Liberalism and the problem of domination

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM Pub Date : 2023-04-26 DOI:10.1177/01914537231172814
V. Kaul
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Abstract

We can distinguish two liberal paradigms that stand in opposition to each other. Liberalism as non-domination seeks to eliminate identities resulting from domination and oppression and hindering the emancipation of individuals. Liberalism as recognition holds that ‘the idea of a human world without identities makes no sense’ (Appiah) and considers identities to have their source in individual liberty and to provide the grounds for pluralism. The two liberal paradigms come to largely different results regarding the role of the state and civil society. The paradigm of non-domination tends to enforce individual rights, if necessary against a hostile cultural and religious context. The paradigm of recognition defends mostly individual liberties, if necessary at the expense of certain individual rights. Liberalism stands here in front of a major dilemma: Either it protects individual rights in the sense of freedom as non-domination, or it defends individual liberties in Isaiah Berlin's tradition of negative liberty– in too many cases and in too many parts of the world, liberalism, understood in the terms presented here, cannot have it both ways. This review article argues that the liberal paradigms of non-domination and recognition are complementary; liberalism is about both recognition and non-domination. Following policy recommendation can be drawn: (1) Democratic institutions (parliament, political parties and constitutional courts) and democratic rights (right to vote, right of assembly and freedom of speech) are most efficient in fighting domination. (2) Although social identities are not fixed and open to change, they cannot be engineered by the state or civil society organizations and grow out of some form of social consensus. (3) The consensus around identities takes place within the pluralist public and civil sphere of a community. (4) While the support in the development of individual capabilities by the state is effective against domination, also history and collective memory help to overcome the traumatic experience of domination. (5) Systemic transformation requires the support from below, notably from the civil society, and is based on individual liberties.
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自由主义和统治问题
我们可以区分出两种相互对立的自由主义范式。自由主义作为一种非支配性的自由主义,其目的是消除因支配和压迫而产生的身份认同,并阻碍个人的解放。作为承认的自由主义认为,“没有身份的人类世界是没有意义的”(阿皮亚),并认为身份来源于个人自由,并为多元主义提供了基础。关于国家和公民社会的角色,这两种自由主义范式得出了截然不同的结果。非统治的范式倾向于加强个人权利,如果有必要反对敌对的文化和宗教背景。承认范式主要捍卫个人自由,如果必要的话,以牺牲某些个人权利为代价。自由主义在这里面临着一个重大的两难境地:要么在自由的非支配意义上保护个人权利,要么在以赛亚·伯林(Isaiah Berlin)的消极自由传统中捍卫个人自由——在太多的情况下,在世界上太多的地方,自由主义,按照这里提出的术语来理解,不可能两者兼得。本文认为,自由主义的非支配范式与承认范式是互补的;自由主义既要承认,也要不受支配。可以提出以下政策建议:(1)民主机构(议会、政党和宪法法院)和民主权利(投票权、集会权和言论自由)在对抗统治方面是最有效的。(2)虽然社会身份不是固定的、开放的,但它不能由国家或民间社会组织来设计,也不能从某种形式的社会共识中产生。(3)围绕身份的共识发生在一个社区的多元公共和公民领域。(4)虽然国家对个人能力发展的支持对统治是有效的,但历史和集体记忆也有助于克服统治的创伤经验。(5)体制转型需要自下而上的支持,尤其是公民社会的支持,并以个人自由为基础。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
105
期刊介绍: In modern industrial society reason cannot be separated from practical life. At their interface a critical attitude is forged. Philosophy & Social Criticism wishes to foster this attitude through the publication of essays in philosophy and politics, philosophy and social theory, socio-economic thought, critique of science, theory and praxis. We provide a forum for open scholarly discussion of these issues from a critical-historical point of view. Philosophy & Social Criticism presents an international range of theory and critique, emphasizing the contribution of continental scholarship as it affects major contemporary debates.
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