Though widely used in studies of judicial politics, American Bar Association (ABA) ratings have a partisan bias. As a result, when researchers include ABA ratings and ideology in a model together, the results may be biased toward non-findings with respect to the effect of ideology, qualifications, or both. This study leverages new data on the ABA rating process to create a valid and reliable new measure for the qualifications of nominees to the US Courts of Appeals. In an empirical example, I test the new measure against alternative specifications to demonstrate its potential. The empirical example also presents a new data set on circuit court confirmation hearing speech. The findings contrast with well-established conclusions from previous studies.
{"title":"Quality in Measurement Matters: Adjusted American Bar Association Ratings and Circuit Court Confirmation Hearing Word Choice","authors":"James A. Sieja","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Though widely used in studies of judicial politics, American Bar Association (ABA) ratings have a partisan bias. As a result, when researchers include ABA ratings and ideology in a model together, the results may be biased toward non-findings with respect to the effect of ideology, qualifications, or both. This study leverages new data on the ABA rating process to create a valid and reliable new measure for the qualifications of nominees to the US Courts of Appeals. In an empirical example, I test the new measure against alternative specifications to demonstrate its potential. The empirical example also presents a new data set on circuit court confirmation hearing speech. The findings contrast with well-established conclusions from previous studies.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":"91 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139440307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jennifer Bowie, Ali S. Masood, Elisha C. Savchak, Natalie Smith, Bianca Wieck, Cameron Abrams, Meghna Melkote
Do lower court judges influence the content of Supreme Court opinions in the United Kingdom? Leveraging original data, we analyze opinion language adoption practices of the UK Supreme Court. We advance a theory where the justices’ choices to adopt language from lower court opinions are influenced by Supreme Court-level attributes and Court of Appeal case characteristics. We uncover compelling evidence that UK Supreme Court justices incorporate language extensively from the written opinions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. Our findings have significant implications for opinion formulation, doctrinal development, and higher and lower court interactions within comparative courts.
{"title":"Lower Court Influence on High Courts: Evidence from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom","authors":"Jennifer Bowie, Ali S. Masood, Elisha C. Savchak, Natalie Smith, Bianca Wieck, Cameron Abrams, Meghna Melkote","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do lower court judges influence the content of Supreme Court opinions in the United Kingdom? Leveraging original data, we analyze opinion language adoption practices of the UK Supreme Court. We advance a theory where the justices’ choices to adopt language from lower court opinions are influenced by Supreme Court-level attributes and Court of Appeal case characteristics. We uncover compelling evidence that UK Supreme Court justices incorporate language extensively from the written opinions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. Our findings have significant implications for opinion formulation, doctrinal development, and higher and lower court interactions within comparative courts.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44444550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joshua Boston, David Carlson, JBrandon Duck-Mayr, Greg Sasso
What effect does political competition have in generating de facto judicial independence? We argue that competition in a legislature can drive increases in de facto judicial independence. Our game-theoretic model reveals that increased competition for seats impedes legislators’ ability to enact their platforms, regardless of government turnover probability, and increased legislative fractionalization also makes court intervention more likely. Utilizing a sample of democratic states, empirical evidence suggests when a country’s legislature is increasingly fractionalized among parties or has increasing seat turnover, we observe increases in de facto independence. This research provides new perspectives on the link between independence and competition.
{"title":"Political Competition and Judicial Independence: How Courts Fill the Void When Legislatures Are Ineffective","authors":"Joshua Boston, David Carlson, JBrandon Duck-Mayr, Greg Sasso","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.16","url":null,"abstract":"What effect does political competition have in generating de facto judicial independence? We argue that competition in a legislature can drive increases in de facto judicial independence. Our game-theoretic model reveals that increased competition for seats impedes legislators’ ability to enact their platforms, regardless of government turnover probability, and increased legislative fractionalization also makes court intervention more likely. Utilizing a sample of democratic states, empirical evidence suggests when a country’s legislature is increasingly fractionalized among parties or has increasing seat turnover, we observe increases in de facto independence. This research provides new perspectives on the link between independence and competition.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49629750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does oral argument attendance impact public perceptions of the judiciary? Judicial independence is partly contingent on public support, but the conditions that generate institutional good will are not well understood. We examine how judicial outreach and court exposure inform public attitudes. Leveraging a field-experiment randomizing in-person attendance at oral arguments conducted by a federal circuit court of appeals on a university campus, we find that exposure increases perceptions of institutional legitimacy and the extent to which judicial decisions are motivated by law versus politics. The results have important implications for judicial politics and policy debates concerning reform initiatives involving circuit riding, courtroom cameras, and public outreach.
{"title":"The Impact of Oral Argument Attendance","authors":"Damon M. Cann, Greg Goelzhauser","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does oral argument attendance impact public perceptions of the judiciary? Judicial independence is partly contingent on public support, but the conditions that generate institutional good will are not well understood. We examine how judicial outreach and court exposure inform public attitudes. Leveraging a field-experiment randomizing in-person attendance at oral arguments conducted by a federal circuit court of appeals on a university campus, we find that exposure increases perceptions of institutional legitimacy and the extent to which judicial decisions are motivated by law versus politics. The results have important implications for judicial politics and policy debates concerning reform initiatives involving circuit riding, courtroom cameras, and public outreach.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46884496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Vulnerable to Intense Appointment Politics? Democrats’ Changed Views Around Justice Ginsburg’s Death – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"D. Glick","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48756621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do people turn on those who turn to the courts? Using a survey experiment, we find people have significantly more negative attitudes toward personal injury litigants than other types of claimants, even when they believe the claimant is injured and mostly not at fault. Moreover, our subjects were not anti-claim, anti-hiring a lawyer, or even anti-government program. Instead, they were distinctively anti-litigant.
{"title":"Turning on Those Who Turn to the Courts: Experimental Evidence of Backlash Against Personal Injury Litigants","authors":"Jeb Barnes, Elli Menounou, Parker R. Hevron","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do people turn on those who turn to the courts? Using a survey experiment, we find people have significantly more negative attitudes toward personal injury litigants than other types of claimants, even when they believe the claimant is injured and mostly not at fault. Moreover, our subjects were not anti-claim, anti-hiring a lawyer, or even anti-government program. Instead, they were distinctively anti-litigant.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49481076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Based on an analysis of all administrative court cases published in the Netherlands in 2020 (N = 4,642), we tested the hypothesis that experienced law clerks write judgments with greater confidence than less experienced clerks. A confidently written judgment was defined as being shorter, less standardized, and containing fewer legal references than a less confidently written judgment. In support of this hypothesis, our results showed that law clerks with more experience co-signed judgments that were less standardized and contained fewer legal references. However, contrary to the confidence hypothesis, we established that these judgments were also longer than judgments co-signed by less experienced clerks. Our study contextualizes the concerns expressed in studies on the US Supreme Court about the delegation of drafting duties to inexperienced law clerks. The study challenges the assumption that delegation of drafting duties to law clerks automatically results in judgments with a less confident writing style, due to the clerks’ inexperience. The assumption may hold for the US Supreme Court, where all law clerks are relatively inexperienced. However, the assumption does not hold in jurisdictions in which law clerks can be just as experienced (in terms of years worked in the legal field) as judges. This conclusion suggests that research on the functioning of the US Supreme Court cannot necessarily be generalized to other jurisdictions.
{"title":"Does Delegation of Drafting Duties to Law Clerks Result in Judgments That Show Lack of Confidence in Terms of Writing Style? A Stylometric Analysis","authors":"P. Mascini, N. Holvast","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Based on an analysis of all administrative court cases published in the Netherlands in 2020 (N = 4,642), we tested the hypothesis that experienced law clerks write judgments with greater confidence than less experienced clerks. A confidently written judgment was defined as being shorter, less standardized, and containing fewer legal references than a less confidently written judgment. In support of this hypothesis, our results showed that law clerks with more experience co-signed judgments that were less standardized and contained fewer legal references. However, contrary to the confidence hypothesis, we established that these judgments were also longer than judgments co-signed by less experienced clerks. Our study contextualizes the concerns expressed in studies on the US Supreme Court about the delegation of drafting duties to inexperienced law clerks. The study challenges the assumption that delegation of drafting duties to law clerks automatically results in judgments with a less confident writing style, due to the clerks’ inexperience. The assumption may hold for the US Supreme Court, where all law clerks are relatively inexperienced. However, the assumption does not hold in jurisdictions in which law clerks can be just as experienced (in terms of years worked in the legal field) as judges. This conclusion suggests that research on the functioning of the US Supreme Court cannot necessarily be generalized to other jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49226033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does the public respond to court-packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public’s outcry or use court-packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy’s shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.
{"title":"Accountability for Court Packing","authors":"M. J. Nelson, A. Driscoll","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does the public respond to court-packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public’s outcry or use court-packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy’s shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44779430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do elected judges tailor criminal sentences to the electorate’s ideology? Utilizing sentencing data from North Carolina’s Superior Courts—which transitioned from statewide to local elections in 1996—we study whether judges are obliging to voters’ preferences. We find some evidence of responsiveness: judges from liberal districts were more lenient, while those from moderately conservative districts assigned harsher sentences. Judges from increasingly conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns, which leads to lower re-election rates. These findings suggest that judges adapt their behavior to retain office, or else they are held accountable by the public.
{"title":"The Electoral Connection in Court: How Sentencing Responds to Voter Preferences","authors":"Joshua Boston, Bernardo S. Silveira","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do elected judges tailor criminal sentences to the electorate’s ideology? Utilizing sentencing data from North Carolina’s Superior Courts—which transitioned from statewide to local elections in 1996—we study whether judges are obliging to voters’ preferences. We find some evidence of responsiveness: judges from liberal districts were more lenient, while those from moderately conservative districts assigned harsher sentences. Judges from increasingly conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns, which leads to lower re-election rates. These findings suggest that judges adapt their behavior to retain office, or else they are held accountable by the public.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45962584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, marked the first time in the Court’s history that justices explicitly disagreed over the meaning and requirements of human dignity. In his dissenting opinion Clarence Thomas sought to reclaim rather than simply reject the language of dignity, advancing a conception of dignity that differed sharply from the conception embraced by the majority. Using this disagreement as a point of departure, this article demonstrates how dignity has served as an extra-textual value that underpins divergent visions of American constitutionalism that, in turn, inform interpretations of the Constitution’s text and history.
奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)是最高法院2015年的一项裁决，确立了同性伴侣结婚的宪法权利，这标志着最高法院历史上大法官们首次在人类尊严的含义和要求上出现明确的分歧。在他的反对意见中，克拉伦斯·托马斯试图收回而不是简单地拒绝尊严的语言，提出了一种与大多数人所接受的概念截然不同的尊严概念。本文以这种分歧为出发点，展示了尊严如何作为一种文本外的价值，支撑着对美国宪政的不同看法，进而为对宪法文本和历史的解释提供信息。
{"title":"Dignity Disputed","authors":"Connor M. Ewing","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, marked the first time in the Court’s history that justices explicitly disagreed over the meaning and requirements of human dignity. In his dissenting opinion Clarence Thomas sought to reclaim rather than simply reject the language of dignity, advancing a conception of dignity that differed sharply from the conception embraced by the majority. Using this disagreement as a point of departure, this article demonstrates how dignity has served as an extra-textual value that underpins divergent visions of American constitutionalism that, in turn, inform interpretations of the Constitution’s text and history.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48082788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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