Fulya Apaydin, Ferit Serkan Öngel, Jonas W. Schmid, Erol Ülker
{"title":"When do workers support executive aggrandizement? Lessons from the recent Turkish experience","authors":"Fulya Apaydin, Ferit Serkan Öngel, Jonas W. Schmid, Erol Ülker","doi":"10.1111/irj.12360","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following the 2017 constitutional referendum under the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party-AKP) rule in Turkey, the reforms granted judicial and legislative powers to the head of the executive under a presidential system. Initial observations reveal that some blue-collar workers who are members of a historically progressive union have also supported these reforms. This is surprising because the union leadership has publicly opposed these changes. What explains this discrepancy? Why did some of these workers support reforms in favour of a powerful executive? Based on a sample from a major metalworking union, this paper finds that partisan identity moderates support for AKP's push for challenging the separation of powers. Although we find that higher amount of debt may reduce worker support for stronger executive, this is conditional on the metal workers' pre-existing partisan commitments. Under these circumstances, highly indebted partisan workers do not diverge from the party line. These results also raise further questions for students of labour and regime change elsewhere in the developing world.</p>","PeriodicalId":46619,"journal":{"name":"INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/irj.12360","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Following the 2017 constitutional referendum under the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party-AKP) rule in Turkey, the reforms granted judicial and legislative powers to the head of the executive under a presidential system. Initial observations reveal that some blue-collar workers who are members of a historically progressive union have also supported these reforms. This is surprising because the union leadership has publicly opposed these changes. What explains this discrepancy? Why did some of these workers support reforms in favour of a powerful executive? Based on a sample from a major metalworking union, this paper finds that partisan identity moderates support for AKP's push for challenging the separation of powers. Although we find that higher amount of debt may reduce worker support for stronger executive, this is conditional on the metal workers' pre-existing partisan commitments. Under these circumstances, highly indebted partisan workers do not diverge from the party line. These results also raise further questions for students of labour and regime change elsewhere in the developing world.
在土耳其正义与发展党(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi)统治下的2017年宪法公投之后,改革将司法权和立法权授予总统制下的行政首脑。最初的观察显示,一些蓝领工人也支持这些改革,他们是一个历史上进步的工会的成员。这是令人惊讶的,因为工会领导层公开反对这些变化。如何解释这种差异呢?为什么这些工人中有些人支持改革,支持大权在握的高管?基于一个主要金属加工工会的样本,本文发现党派认同缓和了对正义与发展党推动挑战三权分立的支持。虽然我们发现较高的债务数额可能会减少工人对更强大的高管的支持,但这是基于金属工人先前存在的党派承诺。在这种情况下,债台高筑的党派工作者不会偏离党的路线。这些结果也为研究其他发展中国家劳工和政权变化的学生提出了进一步的问题。