenarios post-infrastructure","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"26 26","pages":"iii - iv"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139456624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regional Heterogeneity in Environmental Quality: The Role of Firm Production Networks and Trade","authors":"Doyoung Park, Jacob Howard, William Ridley","doi":"10.1086/729124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/729124","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139000499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Management Practices and Climate Policy in China","authors":"Soo-Keong Yong, Ulrich Wagner, Peiyao Shen, Mirabelle Muûls, Ralf Martin, Jing Cao, L. Preux","doi":"10.1086/729013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/729013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"97 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138997610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper evaluates own-price dynamics in taxing environmental externalities. We exploit a natural experiment that exposed some firms to a large and persistent price increase for groundwater, a setting characterized by incomplete markets. Using five years of post-treatment data on farm-level water use, we find that water conservation doubles between the first and fifth year of the tax. Failure to account for dynamics in policies designed to manage groundwater will understate the price elasticity of demand and introduce efficiency costs. Nick Hagerty, Koichiro Yusuke Kuwayama, Pierre Mérel, Mieno, Moser, Reguant, Sears, Sexton, Smith, Woerman, David Zilberman, Oregon State University, of Mines, California Polytechnic State University, University of Chicago, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of Pittsburgh, University of Arizona, Montana State University, University of Nevada Reno, and Pennsylvania State University for helpful discussions and comments. A special thanks goes to Brian Lockwood, Marcus Mendiola, Casey Meusel the Pajaro Valley Management for sharing data and institutional knowledge. This project also benefited the research of Jack Gregory and and the technical support of Eric Lehmer at the Geospatial Innovation Facility at UC Berkeley. Funding and support for this research comes from: the National Bureau of Economic Research, the California Institute for Water Resources, and the UC Security and Sustainability Research Initiative funded by
本文评估了环境外部性征税中的自身价格动态。我们利用一个自然实验，在不完全市场的环境下，让一些公司面临地下水价格持续大幅上涨。利用5年的农业用水处理后数据，我们发现，在征税后的第一年到第五年，节水量翻了一番。如果不考虑地下水管理政策的动态，将低估需求的价格弹性，并引入效率成本。Nick Hagerty、Koichiro Yusuke Kuwayama、Pierre msamurel、Mieno、Moser、Reguant、Sears、Sexton、Smith、Woerman、David Zilberman、俄勒冈州立大学、矿业大学、加州理工大学、芝加哥大学、马萨诸塞大学阿默斯特分校、匹兹堡大学、亚利桑那大学、蒙大拿州立大学、内华达大学里诺分校和宾夕法尼亚州立大学进行有益的讨论和评论。特别感谢Brian Lockwood, Marcus Mendiola, Casey Meusel和Pajaro Valley Management分享数据和机构知识。该项目还得益于加州大学伯克利分校地理空间创新设施的Jack Gregory的研究和Eric Lehmer的技术支持。本研究的资金和支持来自:国家经济研究局、加州水资源研究所和加州大学安全与可持续发展研究计划
{"title":"The Dynamic Impacts of Pricing Groundwater","authors":"Ellen Bruno, Katrina K. Jessoe, W. Hanemann","doi":"10.1086/728988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728988","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates own-price dynamics in taxing environmental externalities. We exploit a natural experiment that exposed some firms to a large and persistent price increase for groundwater, a setting characterized by incomplete markets. Using five years of post-treatment data on farm-level water use, we find that water conservation doubles between the first and fifth year of the tax. Failure to account for dynamics in policies designed to manage groundwater will understate the price elasticity of demand and introduce efficiency costs. Nick Hagerty, Koichiro Yusuke Kuwayama, Pierre Mérel, Mieno, Moser, Reguant, Sears, Sexton, Smith, Woerman, David Zilberman, Oregon State University, of Mines, California Polytechnic State University, University of Chicago, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of Pittsburgh, University of Arizona, Montana State University, University of Nevada Reno, and Pennsylvania State University for helpful discussions and comments. A special thanks goes to Brian Lockwood, Marcus Mendiola, Casey Meusel the Pajaro Valley Management for sharing data and institutional knowledge. This project also benefited the research of Jack Gregory and and the technical support of Eric Lehmer at the Geospatial Innovation Facility at UC Berkeley. Funding and support for this research comes from: the National Bureau of Economic Research, the California Institute for Water Resources, and the UC Security and Sustainability Research Initiative funded by","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"78 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138604649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of Natural Disasters and Extreme Weather on Household Location Choice and Economic Welfare","authors":"Douglas H. Wrenn","doi":"10.1086/728887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728887","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"179 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139249956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Environmental and Regional Economic Development Policy: Evidence from the Rise of Central China Program","authors":"Chunbo Ma, Jianxin Wu, Junji Xiao, Xiaoling Zhan","doi":"10.1086/728792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728792","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"33 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139265817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Selfish Incentives for Climate Policy: Empower the Young!","authors":"Larry Karp, Alesandro Peri, Armon Rezai","doi":"10.1086/728740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728740","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"31 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies seven rebate programs aiming at accelerating the replacement of energy-intensive household appliances. Based on a large product-level data set for several European countries, we study the effects on unit sales and prices of both subsidized and non-subsidized products. The empirical identification strategy exploits the temporary implementation of the rebates in regional segments of the European Common Market. The results for unit sales indicate that subsidies can be an effective instrument for stimulating purchases of energy efficient appliances. While the strength of the stimulus proves sensitive to program design, we find limited evidence of intertemporal substitution, and no indication that program effects are driven by a drop in sales of non-subsidized products. In some cases, sales of non-subsidized products increase, a finding that we attribute to information campaigns associated with the rebate programs. Price effects are modest, implying that subsidies are mostly passed through to consumers. Considering the actual energy savings, however, our analysis shows that rebate programs are a relatively expensive way to improve energy efficiency.
{"title":"Promoting Sales of Energy Efficient Household Appliances: Outcomes and Cost Effectiveness of Rebate Programs","authors":"Thiess Büttner, Boryana Madzharova","doi":"10.1086/728610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728610","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies seven rebate programs aiming at accelerating the replacement of energy-intensive household appliances. Based on a large product-level data set for several European countries, we study the effects on unit sales and prices of both subsidized and non-subsidized products. The empirical identification strategy exploits the temporary implementation of the rebates in regional segments of the European Common Market. The results for unit sales indicate that subsidies can be an effective instrument for stimulating purchases of energy efficient appliances. While the strength of the stimulus proves sensitive to program design, we find limited evidence of intertemporal substitution, and no indication that program effects are driven by a drop in sales of non-subsidized products. In some cases, sales of non-subsidized products increase, a finding that we attribute to information campaigns associated with the rebate programs. Price effects are modest, implying that subsidies are mostly passed through to consumers. Considering the actual energy savings, however, our analysis shows that rebate programs are a relatively expensive way to improve energy efficiency.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"26 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135545828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.
{"title":"When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking","authors":"Judson Boomhower","doi":"10.1086/728467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/728467","url":null,"abstract":"The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.","PeriodicalId":47114,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists","volume":"86 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135765676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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