E. Accinelli, Filipe Martins, A. Pinto, Atefeh Afsar, B. Oliveira
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引用次数: 4
Abstract
ABSTRACT We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.
期刊介绍：
The goal of the Journal of Mathematical Sociology is to publish models and mathematical techniques that would likely be useful to professional sociologists. The Journal also welcomes papers of mutual interest to social scientists and other social and behavioral scientists, as well as papers by non-social scientists that may encourage fruitful connections between sociology and other disciplines. Reviews of new or developing areas of mathematics and mathematical modeling that may have significant applications in sociology will also be considered.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology is published in association with the International Network for Social Network Analysis, the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology, the Mathematical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association, and the Methodology Section of the American Sociological Association.
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