Relations in the Metaphysics of Science

Stavros Ioannidis, S. Psillos, Elina Pechlivanidi
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Abstract

Abstract In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.
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科学形而上学中的关系
在本文中,我们考察了关系在科学形而上学的两个突出观点,即配置主义和结构主义中的地位,并认为目前关于关系形而上学的共识需要重新审视,根据这种共识,关系被视为内部的,并且不构成超出或超越其关系的附加。在讨论了我们所谓的关于关系的内部主义和外部主义之后,我们表明,配置主义和结构主义导致了相反但同样有争议的关系形而上学的说法。虽然我们批评了这些观点的一些普遍版本,但我们确定了我们认为更有希望的配置主义和结构主义版本。这两种更有希望的变体的一个核心特征是关于关系的外在主义观点。与当前的内部主义共识相反,我们声称,关于关系的外部主义的一个版本是最好地结合了形而上学的严谨性和自然主义立场的观点。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
50.00%
发文量
29
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