{"title":"What's in an Indo-Pacific Concept? Shared Visions and Varied Approaches","authors":"Alison Szalwinski","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903867","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"B eginning in the late 2000s, the United States, as well as two of its allies in Asia—Japan and Australia—began to articulate variations of the geopolitical concept of the “Indo-Pacific.” The idea of linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a broader geographic region was not entirely new, but the accompanying strategic overlay, which was introduced as part of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, imbued the idea with new and significant implications for how these three countries would approach foreign policy, economic coordination, and military posture in the region and within their broader national strategies. As each of these three democracies elected new leaders over the next two decades, subsequent administrations across political parties generally reaffirmed and built on the idea of the “Indo-Pacific,” refining their visions for a free, open, prosperous, and secure two-ocean region in contrast with China’s increasingly assertive behavior. By 2022, many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere—including France, Indonesia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—had announced their own version of an Indo-Pacific vision, concept, or strategy, as had both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. At present, the United States, South Korea, and France have all published official policy documents identifying an Indo-Pacific Strategy. Japan refers to its “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision or plan, while Indonesia has an Indo-Pacific concept. Perhaps most surprisingly, Australia lacks any dedicated government document or policy speech outlining an Indo-Pacific vision, instead electing to articulate its approach within its broader national security, foreign policy, and defense strategy papers. The United Kingdom similarly has outlined its thinking on an Indo-Pacific tilt within defense policy documents, while the Pacific Island countries and territories eschew “Indo-Pacific” as a defining construct but identify as a “Blue Pacific Continent” and have clarified regional security interests and priorities in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"100 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903867","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
B eginning in the late 2000s, the United States, as well as two of its allies in Asia—Japan and Australia—began to articulate variations of the geopolitical concept of the “Indo-Pacific.” The idea of linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a broader geographic region was not entirely new, but the accompanying strategic overlay, which was introduced as part of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, imbued the idea with new and significant implications for how these three countries would approach foreign policy, economic coordination, and military posture in the region and within their broader national strategies. As each of these three democracies elected new leaders over the next two decades, subsequent administrations across political parties generally reaffirmed and built on the idea of the “Indo-Pacific,” refining their visions for a free, open, prosperous, and secure two-ocean region in contrast with China’s increasingly assertive behavior. By 2022, many countries in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere—including France, Indonesia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—had announced their own version of an Indo-Pacific vision, concept, or strategy, as had both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. At present, the United States, South Korea, and France have all published official policy documents identifying an Indo-Pacific Strategy. Japan refers to its “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision or plan, while Indonesia has an Indo-Pacific concept. Perhaps most surprisingly, Australia lacks any dedicated government document or policy speech outlining an Indo-Pacific vision, instead electing to articulate its approach within its broader national security, foreign policy, and defense strategy papers. The United Kingdom similarly has outlined its thinking on an Indo-Pacific tilt within defense policy documents, while the Pacific Island countries and territories eschew “Indo-Pacific” as a defining construct but identify as a “Blue Pacific Continent” and have clarified regional security interests and priorities in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security.
期刊介绍:
Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.