Pub Date : 2025-03-19DOI: 10.1177/00220027251321756
Changwook Ju
Sexual violence (SV) in secessionist conflicts reflects distinct political intentions behind rebels’ pursuit of statehood and incumbents’ commitment to territorial integrity. I argue that, compared with their counterparts in non-secessionist conflicts, (1) secessionist rebels are more motivated to eschew SV to garner domestic support and international recognition, while (2) central governments are more incentivized to employ SV to repress and discourage secessionist endeavors. I further theorize that, in secessionist conflicts relative to non-secessionist conflicts, (3) rebel-perpetrated SV is more likely to go unreported, whereas (4) state-perpetrated SV is less likely to go unreported, primarily because of secessionist rebels’ legitimacy-seeking and international actors’ disproportionate attention to heavy-handed state SV. Zero-inflated ordered probit analysis strongly supports these differential implications of secessionist strife for rebel and state SV and the reporting thereof. The theoretical and empirical contributions presented in this article enrich both our understanding of wartime SV and broader conflict studies.
{"title":"Secessionism and Wartime Sexual Violence","authors":"Changwook Ju","doi":"10.1177/00220027251321756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251321756","url":null,"abstract":"Sexual violence (SV) in secessionist conflicts reflects distinct political intentions behind rebels’ pursuit of statehood and incumbents’ commitment to territorial integrity. I argue that, compared with their counterparts in non-secessionist conflicts, (1) secessionist rebels are more motivated to eschew SV to garner domestic support and international recognition, while (2) central governments are more incentivized to employ SV to repress and discourage secessionist endeavors. I further theorize that, in secessionist conflicts relative to non-secessionist conflicts, (3) rebel-perpetrated SV is more likely to go unreported, whereas (4) state-perpetrated SV is less likely to go unreported, primarily because of secessionist rebels’ legitimacy-seeking and international actors’ disproportionate attention to heavy-handed state SV. Zero-inflated ordered probit analysis strongly supports these differential implications of secessionist strife for rebel and state SV and the reporting thereof. The theoretical and empirical contributions presented in this article enrich both our understanding of wartime SV and broader conflict studies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143661255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027251326576
Arthur Dyevre
Do international adjudicators align with the foreign policy interests of their home country? This article contributes new evidence that judges on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) diverge along similar lines as their home states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Ideal points for judges and countries are estimated from nonunanimous judicial votes up to January 2023 using Item Response Modelling and then related to country ideal points estimated from UNGA votes in earlier research. The analysis reveals that, as with countries in the UNGA, a pro-anti-Western divide order constitutes the main dimension of disagreement on the Court. Moreover, ideal points derived from UNGA voting patterns are themselves robust predictors of voting affinity among judges as well as between judges and the parties involved in litigation. Judges originating from nations exhibiting greater geopolitical divergence are more likely to disagree. Just as judges from more pro-Western states are less likely to favour anti-Western litigant states.
{"title":"Decision Making on the World Court: Are International Judges Geopolitically Biased?","authors":"Arthur Dyevre","doi":"10.1177/00220027251326576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251326576","url":null,"abstract":"Do international adjudicators align with the foreign policy interests of their home country? This article contributes new evidence that judges on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) diverge along similar lines as their home states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Ideal points for judges and countries are estimated from nonunanimous judicial votes up to January 2023 using Item Response Modelling and then related to country ideal points estimated from UNGA votes in earlier research. The analysis reveals that, as with countries in the UNGA, a pro-anti-Western divide order constitutes the main dimension of disagreement on the Court. Moreover, ideal points derived from UNGA voting patterns are themselves robust predictors of voting affinity among judges as well as between judges and the parties involved in litigation. Judges originating from nations exhibiting greater geopolitical divergence are more likely to disagree. Just as judges from more pro-Western states are less likely to favour anti-Western litigant states.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143631321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-13DOI: 10.1177/00220027251324465
Nikola Mirilovic, Ariel Zellman, Jonathan Fox
To what extent does minority distinctiveness from the majority mitigate or exacerbate discrimination? Similarities between majority and minority groups may reduce societal and political discrimination. Yet shared identities along one cleavage coupled with distinctive characteristics along another may also render commonalities salient for inter-group competition and conflict. We examine how cross-cuttingness of group-level religious identity with ethnicity, geographic concentration, and economic class influences societal religious discrimination (SRD) and governmental religious discrimination (GRD) against religious minorities at the state level. We find that greater cross-cuttingness of religion and ethnicity leads to decreased SRD and GRD. Yet while more cross-cutting geographic distributions of religious groups correlate with lower SRD and higher GRD, greater economic cross-cuttingness between religious groups correlates with higher SRD and lower GRD. These findings offer a nuanced theoretical and empirical bridge to understand discrimination, as social and political behaviors between individual expressions of societal prejudice and intergroup violent conflict.
{"title":"Multidimensional Identity Cleavages and Religious Discrimination","authors":"Nikola Mirilovic, Ariel Zellman, Jonathan Fox","doi":"10.1177/00220027251324465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251324465","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent does minority distinctiveness from the majority mitigate or exacerbate discrimination? Similarities between majority and minority groups may reduce societal and political discrimination. Yet shared identities along one cleavage coupled with distinctive characteristics along another may also render commonalities salient for inter-group competition and conflict. We examine how cross-cuttingness of group-level religious identity with ethnicity, geographic concentration, and economic class influences societal religious discrimination (SRD) and governmental religious discrimination (GRD) against religious minorities at the state level. We find that greater cross-cuttingness of religion and ethnicity leads to decreased SRD and GRD. Yet while more cross-cutting geographic distributions of religious groups correlate with lower SRD and higher GRD, greater economic cross-cuttingness between religious groups correlates with higher SRD and lower GRD. These findings offer a nuanced theoretical and empirical bridge to understand discrimination, as social and political behaviors between individual expressions of societal prejudice and intergroup violent conflict.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143607830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-25DOI: 10.1177/00220027251323557
Conner B. Joyce
Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory.
{"title":"Do States Constrain Non-State Hackers? International Telecommunication Union Elections and Non-State Cyber Aggression","authors":"Conner B. Joyce","doi":"10.1177/00220027251323557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251323557","url":null,"abstract":"Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-10DOI: 10.1177/00220027251318938
Vilde Lunnan Djuve, Carl Henrik Knutsen
The mobilization of opposition mass movements may spur regime change via different processes, including popular revolutions or coups. We zoom in on one salient channel through which mass mobilization may induce regime change, namely via provoking incumbent responses. Synthesizing different arguments, we detail how incumbent elites sometimes preemptively alter the regime to diffuse threats by incumbent-guided democratization or by using opposition mobilization as windows of opportunity to transform the regime into one they prefer over the status quo (e.g., via self-coups). We combine data on opposition campaigns with detailed data on modes of regime breakdown and find that, overall, sustained mass movements are clearly associated with subsequent incumbent-led transitions. When disaggregating, violent movements typically precede only non-liberalizing transitions. In contrast, nonviolent movements are associated with all incumbent-led transitions, including democratizing ones. Thus, nonviolence is a key component in many successful campaigns for democracy, also absent full-fledged revolutions.
{"title":"Citizen Action and Elite Responses: Opposition Mass Movements and Regime Change From Within, 1900–2019","authors":"Vilde Lunnan Djuve, Carl Henrik Knutsen","doi":"10.1177/00220027251318938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251318938","url":null,"abstract":"The mobilization of opposition mass movements may spur regime change via different processes, including popular revolutions or coups. We zoom in on one salient channel through which mass mobilization may induce regime change, namely via provoking incumbent responses. Synthesizing different arguments, we detail how incumbent elites sometimes preemptively alter the regime to diffuse threats by incumbent-guided democratization or by using opposition mobilization as windows of opportunity to transform the regime into one they prefer over the status quo (e.g., via self-coups). We combine data on opposition campaigns with detailed data on modes of regime breakdown and find that, overall, sustained mass movements are clearly associated with subsequent incumbent-led transitions. When disaggregating, violent movements typically precede only non-liberalizing transitions. In contrast, nonviolent movements are associated with all incumbent-led transitions, including democratizing ones. Thus, nonviolence is a key component in many successful campaigns for democracy, also absent full-fledged revolutions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143385415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027241312624
Lars-Erik Cederman, Yannick I. Pengl, Dennis Atzenhofer, Luc Girardin
It is generally accepted that violations of state-nation congruence can cause conflict, but it remains unclear which configurations cause civil and interstate conflict, and how these conflict types interact. Inspired by Myron Weiner’s classical model of the “Macedonian Syndrome,” we propose an integrated theoretical framework that links specific nationality questions to both conflict types. Using spatial data on state borders and ethnic settlements in Europe since 1816, we show that excluded and divided groups are more likely to rebel and, where they govern on only one side of the border, to initiate territorial claims and militarized disputes. To make things worse, rebellion and interstate conflict reinforce each other where ethnic division coincides with partial home rule. We obtain similar findings for civil wars and territorial claims in a global sample post-1945. Yet governments shy away from engaging in interstate disputes to address nationality questions and instead support ethnic rebels abroad.
{"title":"Nationality Questions and War: How Ethnic Configurations Affect Conflict Within and Between States","authors":"Lars-Erik Cederman, Yannick I. Pengl, Dennis Atzenhofer, Luc Girardin","doi":"10.1177/00220027241312624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241312624","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally accepted that violations of state-nation congruence can cause conflict, but it remains unclear which configurations cause civil and interstate conflict, and how these conflict types interact. Inspired by Myron Weiner’s classical model of the “Macedonian Syndrome,” we propose an integrated theoretical framework that links specific nationality questions to both conflict types. Using spatial data on state borders and ethnic settlements in Europe since 1816, we show that excluded and divided groups are more likely to rebel and, where they govern on only one side of the border, to initiate territorial claims and militarized disputes. To make things worse, rebellion and interstate conflict reinforce each other where ethnic division coincides with partial home rule. We obtain similar findings for civil wars and territorial claims in a global sample post-1945. Yet governments shy away from engaging in interstate disputes to address nationality questions and instead support ethnic rebels abroad.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143056195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-24DOI: 10.1177/00220027251315668
Shenghao Zhang, Han Dorussen
Peacekeeping has been found to be effective in containing conflict and civilian victimization, while the findings for the effect of aid on violence are indeterminate. So far the effects of peacekeeping and aid on violence have mainly been studied separately, this article investigates, at the subnational level, the effect of humanitarian aid on one-sided violence conditional on the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Although humanitarian aid can occasionally exacerbate violence, it is argued that peacekeepers reverse this unintended consequence of the provision of aid. We argue that they do so by means of sharing information and the provision of security bubbles. Empirically, we look at the coincidence of subnational location of humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping troops and find support for the idea that the effect of aid on violence against civilians is conditional on the presence of peacekeepers.
{"title":"Does Peacekeeping Mitigate the Impact of Aid on Conflict? Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Aid and Violence Against Civilians","authors":"Shenghao Zhang, Han Dorussen","doi":"10.1177/00220027251315668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251315668","url":null,"abstract":"Peacekeeping has been found to be effective in containing conflict and civilian victimization, while the findings for the effect of aid on violence are indeterminate. So far the effects of peacekeeping and aid on violence have mainly been studied separately, this article investigates, at the subnational level, the effect of humanitarian aid on one-sided violence conditional on the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Although humanitarian aid can occasionally exacerbate violence, it is argued that peacekeepers reverse this unintended consequence of the provision of aid. We argue that they do so by means of sharing information and the provision of security bubbles. Empirically, we look at the coincidence of subnational location of humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping troops and find support for the idea that the effect of aid on violence against civilians is conditional on the presence of peacekeepers.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143026648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-23DOI: 10.1177/00220027251315561
Sam Whitt, Vera Mironova, Douglas Page
Scholars are increasingly drawing attention to the societal consequences of conflict-related violence. What remains unclear is the interplay between short-term and long-term legacies of wartime traumas. We consider the case of Mosul, Iraq, a setting in which inhabitants have experienced wide-ranging victimization during both recent and historical contexts. In a 2022 survey, we inquired across a broad range of self-reported conflict experiences involving personal and kinship-based victimization including physical and sexual violence, property destruction, forced imprisonment, and displacement as a result of ISIS occupation. We also probed for victimization dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. Examining altruism toward other ISIS victims in a dictator game, we find that while ISIS-related victimization increases out-group empathy and reduces in-group bias in altruism, earlier conflict experiences exert independent influence as well. We consider the implications of our findings for conflict research involving multiple layers and sources of trauma and victimization.
{"title":"Legacies of Past and Present Violence: Evidence From Mosul, Iraq","authors":"Sam Whitt, Vera Mironova, Douglas Page","doi":"10.1177/00220027251315561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251315561","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars are increasingly drawing attention to the societal consequences of conflict-related violence. What remains unclear is the interplay between short-term and long-term legacies of wartime traumas. We consider the case of Mosul, Iraq, a setting in which inhabitants have experienced wide-ranging victimization during both recent and historical contexts. In a 2022 survey, we inquired across a broad range of self-reported conflict experiences involving personal and kinship-based victimization including physical and sexual violence, property destruction, forced imprisonment, and displacement as a result of ISIS occupation. We also probed for victimization dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. Examining altruism toward other ISIS victims in a dictator game, we find that while ISIS-related victimization increases out-group empathy and reduces in-group bias in altruism, earlier conflict experiences exert independent influence as well. We consider the implications of our findings for conflict research involving multiple layers and sources of trauma and victimization.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143020486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-10DOI: 10.1177/00220027241310378
Costantino Pischedda, Mauro Gilli, Andrea Gilli
What explains counterinsurgency outcomes? Existing scholarship points to characteristics and strategies of incumbents and insurgents but neglects the role of insurgents’ weapons. Some studies discuss the effects of the firepower of insurgents relative to incumbents. Focusing on relative firepower, however, is problematic given the asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare, with insurgents eschewing decisive engagements where incumbents would bring to bear their material superiority. We turn the spotlight, instead, on guerrilla firepower, i.e., insurgents’ absolute ability to inflict casualties on incumbents using small arms in hit-and-run attacks. We argue that technological innovations dating to the mid-19th century sowed the seeds for cumulative increases in lethality of insurgents' small arms – the standard tools of guerrilla warfare – over the following 150 years, enhancing tactical effectiveness of hit-and-run attacks and thus insurgents’ prospects of strategic success. Statistical analysis of novel data on guerrilla firepower in counterinsurgency campaigns from 1800 to 2005 corroborates our argument.
{"title":"Weapons of the Weak: Technological Change, Guerrilla Firepower, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes","authors":"Costantino Pischedda, Mauro Gilli, Andrea Gilli","doi":"10.1177/00220027241310378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241310378","url":null,"abstract":"What explains counterinsurgency outcomes? Existing scholarship points to characteristics and strategies of incumbents and insurgents but neglects the role of insurgents’ weapons. Some studies discuss the effects of the firepower of insurgents relative to incumbents. Focusing on relative firepower, however, is problematic given the asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare, with insurgents eschewing decisive engagements where incumbents would bring to bear their material superiority. We turn the spotlight, instead, on guerrilla firepower, i.e., insurgents’ absolute ability to inflict casualties on incumbents using small arms in hit-and-run attacks. We argue that technological innovations dating to the mid-19th century sowed the seeds for cumulative increases in lethality of insurgents' small arms – the standard tools of guerrilla warfare – over the following 150 years, enhancing tactical effectiveness of hit-and-run attacks and thus insurgents’ prospects of strategic success. Statistical analysis of novel data on guerrilla firepower in counterinsurgency campaigns from 1800 to 2005 corroborates our argument.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142961432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027241308270
Ipek Ece Sener
Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid civilian victimization before peace talks by offering them a seat at the negotiation table.
{"title":"Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting","authors":"Ipek Ece Sener","doi":"10.1177/00220027241308270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241308270","url":null,"abstract":"Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid civilian victimization before peace talks by offering them a seat at the negotiation table.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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