Political Competition and Authoritarian Repression

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS World Politics Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI:10.1017/S0043887122000132
Pearce Edwards
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Abstract

abstract Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes’ security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, which creates a challenge for regimes that want to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile, a period that included civilian collaboration with repression, this article presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. The author uses pre-coup democratic elections to measure political competition and addresses the challenge of estimating political preferences unaffected by repression. Qualitative evidence and further quantitative tests probe implications of the partisan rivalry mechanism and account for alternative explanations.
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政治竞争与专制镇压
专制政权进行镇压以防止对其统治的大规模抵抗。在这样做的过程中,政权的安全部队需要了解动员这种抵抗的持不同政见者的信息。政治竞争助长了党派间的对抗,通过激励平民向安全部队提供所需信息,为解决这一问题提供了一种解决方案。然而,平民分享任何政治对手的信息,而不仅仅是持不同政见者,这给想要针对持不同政见的政权带来了挑战。本文利用1973年奥古斯托·皮诺切特在智利掌权的政变后的新档案数据,提供了证据,证明政变前的激烈政治竞争与更频繁的镇压和更多针对非异见人士的镇压有关。作者利用政变前的民主选举来衡量政治竞争,并解决了估计不受镇压影响的政治偏好的挑战。定性证据和进一步的定量测试探讨了党派竞争机制的含义,并解释了其他解释。
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来源期刊
World Politics
World Politics Multiple-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs
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