Nietzsche comme Bouddha de l'Europe, ou De l'Affinité des "Contraires"

IF 0.7 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI:10.1353/hph.2023.0022
Antoine Panaïoti
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Abstract

abstract:According to a common caricature, Nietzsche cuts the figure of an anti-Buddha who advocates a type of life affirmation that is the contrary of Buddhist or Schopenhauerian life negation. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate, through a rigorous study of some of his later works—most notably Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antichrist (1905[1888]), and Ecce Homo (1908[1888])—that Nietzsche does not at all present himself as an anti-Buddha stricto sensu, or as a figure whose teaching is diametrically opposed to that of the Indian master. The late Nietzsche, more precisely, does not conceive of amor fati and nirvāṇa as opposed ethical poles—or negatives of one another. On the contrary, certain texts in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist make it clear that there are significant affinities between amor fati and nirvāṇa as Nietzsche understands it, with respect to both the relationship to the self (seeing oneself "as a fatum") and to the other (overcoming ressentiment) that it implies. This, I conclude, lends credence to Nietzsche's infamous hypothesis according to which, contrary to appearances, all ethical ideals might in fact be "insidiously consanguine, linked up, knotted with that bad thing which seems to be their contrary" (Beyond Good and Evil, §2, KSA 5:17).
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尼采作为欧洲的佛陀,或“对立”的亲和力
根据一幅常见的漫画,尼采塑造了一个反佛的形象,他倡导一种与佛教或叔本华式的生命否定相反的生命肯定。在本文中,我试图通过对他后期作品的严谨研究来证明——最著名的是《超越善恶》(1886)、《反基督》(1905[1888])和《见人》(1908[1888])——尼采根本没有把自己呈现为一个严格意义上的反佛陀,或者是一个教义与印度大师截然相反的人物。更准确地说,晚期的尼采,并不认为爱和nirvāṇa是对立的伦理极点,或互为否定。相反,在《我是人》和《反基督者》中,某些文本清楚地表明,正如尼采所理解的那样,爱与命运之间存在着重要的亲缘关系,就其与自我的关系(将自己视为“命运”)和与他人的关系(克服怨恨)而言,这意味着。我的结论是,这为尼采臭名昭著的假设提供了依据,根据这个假设,与表象相反,所有的伦理理想实际上可能是“阴险地有血缘关系,与那些似乎与他们相反的坏事联系在一起”(超越善恶,§2,KSA 5:17)。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
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0.00%
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72
期刊介绍: Since January 2002, the Journal of the History of Philosophy has been published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. For subscriptions, change of address, and back issues, please contact Subscription Services. In addition to photocopying allowed by the "fair use" doctrine, JHP authorizes personal or educational multiple-copying by instructors for use within a course. This policy does not cover photocopying for commercial use either by individuals or publishers. All such uses must be authorized by JHP.
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