Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part II (Revealed Preferences)

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS Games Pub Date : 2022-10-16 DOI:10.3390/g13050068

Caleb M. Koch, H. Nax

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We investigate the strategic nature of farmers’ groundwater usage with a rich dataset from the American Midwest. We propose a new revealed preference test for the groundwater interaction as a dynamic game. We reject a view of groundwater usage decisions as strategic substitutes in favor of strategic complements as a better description.

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地下水利用和战略互补：第二部分（揭示的偏好）

我们利用来自美国中西部的丰富数据集调查了农民地下水使用的战略性质。我们提出了一个新的揭示偏好测试地下水相互作用作为一个动态游戏。我们反对将地下水使用决策视为战略替代品的观点，而赞成将战略补充作为更好的描述。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.

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