Theorizing the Cooling-Off Provision as an Additional Standard of Investment Protection

IF 0.3 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Utrecht Journal of International and European Law Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI:10.5334/UJIEL.523
D. Bella
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Abstract

Most of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) contains a cooling-off period provision requiring both parties to an investment dispute to make an attempt to settle their differences amicably within a clear time frame, before initiating arbitration. The cooling-off period is triggered by the notice of dispute sent by the investor to the host-State and can range from several months up to one year. At times arbitral tribunals have considered this provision as an optional procedural requirement, others, as a condition precedent for tribunals’ jurisdiction. In either case, tribunals have exclusively focused on the consequences for the investor, whenever the investor had not complied with this waiting period by filing the arbitration prior to its elapse. However, can the cooling-off provision be construed as a procedural standard of investment protection whenever the Respondent-State does not comply with this provision by refusing to engage in consultations with the investor? This article argues so by examining the function, character and content of this provision and by shifting the focal point of arbitral precedents. Indeed, from the investor’s perspective, this provision may well be a treaty-based procedural standard of investment protection to find a cost-effective and prompt solution to a dispute whose breach may call for redress.
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将冷静期条款理论化作为投资保护的附加标准
大多数国际投资协定(IIAs)都包含冷静期条款,要求投资争端的双方在启动仲裁之前,在明确的时间框架内努力友好地解决分歧。冷静期由投资者向东道国发出争议通知触发,可以从几个月到一年不等。仲裁法庭有时将这一规定视为一项任择性程序要求,有时则将其视为法庭管辖权的先决条件。在任何一种情况下,仲裁庭都只关注投资者的后果,只要投资者没有遵守这一等待期,在该等待期届满之前提交仲裁。然而,当被投资国拒绝与投资者协商而不遵守这一规定时,冷静条款是否可以被解释为投资保护的程序性标准?本文通过考察这一规定的功能、特征和内容,并通过转移仲裁判例的焦点来论证这一点。事实上,从投资者的角度来看,这项规定很可能是一种基于条约的投资保护程序标准,以便为违反可能需要补救的争端找到一种具有成本效益的迅速解决办法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
审稿时长
11 weeks
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