Spirit of Rights. Response to Comments

Abstract

Let me begin by expressing my thanks to Ivo Cerman for organizing and contributing to this forum, as well as to Thérence Carvalho, Emmanuelle de Champs, and Olivier Grenouilleau for their generous, erudite, and very insightful comments . I am very honored by the time and attention that these four distinguished scholars have dedicated to reading my book so closely . Reflecting on these comments, my greatest regret is that I cannot go back and address some of their feedback in the book itself . In particular, the authors have brought to my attention various studies that would have enriched my understanding of the topics discussed in the book . I knew when writing this book that I was undoubtedly overlooking some of the scholarship in French and German, and these comments have confirmed my fears . While I genuinely regret not having benefited from these additional sources, I will note in my defense that, for a book that ranges from the 12th to the 20th century, I could not track down all the secondary literature on all my sources . To be sure, this is a weak defense where the specific lacunae identified by the comments are concerned, as they mostly fall in the chronological and subject areas that the book focuses on, namely the 18th century . In this regard, I can only say that while I discuss such topics as Physiocracy and abolitionism at length, the book is not primarily about either of these topics . So what is the book really about? It may be helpful here to restate its goals and origins, particularly as I am largely responding to two trends in Anglo-American scholarship . These trends are in some respects mirror-images of each other . The first concerns older works on the history of human rights . These studies tended to take an either/or approach to political texts that discuss natural law or natural rights . Scholars such as Leo Strauss, Michel Villey (who was French, but played an influential role in English-language scholarship), and Richard Tuck traced a general evolution, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, away from natural law toward natural rights . They typically accompanied this analysis with a value judgment, privileging one over the other (natural law, for Strauss and Villey; natural rights, for Tuck) .1 The second trend concerns more recent scholarship . In the influential studies by Lynn Hunt, Samuel Moyn, and others, the history of human rights is almost entirely severed