The Sovereign Lender of Last Resort Role of the ECB: Rules, Choice, and Time

Abstract

Abstract This article argues that the European Central Bank (ECB), supported by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), can be perceived to have functionally softened the no sovereign lender of last resort (LOLR) rule originally implied by Articles 123 and 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) towards a rule-with-exceptions and, increasingly, towards a presumption: The ECB will act as sovereign LOLR to a constituent Member unless and until that Member is insolvent or unwilling to cooperate with measures designed to restore market confidence. This functional moderation of a rule, from an ex ante specification of an outcome towards the exercise of greater choice at the point of application, carries with it contentious normative questions. To motivate discussion thereof beyond a largely ahistorical, non-indexical, rules versus discretion debate, the rules of the currency union are located within the genealogy of international exchange rate regimes. The “convertibility” rule of the gold standard and the “parity” rule of the Bretton Woods system are contrasted with their Eurozone equivalent. A consequentialist standpoint is sketched out from which the interventions of the ECB, in light of their available alternatives, appear broadly consistent with welfarist cost-benefit analysis and less normatively worrisome than by reference to evaluative criteria that emphasize a narrowly rule-bound conception of the rule of law.