The Influence of Procurator Generals in Constitutional Review

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW Journal of Law and Courts Pub Date : 2020-12-17 DOI:10.1086/712651
Tanya Bagashka, L. Tiede
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

After democratic transitions, many Eastern European countries reformed their political institutions in a piecemeal fashion. Focusing on the Bulgarian Constitutional Court from 1992 to 2012 and the Soviet-style procurator general, we analyze how legal reforms operate in practice in transitional societies. Using original data, we find that judges are influenced by the powerful and unaccountable procurator general. Judges’ decisions to strike down laws also are guided by alignment with their or their appointers’ political preferences and the opinions of interested parties in amicus briefs. The study has implications about interbranch relations and the role of procurator generals in constitutional review.
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检察长在宪法审查中的影响
民主过渡后,许多东欧国家以零碎的方式改革了其政治体制。我们以1992年至2012年的保加利亚宪法法院和苏联式的检察长为重点,分析了法律改革在转型社会的实践中是如何运作的。使用原始数据,我们发现法官受到有权力和不负责任的检察长的影响。法官推翻法律的决定也以与他们或其任命者的政治偏好和法庭之友简报中相关方的意见相一致为指导。这项研究对跨部门关系和检察长在宪法审查中的作用具有启示意义。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
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