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Anti-Asian Racism 亚裔种族主义
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.08
David Haekwon Kim, Ronald R. Sundstrom
Abstract Over the last twenty-five years, philosophers have offered increasingly more sophisticated accounts of the nature and wrongness of racism. But very little in this literature discusses what is distinctive to anti-Asian racism. This gap exists partly because philosophy, like much of U.S. culture, has been influenced by civic narratives that center anti-black racism in ways that leave vague anti-Asian racism. We discuss this conceptual gap and its effects on understanding anti-Asian racism. In response to this problem, we offer an account of anti-Asian racism not beholden to the black-white binary. In our view, xenophobia, as a form of civic ostracism, plays a distinctive role in anti-Asian racism and admits of a complexity that is worth philosophical study. We also begin an exploration of a correlated phenomenon, namely xenophilia. It has a peculiar, often pernicious, presence in anti-Asian racism and sexism, but it is morally more complex than xenophobia.
在过去的25年里,哲学家们对种族主义的本质和错误提供了越来越复杂的解释。但在这些文献中,很少讨论反亚裔种族主义的特点。这一差距之所以存在,部分原因在于哲学,就像美国文化的许多方面一样,一直受到公民叙事的影响,这些叙事以反黑人种族主义为中心,而对亚裔种族主义则留下了模糊的印象。我们将讨论这一概念差距及其对理解反亚裔种族主义的影响。为了回应这个问题,我们提供了一种不依赖于黑白二元的反亚裔种族主义的描述。我们认为,仇外心理作为公民排斥的一种形式,在反亚洲种族主义中起着独特的作用,其复杂性值得哲学研究。我们也开始探索一个相关的现象,即排外。它在反亚裔的种族主义和性别歧视中有一种特殊的、往往是有害的存在,但在道德上比仇外心理更复杂。
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引用次数: 0
“Go Back to Where You Came From!” “滚回你来的地方去!”
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.07
José Jorge Mendoza
Abstract There are two competing ways of understanding nefarious expressions of nationalism in countries like the U.S., either as xenophobia or racism. In this essay, I offer a way of capturing what is attractive in both accounts: a way of thinking about the xenophobia of U.S. nationalism that does not miss or minimize the role that race plays in condemning such expressions, but at the same time does not risk overextending the definition of racism. To do this, the essay makes a case for decoupling and slightly revising the meaning of the terms “racialization” and “racial formation” while also proposing a third term, “racial disintegration.” In doing so, we find that the xenophobia directed at certain pan-racial groups, at least in places like the U.S., promotes a unique brand of White supremacy and does so in ways that maintain or reshape the nation's understanding of race and specifically its racial categories.
在像美国这样的国家,有两种相互竞争的方式来理解民族主义的邪恶表达,要么是仇外心理,要么是种族主义。在这篇文章中,我提供了一种捕捉两种说法中吸引人的地方的方法:一种思考美国民族主义仇外心理的方法,这种方法不会错过或最小化种族在谴责这种表达方面所起的作用,但同时也不会冒着过度扩展种族主义定义的风险。为此,本文对“种族化”和“种族形成”这两个术语进行了解耦,并略微修改了它们的含义,同时还提出了第三个术语“种族解体”。在这样做的过程中,我们发现,针对某些泛种族群体的仇外心理,至少在美国这样的地方,促进了一种独特的白人至上主义,并以维持或重塑国家对种族,特别是种族类别的理解的方式做到了这一点。
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引用次数: 1
American Philosophical Quarterly 美国哲学季刊
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.09
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引用次数: 0
Structural Racism Within Reason 合理的结构性种族主义
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.04
Alisa Bierria
Abstract In this discussion, I engage the politics of intention to explore how structural racism structures the production of meaning and the practice of reason. Building on María Lugones's analysis of intention formation as a form of practical reasoning, I explore the reasoning at work during the 2011 Stand Your Ground (SYG) hearing of black survivor of domestic violence, Marissa Alexander, to contend that structural racism—in this case, both intimate personal violence and intimate state violence against black women—enacts race/gender domination through projecting constructed intentions onto black women as a strategy to rationalize punishing black women. I also discuss two key black feminist critiques of reason—Patricia Hill Collins’ discussion of “controlling images” (2000) and Michelle Cliff's concept of the “mythic mind” (1982)—to propose controlling intentions as a framework to theorize how structural racism produces fictive intentions used to rationalize the criminal punishment of survival and justify that outcome as common sense.
在这篇讨论中,我利用意图政治来探讨结构性种族主义是如何构建意义的生产和理性的实践的。在María lugoones对意图形成作为一种实践推理形式的分析的基础上,我探索了2011年家庭暴力的黑人幸存者Marissa Alexander在“坚守阵地”(Stand Your Ground, SYG)听证会上的推理,以争辩结构性种族主义——在这种情况下,针对黑人妇女的亲密的个人暴力和亲密的国家暴力都通过将构建的意图投射到黑人妇女身上,作为惩罚黑人妇女的一种策略,从而实施了种族/性别统治。我还讨论了黑人女权主义者对理性的两个关键批评——帕特里夏·希尔·柯林斯(patricia Hill Collins)关于“控制意象”(2000)的讨论和米歇尔·克利夫(Michelle Cliff)关于“神话心灵”(1982)的概念——提出控制意图作为一个框架,来理论化结构性种族主义如何产生用于合理化生存的刑事惩罚的虚构意图,并将结果证明为常识。
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引用次数: 0
Is Racism Essentially Systemic? 种族主义本质上是系统性的吗?
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.05
Michael O. Hardimon
Abstract A shift in popular discourse over the last few years makes it makes it tempting to think that the answer to the question whether racism is essentially systemic is yes. My argument, however, is that there are forms of racism—things that are properly counted as instances of racism—that are distinct from and independent of systemic racism. These include ideational racism, ideological racism, racism as antipathy, and racism as prejudice and bigotry. Systemic racism does exist and is not reducible to these other forms of racism. It is arguably the form of racism that should be of most concern to us, but it is not the only form that racism takes.
在过去的几年里,流行话语的转变使得人们很容易认为种族主义是否本质上是系统性的这个问题的答案是肯定的。然而,我的观点是,有些形式的种族主义——可以被恰当地算作种族主义的例子——与系统性的种族主义截然不同,也独立于后者。这些种族主义包括观念上的种族主义、意识形态上的种族主义、作为反感的种族主义、作为偏见和偏执的种族主义。系统性种族主义确实存在,而且不能简化为其他形式的种族主义。这可以说是我们最应该关注的种族主义形式,但它并不是种族主义的唯一形式。
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引用次数: 0
Virtue Ethics in Social Theory 社会理论中的德性伦理
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.02
J. L. A. Garcia
Abstract Tommie Shelby has offered an influential, carefully stated, and well-argued set of objections to any volitional analysis of racism (VAR) as consisting centrally in certain forms of race-based disregard. Here I hope to defend aspects of VAR by analyzing, evaluating, and sometimes countering several of his major contentions, which have stood unchallenged in the literature over more than two decades. First, I sketch and respond to his Methodological objection to VAR, which criticizes VAR's reliance on language and linguistic intuitions; then to a Psychological objection, which suggests that VAR implausibly distances an agent's intentions from her beliefs; and, finally, to a Psychopathological objection, which holds that VAR requires treating as unproblematic some psychological states better seen as aberrant. The following section treats three subtle counterexamples Shelby uses to challenge VAR's core contentions about what's necessary and what's sufficient for racism. I close with some gestures toward what I see as a promising approach, very different from his, to studying these topics.
汤米·谢尔比(Tommie Shelby)提出了一套有影响力的、仔细陈述的、论证充分的反对意见,反对任何对种族主义(VAR)的意志分析,认为它主要是由某些形式的基于种族的漠视构成的。在这里,我希望通过分析、评估和有时反驳他的几个主要论点来捍卫VAR的各个方面,这些论点在过去20多年的文献中无人质疑。首先,我概述并回应他对VAR的方法论反对,批评VAR对语言和语言直觉的依赖;然后是心理学上的反对意见,这表明VAR难以置信地将代理人的意图与其信念区分开来;最后是精神病理学上的反对意见,该反对意见认为,VAR需要将一些最好被视为异常的心理状态视为无问题。接下来的部分将讨论谢尔比用三个微妙的反例来挑战VAR关于什么是必要的,什么是充分的种族主义的核心论点。最后,我提出了一些我认为很有前途的方法,与他的方法非常不同,来研究这些主题。
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引用次数: 0
Race and Class Together 种族和阶级在一起
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.06
Lawrence Blum
Abstract The dispute about the role of class in understanding the life situations of people of color has tended to be overpolarized, between a class reductionism and an “it's only race” position. Class processes shape racial groups’ life situations. Race and class are also distinct axes of injustice; but class injustice informs racial injustice. Some aspects of racial injustice can be expressed only in concepts associated with class (e.g., material deprivation, inferior education). But other aspects of racial injustice or other harms, such as racial discrimination or stigma, are not reducible to class concepts and cannot be fully addressed through class-focused policies. Overall, any attempt to fully secure racial justice for a racial group will require a combination of race-focused and class-focused policies. Anti-racist outlooks often neglect or downplay either the normative or the explanatory significance of class, or both—for example, by overlooking or downplaying the dignitary harms of class and the material harms of race; missing the historical dimension of class injustice; masking class by a narrowing of the complex normative structure of racial disparities; or not recognizing that a class-focused initiative (like raising the minimum wage) can address substantial racial justice concerns, even though not all of them. “Systemic racism” terminology recognizes class explanatorily but suppresses it normatively. Charles Mills's influential notion of “white supremacy,” while a powerful tool for conceptualizing and illuminating racial injustice, can also contribute to minimizing or masking the justice-related impact of class, as do some of Mills's specific discussions of class in various writings.
关于阶级在理解有色人种生活状况中的作用的争论,在阶级简化论和“只是种族”的立场之间趋于两极分化。阶级过程塑造了种族群体的生活状况。种族和阶级也是不同的不公正轴心;但是,阶级的不公正导致了种族的不公正。种族不公正的某些方面只能用与阶级有关的概念来表示(例如,物质剥夺、劣等教育)。但是,种族不公正或其他危害的其他方面,如种族歧视或耻辱,不能简化为阶级概念,不能通过以阶级为重点的政策来充分解决。总的来说,任何为一个种族群体充分争取种族正义的努力都需要以种族为中心和以阶级为中心的政策相结合。反种族主义观点往往忽视或淡化阶级的规范性或解释性意义,或两者兼而有之——例如,忽视或淡化阶级的尊严伤害和种族的物质伤害;忽略了阶级不公正的历史维度;通过缩小种族差异的复杂规范结构来掩盖阶级;或者没有认识到一个以阶级为中心的倡议(比如提高最低工资)可以解决重大的种族正义问题,尽管不是所有的问题。“系统性种族主义”术语在解释上承认阶级,但在规范上压制阶级。查尔斯·米尔斯(Charles Mills)颇具影响力的“白人至上”概念,虽然是概念化和阐明种族不公正的有力工具,但也有助于减少或掩盖阶级对司法的影响,正如米尔斯在各种著作中对阶级的一些具体讨论所做的那样。
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引用次数: 1
What Does it Mean to Say “The Criminal Justice System is Racist”? “刑事司法系统是种族主义的”是什么意思?
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.03
Amelia M. Wirts
Abstract This paper considers three possible ways of understanding the claim that the American criminal justice system is racist: individualist, “patterns”-based, and ideology-based theories of institutional racism. It rejects an individualist explanation of institutional racism because such an explanation fails to explain the widespread prevalence of anti-black racism in this system or indeed in the United States. It considers a “patterns” account of institutional racism, where consistent patterns of disparate racial effect mimic the structure of intentional projects of racial subjugation like slavery or Jim Crow. While a “patterns” account helpfully directs attention to the effects of policies and practices that make up an institution, it does not fully explain the deep roots of anti-blackness in the criminal justice system in the United States. The paper concludes by defending an ideology-based theory of institutional racism for understanding the criminal justice system because the stereotype of the black criminal has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the patterns of disparate outcome for black people in the criminal justice system. This relationship creates a looping effect where the stereotype of the black criminal fuels the disproportionate involvement of black people in the criminal justice system, and the disproportionate representation of black people with felony records, in prisons, brutalized in police encounters, and so on reinforces the idea that black people are especially prone to criminality. Ideological approaches to racism that integrate attention to the patterns of disparate effect best explain what it means to say that the criminal justice system is racist.
摘要本文从个人主义、基于“模式”的制度性种族主义理论和基于意识形态的制度性种族主义理论三个方面对美国刑事司法系统种族主义的观点进行了探讨。它拒绝对制度性种族主义的个人主义解释,因为这种解释无法解释在这个体系中或实际上在美国普遍存在的反黑人种族主义。它考虑了制度性种族主义的“模式”解释,其中不同种族影响的一致模式模仿了奴隶制或吉姆·克劳(Jim Crow)等故意种族征服项目的结构。虽然“模式”解释有助于将人们的注意力引向构成一种制度的政策和实践的影响,但它并不能完全解释美国刑事司法系统中反黑人的根深蒂固的根源。论文最后为理解刑事司法系统的制度性种族主义的意识形态理论进行了辩护,因为黑人罪犯的刻板印象与黑人在刑事司法系统中的不同结果模式有着相互加强的关系。这种关系产生了一种循环效应,黑人罪犯的刻板印象助长了黑人在刑事司法系统中不成比例的参与,而有重罪记录的黑人的不成比例的代表,在监狱里,在警察遭遇中被虐待,等等,强化了黑人特别容易犯罪的想法。对种族主义的意识形态研究将对不同影响模式的关注整合在一起,最好地解释了刑事司法系统是种族主义的含义。
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引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue: Racism 特刊导言:种族主义
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.4.01
Ronald R. Sundstrom
Racism as an independent topic of investigation in philosophy has considerably developed since the 1990s, when it appeared as part of growing debates that, on the one hand, investigated the political meaning of race and, on the other, its ontology and whether it existed at all. Likewise, with the idea of racism, its broadly normative meaning is critiqued by some philosophers, while others ask how best to conceive of it and identify its immorality. There were a few early and significant forays in philosophy about the nature of racism, of which three works stand out because of the way they set the terms of the debate: David Theo Goldberg's Racist Culture, Charles W. Mills’ The Racial Contract, and Jorge L.A. Garcia's “The Heart of Racism.”1 This collection reacts to the latter fork in the discussion but does so in ways that significantly touch on the former.The collection begins with Jorge L. Garcia's “Virtue Ethics in Social Theory: Defending a Volitional Analysis of Racism from Tommie Shelby's Challenges.” It is a clarification and defense of his influential volitional analysis of racism (VAR) from three prominent objections: that VAR inadequately accounts for the immorality of racism because it relies on the assumed wrongness of racism built into ordinary usage of the term ‘racist;’ that it mistakenly separates intention from belief; and that it does not fully account for the racism of some troubling mental states that cannot be traced back to a racist ill-will. Garcia's account of racism as fundamentally rooted in racist ill-will, along with Lawrence Blum's, is representative of agent-centered theories of racism. Not only do they attempt to explain individual or personal racism, but they also hold that racism in institutions, structures, or systems traces back to the racism of persons.Current accounts of structural racism, however, claim that it exists and operates independently of infection from intentionally racist persons, that the focus on racist persons cannot adequately account for how racism works in society, and that, instead, we should concentrate on structures and ideologies. Amelia Wirts sharply defends this view in her, “What does it mean to say ‘The Criminal Justice System is Racist’?” She explains how structural racism applies to America's criminal justice system and other “intermediate” (between individual and societal level) structures. Wirts argues that personal accounts of racism, and in particular Garcia's VAR, do not adequately account for the patterns of racial disparity in the criminal justice system or its disproportionate harm to black people. She advocates, instead, for a patterned view of structural racism, the patterns of which operate “as if it were designed to disproportionately harm” some racialized group. Additionally, Wirts adds that such patterns are particularly racist when they fuel racist ideological symbols, as the criminal justice system does in relation to the idea of the black criminal.Structural analyses
在考虑了当前关于种族主义及其不道德意义的哲学讨论的方向之后,下一组文章将讨论扩展到阶级,仇外心理和白人民族主义等问题上。劳伦斯·布鲁姆(Lawrence Blum)的《种族和阶级在一起》(Race and Class Together)拉开了序幕。布卢姆在他对种族主义的分析中加入了阶级,并批评了阶级在反种族主义理论中的缺失。他认为,关注阶级是确保种族主义受害者获得正义的必要条件,因为追求正义往往是两者的问题。布卢姆认为,种族和阶级是“在规范上截然不同的不公正轴心”,根据问题的不同,种族不公正需要分开处理。然而,种族不公正的某些方面只能通过阶级分析来解决,需要阶级或阶级-种族综合政策。布卢姆指出,种族主义的目标群体(他认为是黑人、土著人和拉丁裔)的许多成员都有跨阶级的利益,其中包括与一些白人的共同利益,而这些利益是他们与自己群体中经济上更优越的成员所没有的。他认为,这些利益应该通过“以阶级为中心的政策”来解决,以一种确保弱势种族群体正义的方式。乔斯·豪尔赫·门多萨在《回到你来的地方!《种族主义、仇外心理和白人民族主义》将我们的注意力转向了白人民族主义,以研究它是种族主义的表达还是仇外心理的表达。尽管门多萨认识到仇外心理在白人民族主义中的重要性,但他并没有忽视它与种族主义思想的联系。然而,他承认,在谴责白人民族主义时强调种族的作用可能会使种族概念,即在泛种族团体方面,过度扩展,因为这些团体的一些成员在种族上被认定为白人。因此,在这种情况下,种族主义反对白人民族主义的指控可能并不适用。为了处理这些情况,门多萨巧妙地将“激进化”和“种族形成”的概念分离开来,提出了一个新的概念,“种族解体”,以解释白人民族主义的运作和目标的转变。在最后一篇文章中,大卫·h·金(David H. Kim)和我讨论了“反亚洲种族主义”中的仇外心理和种族主义。我们从种族主义的一般理论转向探究反亚洲种族主义的基础是什么。当代关于种族主义的报道很少提到针对亚洲人的种族主义。这在一定程度上是由于这些讨论中的高度抽象,但也因为许多文献将反黑人作为种族主义的典范。我们的文章以一种不依赖于黑白二元的方式解决了这一空白。我们讨论了反亚裔种族主义在这种二元对立的美国背景下如何成为一个概念性问题。然后,我们认为仇外心理作为公民排斥的一种形式,以及在某种程度上的排外主义,在反亚洲种族主义的运作及其不道德方面发挥了特殊作用。本作品集中的作品与涉及种族主义的时事和争议产生了共鸣,并说明了辩论与这些事件相关并发言的潜力,而不仅仅是与一个封闭的学术对话的专业兴趣有关。每一件作品都展示了延伸辩论和讨论的重要路线的潜力,触及了公众讨论种族主义的原始神经。
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引用次数: 0
Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology 认识论中怀疑论的新进展
IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.5406/21521123.60.3.04
Chris Ranalli
This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics might meet.
这篇论文批判性地调查了近20年来关于激进怀疑主义的研究。它侧重于三个关键问题。首先,它首先探讨了哲学家们最近是如何挑战我们对激进怀疑论点的理解的。然后,它解析并批判性地评估了一些对激进怀疑主义有影响的反应:结构主义、知识优先认识论、认识论分离主义和铰链认识论。第三,它探讨了实用主义的一些新发展,如实用主义怀疑主义,衡量其反怀疑主义的重要性,并反映了激进的怀疑认识论和伦理学可能相遇的方式。
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引用次数: 0
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