Preston Greene, A. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton
{"title":"How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures?","authors":"Preston Greene, A. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton","doi":"10.5406/21521123.59.4.03","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future (positive future-bias) and pains to be in the past (negative future-bias). Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value (fragile positive future-bias), or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh future ones (robust positive future-bias)? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.4.03","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future (positive future-bias) and pains to be in the past (negative future-bias). Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value (fragile positive future-bias), or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh future ones (robust positive future-bias)? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust.
期刊介绍:
Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.