{"title":"Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination\n in pure coordination games","authors":"James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their\n choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is\n through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just\n assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been\n suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged\n to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an\n in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity,\n measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in\n nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no\n descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the\n others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online\n experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected\n effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and\n team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies,\n those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier\n to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said\n they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a\n follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with\n strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and\n team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior\n was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A\n hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team\n reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the\n strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may\n have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to\n predict their strategy.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Judgment and Decision Making","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009116","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their
choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is
through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just
assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been
suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged
to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an
in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity,
measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in
nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no
descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the
others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online
experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected
effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and
team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies,
those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier
to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said
they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a
follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with
strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and
team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior
was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A
hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team
reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the
strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may
have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to
predict their strategy.