Repression and Dissent: How Tit-for-Tat Leads to Violent and Nonviolent Resistance

Abstract

Much research examines the state-dissident nexus by large-n studies and rational choice theories. This article contributes an analysis of dissident reasoning through a computational evaluation of ethnographic interviews. The analysis shows that dissident decision-making is based on tit-for-tat deliberations: Dissidents choose violent means primarily in response to violent repression, and nonviolent means in response to nonviolent repression. Ordinary citizens not participating in dissent consider positive state behavior or safety concerns instead. Consistent with arguments that state-dissident interactions are reciprocal, these findings reveal unexpected cognitive similarities between political dissent and cooperation, which is often associated with tit-for-tat deliberations. They also show the importance of state repression compared with other motivators of dissent, including perceived relative deprivation and social contagion. The findings identify heuristic patterns of reasoning which suggest that dissidents may be more open to change and, ultimately, cooperation with state authorities than what is argued by repressive states.