Pub Date : 2024-09-19DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284519
Anastasia Marinopoulou
The aim of the present study is to articulate a comparative study of Zeno of Citium and Immanuel Kant. The main reason for the comparative form of the study is that the full extent of the selective affiliations, continuities and discontinuities in the philosophers’ thought with regard to democracy under a cosmopolitan condition, as they define it, has not yet been explored. Studying their political arguments does not entail, in the present study, a historical examination of their ideas. Historical research has, to date, been the norm in the examination of the thought of these thinkers. However, although both thinkers focus both on citizenship as an indispensable condition for democratic governance, a systematic comparison of what citizenship and democracy are as major political concerns in Zeno and Kant remains unquestioned by researchers. The originality of the present research derives, first, from the comparison of both thinkers that has not been critically presented so far. Second, it derives from the critique of the political views of Zeno according to the research conducted in the Gregory Vlastos Archive (that has never been conducted and presented so far) and is followed by tracing symmetries and asymmetries in the works of Kant that extend their arguments on cosmopolitanism to the solidification of democracy and the avoidance of war. As for the focus of the study on Kant, the novelty that is being argued for is the priority attributed to the cosmopolitan agenda as a precondition of a sovereign democratic state instead of the opposite being presented and claimed so far.
{"title":"The cosmopolitan imperative: Or how to avoid wars through more democracy","authors":"Anastasia Marinopoulou","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284519","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the present study is to articulate a comparative study of Zeno of Citium and Immanuel Kant. The main reason for the comparative form of the study is that the full extent of the selective affiliations, continuities and discontinuities in the philosophers’ thought with regard to democracy under a cosmopolitan condition, as they define it, has not yet been explored. Studying their political arguments does not entail, in the present study, a historical examination of their ideas. Historical research has, to date, been the norm in the examination of the thought of these thinkers. However, although both thinkers focus both on citizenship as an indispensable condition for democratic governance, a systematic comparison of what citizenship and democracy are as major political concerns in Zeno and Kant remains unquestioned by researchers. The originality of the present research derives, first, from the comparison of both thinkers that has not been critically presented so far. Second, it derives from the critique of the political views of Zeno according to the research conducted in the Gregory Vlastos Archive (that has never been conducted and presented so far) and is followed by tracing symmetries and asymmetries in the works of Kant that extend their arguments on cosmopolitanism to the solidification of democracy and the avoidance of war. As for the focus of the study on Kant, the novelty that is being argued for is the priority attributed to the cosmopolitan agenda as a precondition of a sovereign democratic state instead of the opposite being presented and claimed so far.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-19DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284531
Allyn Fives
An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral problem of authority. For some, authority has legitimacy in a deliberative democracy because deference to its rules better meets the demands of freedom and rationality. As I hope to show here, this line of thought does not give an adequate account of authority. If a directive is legitimate only if it has a certain content, as deliberative democrats are saying, one does not defer to but rather merely complies with such a directive.
{"title":"Problems some deliberative democrats have with authority","authors":"Allyn Fives","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284531","url":null,"abstract":"An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral problem of authority. For some, authority has legitimacy in a deliberative democracy because deference to its rules better meets the demands of freedom and rationality. As I hope to show here, this line of thought does not give an adequate account of authority. If a directive is legitimate only if it has a certain content, as deliberative democrats are saying, one does not defer to but rather merely complies with such a directive.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284544
Adriana Zaharijević, Milan Urošević
The article scrutinizes Foucault’s articulations of resistance, arguing against the entrenched understanding that resistance in Foucault is necessarily negative, or impossible. We concentrate on a specific period of his work, situated between the disciplinary phase and the beginning of the 1980s when Foucault began to develop the idea of the aesthetic of existence. We argue that in this period Foucault developed the notion of resistance as agentic, lived and possible, through three interrelated concepts. These are reverse discourse, counter-conduct and the critical attitude, elaborated in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, the course Security, Territory, Population and the lecture ‘What is Critique?’. The link between these concepts is provided by the effect they produce, captured by Foucault’s understanding of desubjectivation. Our claim is that Foucault reorients his work towards studying subjectivity through articulating resistance as desubjectivation. The main claim of the article is that Foucault not only allows for the possibility of resistance, but that his attempts to calibrate what it may mean to resist led him to fine-tune his understanding of power. Foucault arrived at power as subjection through the gradual development of resistance as desubjectivation.
{"title":"Resistance as desubjectivation in Foucault","authors":"Adriana Zaharijević, Milan Urošević","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284544","url":null,"abstract":"The article scrutinizes Foucault’s articulations of resistance, arguing against the entrenched understanding that resistance in Foucault is necessarily negative, or impossible. We concentrate on a specific period of his work, situated between the disciplinary phase and the beginning of the 1980s when Foucault began to develop the idea of the aesthetic of existence. We argue that in this period Foucault developed the notion of resistance as agentic, lived and possible, through three interrelated concepts. These are reverse discourse, counter-conduct and the critical attitude, elaborated in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, the course Security, Territory, Population and the lecture ‘What is Critique?’. The link between these concepts is provided by the effect they produce, captured by Foucault’s understanding of desubjectivation. Our claim is that Foucault reorients his work towards studying subjectivity through articulating resistance as desubjectivation. The main claim of the article is that Foucault not only allows for the possibility of resistance, but that his attempts to calibrate what it may mean to resist led him to fine-tune his understanding of power. Foucault arrived at power as subjection through the gradual development of resistance as desubjectivation.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284521
Marie-Josée Lavallée
The article aims to take a stand in the debates surrounding the potential contribution of the theoreticians of the first generation of the Frankfurt School to postcolonial/decolonial theory, by showing that Herbert Marcuse, in his work, has outlined coloniality as later authors have defined it. Marcuse denounced the neocolonialism and neoimperialism of which the Global South populations were prey at the time of decolonizations. He showed that the welfare state and the affluent society in contemporary Western societies largely fed themselves on the continued economic exploitation of the Global South. Marcuse decried the uneven development bred by the capitalist system and criticized the ideology and mechanisms of development imposed on the newly independent countries, which also violated the subjectivity of their peoples, ignoring their values and aspirations. He condemned the racial-based violence and war imposed on the ‘underprivileged’ in the Global South and the Global North alike. These trains of thought describe different aspects of coloniality. This article will analyze these insights through a close reading of Marcuse’s work and comparisons with the writings of Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah and Samir Amin.
{"title":"Marcusean resources to think coloniality","authors":"Marie-Josée Lavallée","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284521","url":null,"abstract":"The article aims to take a stand in the debates surrounding the potential contribution of the theoreticians of the first generation of the Frankfurt School to postcolonial/decolonial theory, by showing that Herbert Marcuse, in his work, has outlined coloniality as later authors have defined it. Marcuse denounced the neocolonialism and neoimperialism of which the Global South populations were prey at the time of decolonizations. He showed that the welfare state and the affluent society in contemporary Western societies largely fed themselves on the continued economic exploitation of the Global South. Marcuse decried the uneven development bred by the capitalist system and criticized the ideology and mechanisms of development imposed on the newly independent countries, which also violated the subjectivity of their peoples, ignoring their values and aspirations. He condemned the racial-based violence and war imposed on the ‘underprivileged’ in the Global South and the Global North alike. These trains of thought describe different aspects of coloniality. This article will analyze these insights through a close reading of Marcuse’s work and comparisons with the writings of Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah and Samir Amin.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284517
Jennifer Corby
This article engages the role of temporality in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Rather than focusing on the political individual proposed by his later works, it politicizes the conception of subjectivity advanced in his earlier works. In these, he advances a materialist account of subjectivity that is conceptualized in entirely temporal terms. It is, he argues, the temporal categories of memory and imagination that make humans uniquely capable of selfhood and freedom. This early conception lacks the tendency towards domination described in Leviathan, in which the state of nature is presented as a war of all against all. However, this article argues that what the state of nature reveals is that the temporality of subjectivity is not objective, but rather socially produced. As such, the state of nature depicts behavior resulting from material anxiety, which prevents thinking, and therefore acting, beyond the present. Political institutions therefore emerge in his thought as a mechanism for quelling anxiety such that the future becomes actionable. By projecting a vision of a secure, open future, these institutions create a present in which meaningful, self-directed actions become possible. That is, he is the first to posit the very modern notion that political institutions fundamentally shape our sense of possibility.
{"title":"The paradox of possibility: A temporal reading of Thomas Hobbes","authors":"Jennifer Corby","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284517","url":null,"abstract":"This article engages the role of temporality in the work of Thomas Hobbes. Rather than focusing on the political individual proposed by his later works, it politicizes the conception of subjectivity advanced in his earlier works. In these, he advances a materialist account of subjectivity that is conceptualized in entirely temporal terms. It is, he argues, the temporal categories of memory and imagination that make humans uniquely capable of selfhood and freedom. This early conception lacks the tendency towards domination described in Leviathan, in which the state of nature is presented as a war of all against all. However, this article argues that what the state of nature reveals is that the temporality of subjectivity is not objective, but rather socially produced. As such, the state of nature depicts behavior resulting from material anxiety, which prevents thinking, and therefore acting, beyond the present. Political institutions therefore emerge in his thought as a mechanism for quelling anxiety such that the future becomes actionable. By projecting a vision of a secure, open future, these institutions create a present in which meaningful, self-directed actions become possible. That is, he is the first to posit the very modern notion that political institutions fundamentally shape our sense of possibility.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-14DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284516
Lauren Guilmette
This essay engages Drucilla Cornell's thinking about ethical feminism, dignity, and intergenerational responsibility in the wake of her passing in December 2022.
{"title":"Legacies of dignity: Remembering Drucilla Cornell","authors":"Lauren Guilmette","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284516","url":null,"abstract":"This essay engages Drucilla Cornell's thinking about ethical feminism, dignity, and intergenerational responsibility in the wake of her passing in December 2022.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142253485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-14DOI: 10.1177/01914537241284525
Robert Diab
In the mid-1980s, Richard Rorty debated aspects of Jean-François Lyotard’s evolving theories of language and politics, embracing the latter’s critique of metanarratives as forms of metaphysics we should discard but rejecting Lyotard’s claims about the incommensurability of language games. Largely overlooked was the force of Lyotard’s critique of the transvaluation of knowledge in the emerging digital age, canvased in The Postmodern Condition. This article revisits the encounter between these thinkers to reconstruct the more central challenge that Lyotard’s theory posed to Rorty’s pragmatic politics and to liberal cosmopolitanism more broadly. Lyotard’s work was prescient in detailing an emerging technological order in which ideals of tolerance and solidarity in the form of Rortian translation and redescription come into conflict with imperatives of performativity, profit-seeking, and power – fostering dominance rather than universal progress. The article concludes by drawing implications of the encounter for current scholarship on Rorty and political theory.
{"title":"Revisiting the Rorty–Lyotard debate: The microchip and liberal cosmopolitanism","authors":"Robert Diab","doi":"10.1177/01914537241284525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241284525","url":null,"abstract":"In the mid-1980s, Richard Rorty debated aspects of Jean-François Lyotard’s evolving theories of language and politics, embracing the latter’s critique of metanarratives as forms of metaphysics we should discard but rejecting Lyotard’s claims about the incommensurability of language games. Largely overlooked was the force of Lyotard’s critique of the transvaluation of knowledge in the emerging digital age, canvased in The Postmodern Condition. This article revisits the encounter between these thinkers to reconstruct the more central challenge that Lyotard’s theory posed to Rorty’s pragmatic politics and to liberal cosmopolitanism more broadly. Lyotard’s work was prescient in detailing an emerging technological order in which ideals of tolerance and solidarity in the form of Rortian translation and redescription come into conflict with imperatives of performativity, profit-seeking, and power – fostering dominance rather than universal progress. The article concludes by drawing implications of the encounter for current scholarship on Rorty and political theory.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142269064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263273
Rosalind Dixon
Constitutions serve to legitimate the exercise of public power. Yet their scope is often subject to reasonable disagreement among citizens in a democracy. As Frank Michelman notes, this points to an understanding of democratic constitutions as a framework for contestation, rather than entrenched set of binding legal constraints. This understanding, however, arguably overlooks the difference between ordinary constitutional norms and those that protect the ‘democratic minimum core’. For the latter, there is far less scope for reasonable disagreement, and greater prudential importance to conceptualizing constitutions as entrenched norms authorized strong-form judicial review. The essay thus explores the idea of a ‘tiered’ approach to constitutional design, which combines elements of strong and weak constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review. In doing so, it further considers the role that transnational norms or practices could play in helping delineate these different constitutional tiers.
{"title":"Justification by constitution and tiered constitutional design?","authors":"Rosalind Dixon","doi":"10.1177/01914537241263273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537241263273","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutions serve to legitimate the exercise of public power. Yet their scope is often subject to reasonable disagreement among citizens in a democracy. As Frank Michelman notes, this points to an understanding of democratic constitutions as a framework for contestation, rather than entrenched set of binding legal constraints. This understanding, however, arguably overlooks the difference between ordinary constitutional norms and those that protect the ‘democratic minimum core’. For the latter, there is far less scope for reasonable disagreement, and greater prudential importance to conceptualizing constitutions as entrenched norms authorized strong-form judicial review. The essay thus explores the idea of a ‘tiered’ approach to constitutional design, which combines elements of strong and weak constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review. In doing so, it further considers the role that transnational norms or practices could play in helping delineate these different constitutional tiers.","PeriodicalId":46930,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142219334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-06DOI: 10.1177/01914537241270740
David Ventura
The final chapter of Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth includes several psychiatric case histories that speak to the indelible effects of the deathly atmospherics of colonialism on the psychology of the colonized. Though Fanon reveals that these case histories are drawn from his own clinical practice in Algeria, he almost entirely refuses to contextualize their inclusion in the text, and even warns that his presentation intentionally ‘avoid[s] any semiological, nosological, or therapeutic discussion’. In this article, I read Fanon’s case histories in Wretched in terms of Christina Sharpe’s notion of Black redaction, which she adumbrates in her In the Wake: On Blackness and Being as a critical strategy for ‘imagining otherwise’ that seeks to counter the generalized anti-Black atmosphere that still governs the world in the wake of transatlantic slavery. My argument is that in presenting the case histories of Wretched in refusal of dominant psychiatric discourses, Fanon engages a Black redactive strategy that aims to imagine the psychological effects of colonization otherwise than through the pathologizing colonial frames by which racialized and colonized lives are systematically rendered invisible. Further, I contend that reading Fanon’s case histories in such Black redactive terms enables us to recognize that his clinically inflected political thought is not premised on a valuation of pathology, as has been argued by his Black optimist (Fred Moten) and Afro-pessimist (Jared Sexton) readers alike. In fact, as I conclude by arguing in response to these readings, at play in Fanon’s Black redactive strategy in Wretched is not a valuation of pathology, but the matter of its transvaluation.
弗朗茨-法农的《地球上的不幸者》的最后一章包含了几个精神病病例，这些病例说明了殖民主义的死亡气氛对殖民者心理的不可磨灭的影响。虽然法农透露这些病例来自他自己在阿尔及利亚的临床实践，但他几乎完全拒绝将这些病例纳入文本的背景，甚至警告说他的表述有意 "避免任何符号学、名词学或治疗学的讨论"。在本文中，我从克里斯蒂娜-夏普（Christina Sharpe）的 "黑人节录"（Black redaction）概念的角度来解读法农在《悲惨世界》中的个案史，她在《唤醒：关于黑人与存在》（In the Wake: On Blackness and Being）一书中将 "黑人节录 "作为一种 "另类想象 "的批判性策略，旨在对抗跨大西洋奴隶制之后仍然笼罩世界的普遍反黑人氛围。我的论点是，法农在呈现《悲惨世界》的病例史时，拒绝了主流的精神病学话语，他采用了一种黑人再活动策略，旨在通过病理化的殖民框架，想象殖民化的心理影响，而不是通过病理化的殖民框架，系统地使种族化和殖民化的生活变得无影无踪。此外，我认为，以这种黑人重写的方式阅读法农的案例史，能够让我们认识到，他的临床政治思想并非以病理学评价为前提，正如他的黑人乐观主义读者（弗雷德-莫滕）和非洲悲观主义读者（贾里德-塞克斯顿）所认为的那样。事实上，正如我最后针对这些解读所做的论证，法农在《凄凉》一书中的黑人再行动策略并不是对病态的评价，而是对病态的反评价。
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Pub Date : 2024-08-06DOI: 10.1177/01914537241265117
Guido Niccolò Barbi
This article discusses possible ways to account for how solidarity comes to be constituted. Beyond accounts tying solidarity either to identity, or to the adherence to a common normative framework, recent scholarship has underscored the role played by collective action in bringing about solidarity. In this paper, I agree that collective action has been often overlooked as a fundamental element in constituting solidarity but warn against the risk of conceptualizing the source of solidarity exclusively in terms of action. Instead, I propose to understand solidarity as resulting from the continuous interaction between two different dimensions of solidarity: constitutive solidarity that centres on collective action, and constituted solidarity which centres on given identities. My paper begins by distinguishing the two meanings of solidarity – constituted and constitutive. The first referring to an (instituted) set of mutual obligations applying to a given group, the second referring to solidarity as underlying social bond, which establishes the solidarity group in the first place. The paper then goes on to discuss three different accounts of constitutive solidarity: identity-based, obligations-based and action-based. I argue that only the action-based account can conceptualise the coming about of new forms of solidarity and the changing scope of the solidarity group. Yet, such accounts are unable to conceptualise how constitutive solidarity can come to ground constituted forms of solidarity, able to endure through time. On this basis, I propose to interpret constitutive and constituted solidarity as two ‘moments’ of solidarity, one symbolically grounding the other, even if not through linear causation. Rather, constitutive solidarity is constantly evolving and constantly contributes to remap the identities depicting social reality, which ground constituted forms of solidarity.
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