Pub Date : 2024-11-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027241299815
Alejandro Corvalan
There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.
{"title":"Does Local Representation Reduce Self-Determination Conflict?","authors":"Alejandro Corvalan","doi":"10.1177/00220027241299815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241299815","url":null,"abstract":"There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027241297641
Ruixing Cao
Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument.
{"title":"Personalist Regime and Rebel Sponsorship in Civil Conflicts","authors":"Ruixing Cao","doi":"10.1177/00220027241297641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241297641","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions do sponsors directly intervene in the target state’s civil conflicts? While previous research on state sponsorship for the rebels tends to focus on how ties between the two can influence their interactions, this article argues that the sponsor is more willing to provide combat support when the target state is under the rule of a personalist regime. Due to a lack of internal constraints, personalist leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies. The high degree of policy flexibility also makes personalist regimes unreliable partners for negotiation. To avoid future instability, rival states are more likely to use civil conflicts as opportunities to weaken the personalist regime. Military ineffectiveness under personalist regimes also lowers the cost of combat support and potentially allows sponsors to reap more material benefits from the civil conflict. Utilizing comprehensive data on personalism and rebel sponsorship, I find support for this argument.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"252 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-06DOI: 10.1177/00220027241297692
Oliver Pamp, Andreas Mehltretter, Paul Binder, Paul W. Thurner
There is a scarcity of systematic data regarding the military equipment of rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts. This empirical gap has impeded the rigorous evaluation of (formal) theories concerning militarized interactions between governments and rebel groups. To address this deficiency, we have developed the Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD). This dataset provides detailed information on the military arsenals of 270 groups over the period from 1989 to 2020, categorizing 15 different types of small arms, light weapons, explosives, and major weapons. In this article, we introduce RAD, compare it with existing datasets, elucidate the data collection process, present an initial overview of the information contained in it, and apply the data to examine civilian suffering in civil wars. Although this dataset is merely an initial step that can be expanded as additional public information becomes available, RAD offers the first organized compilation of data on the armament levels of rebels.
{"title":"Introducing the Rebels’ Armament Dataset (RAD): Empirical Evidence on Rebel Military Capabilities","authors":"Oliver Pamp, Andreas Mehltretter, Paul Binder, Paul W. Thurner","doi":"10.1177/00220027241297692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241297692","url":null,"abstract":"There is a scarcity of systematic data regarding the military equipment of rebel groups engaged in intrastate conflicts. This empirical gap has impeded the rigorous evaluation of (formal) theories concerning militarized interactions between governments and rebel groups. To address this deficiency, we have developed the Rebels' Armament Dataset (RAD). This dataset provides detailed information on the military arsenals of 270 groups over the period from 1989 to 2020, categorizing 15 different types of small arms, light weapons, explosives, and major weapons. In this article, we introduce RAD, compare it with existing datasets, elucidate the data collection process, present an initial overview of the information contained in it, and apply the data to examine civilian suffering in civil wars. Although this dataset is merely an initial step that can be expanded as additional public information becomes available, RAD offers the first organized compilation of data on the armament levels of rebels.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142594766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027241296045
Francesco Iacoella, Patricia Justino, Bruno Martorano
This paper analyses how pre-pandemic levels of inequality across US counties have shaped the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incidence of protests. The results from difference-in-differences and instrumental variable models using high-frequency weekly data show that more stringent measures to contain the pandemic increased the incidence of protests, but only in US counties with high levels of inequality before the start of the pandemic where grievances may have been initially stronger. The impact of government responses to COVID-19 on protests is largely explained by adverse changes in economic conditions in counties with the highest levels of pre-pandemic inequality. Policy stringency measures were also associated with more protests in the most unequal counties which voted for the Republican party in the 2016 elections and exhibited, at the start of the pandemic, lower levels of trust in the president and lower satisfaction with democracy.
{"title":"Lockdown and Unrest: Inequality, Restrictions and Protests During COVID-19","authors":"Francesco Iacoella, Patricia Justino, Bruno Martorano","doi":"10.1177/00220027241296045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241296045","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses how pre-pandemic levels of inequality across US counties have shaped the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incidence of protests. The results from difference-in-differences and instrumental variable models using high-frequency weekly data show that more stringent measures to contain the pandemic increased the incidence of protests, but only in US counties with high levels of inequality before the start of the pandemic where grievances may have been initially stronger. The impact of government responses to COVID-19 on protests is largely explained by adverse changes in economic conditions in counties with the highest levels of pre-pandemic inequality. Policy stringency measures were also associated with more protests in the most unequal counties which voted for the Republican party in the 2016 elections and exhibited, at the start of the pandemic, lower levels of trust in the president and lower satisfaction with democracy.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142519387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-23DOI: 10.1177/00220027241293715
Benoit Siberdt
Are civil wars shaped by how they start? While existing literature points to the path-dependent nature of conflict, the link between the type of onset and wartime dynamics have been largely overlooked. Building on a recent typology capturing the dynamics of civil war onset (1944–2020), I analyze conflict trajectories, focusing on three macro-level wartime dynamics: warfare, intensity, and duration. This article shows that how large-scale armed conflicts begin (e.g., whether they start as peripheral conflicts or are fought centrally) helps us predict how intensely they will be fought or how long they will last. These findings show that onset matters beyond signaling the start of large-scale conflict and tells us about the dynamics that will likely follow. Altogether, this article establishes a new process-oriented macro-level research program in the field of conflict analysis.
{"title":"Why Onset Matters: Warfare, Intensity, and Duration in Civil War","authors":"Benoit Siberdt","doi":"10.1177/00220027241293715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241293715","url":null,"abstract":"Are civil wars shaped by how they start? While existing literature points to the path-dependent nature of conflict, the link between the type of onset and wartime dynamics have been largely overlooked. Building on a recent typology capturing the dynamics of civil war onset (1944–2020), I analyze conflict trajectories, focusing on three macro-level wartime dynamics: warfare, intensity, and duration. This article shows that how large-scale armed conflicts begin (e.g., whether they start as peripheral conflicts or are fought centrally) helps us predict how intensely they will be fought or how long they will last. These findings show that onset matters beyond signaling the start of large-scale conflict and tells us about the dynamics that will likely follow. Altogether, this article establishes a new process-oriented macro-level research program in the field of conflict analysis.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142488738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-19DOI: 10.1177/00220027241293395
Per F. Andersson, Jan Teorell
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.
{"title":"The Double-Edged Sword: How State Capacity Prolongs Autocratic Tenure but Hastens Democratization","authors":"Per F. Andersson, Jan Teorell","doi":"10.1177/00220027241293395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241293395","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027241290770
Guillaume Cheikbossian, Julie Rosaz
In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. We observe overinvestment and no negative effect of group size whether the prize value is exogenous or endogenous. Also, a productive contest seems to have no positive effect on individual investments. A destructive contest, however, does have a significant negative impact, but this effect is reduced with a larger number of competing groups.
{"title":"Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"Guillaume Cheikbossian, Julie Rosaz","doi":"10.1177/00220027241290770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241290770","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. We observe overinvestment and no negative effect of group size whether the prize value is exogenous or endogenous. Also, a productive contest seems to have no positive effect on individual investments. A destructive contest, however, does have a significant negative impact, but this effect is reduced with a larger number of competing groups.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241268482
Michael R. Kenwick, Sarah Maxey
The militarization of border control is a defining feature of contemporary international politics. Why do states flock toward these policies despite their questionable efficacy? We theorize that border militarization stems in part from public reactions to the threat of international and domestic decline. We test this argument with two conjoint experiments that randomize the implementing agency, strategy, costs, and effectiveness of different policies. First, we evaluate whether the public has a baseline preference for militarization, holding constant the material costs and consequences of the border policy. Second, we prime threats of decline—in terms of either America’s dominant status in the world or the majority position of white-identifying Americans within the U.S.—and track changes in preferences for militarized border policies. The results indicate that both threats of decline can increase support for border militarization, with important partisan differences. Border militarization plausibly stems from the reactionary politics of domestic audiences.
{"title":"Explaining Public Demands for Border Militarization","authors":"Michael R. Kenwick, Sarah Maxey","doi":"10.1177/00220027241268482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241268482","url":null,"abstract":"The militarization of border control is a defining feature of contemporary international politics. Why do states flock toward these policies despite their questionable efficacy? We theorize that border militarization stems in part from public reactions to the threat of international and domestic decline. We test this argument with two conjoint experiments that randomize the implementing agency, strategy, costs, and effectiveness of different policies. First, we evaluate whether the public has a baseline preference for militarization, holding constant the material costs and consequences of the border policy. Second, we prime threats of decline—in terms of either America’s dominant status in the world or the majority position of white-identifying Americans within the U.S.—and track changes in preferences for militarized border policies. The results indicate that both threats of decline can increase support for border militarization, with important partisan differences. Border militarization plausibly stems from the reactionary politics of domestic audiences.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-14DOI: 10.1177/00220027241291658
{"title":"Bruce Russett Award for Article of the Year in JCR for 2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/00220027241291658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241291658","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142440192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article introduces the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset, the product of a collaboration between academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data on US security assistance, the USASSA dataset transforms detailed information about how security assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of US security assistance, but also its diversity. While some security assisance is akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. We demonstrate the utility of the dataset with an exploration of whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic terrorism vary across types of aid.
{"title":"Building Partner Capacity: US Aid to Security Sector Actors","authors":"Patricia Sullivan, Giovanny Rincon Alvarez, Nathan Marx","doi":"10.1177/00220027241276156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241276156","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset, the product of a collaboration between academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data on US security assistance, the USASSA dataset transforms detailed information about how security assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of US security assistance, but also its diversity. While some security assisance is akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. We demonstrate the utility of the dataset with an exploration of whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic terrorism vary across types of aid.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142383728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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