Zi‐Han Wei, Xiao‐Zhuang Wang, Li-Qian Jia, Hong‐Zhi Liu
Continuous risky decisions refer to decisions that involve trade-offs among options with persistent risks. People can use the probability of occurrence per unit time (e.g., ‘the probability of occurrence is 1% per month’) or the average time of risk occurrence (e.g., ‘the average occurrence time is 100 months’) to represent continuous risky options. In this study, we examined the effect of the presentation format (i.e., the probability of occurrence per unit time vs. the average time of risk occurrence) on continuous risky decisions in the gain domain and further explored the underlying mechanism. In Study 1 (N = 122), we demonstrated the effect of presentation format on continuous risky decisions and the moderating effect of the magnitude of probabilities. Specifically, when the probabilities were relatively low, compared with the probability of occurrence per unit time, using the average time of risk occurrence to present the continuous risky options led to more risk-averse decisions. However, when the probabilities were relatively high, compared with the probability of occurrence per unit time, the presentation format of the average time occurrence led to more risk-seeking decisions. In Study 2 (N = 136), we found that the moderating effect of the option probabilities on continuous risky decisions was mediated by the subjective attribute-wise difference judgment. In Study 3 (N = 221), we replicated the effect of presentation format on continuous risky decisions in more natural scenarios. The study offered a deep understanding of the mechanism of continuous risky decision-making, and the results were conducive to further developing theories in relevant fields.
{"title":"Probability or time: Effect of presentation format on continuous risky decisions","authors":"Zi‐Han Wei, Xiao‐Zhuang Wang, Li-Qian Jia, Hong‐Zhi Liu","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.25","url":null,"abstract":"Continuous risky decisions refer to decisions that involve trade-offs among options with persistent risks. People can use the probability of occurrence per unit time (e.g., ‘the probability of occurrence is 1% per month’) or the average time of risk occurrence (e.g., ‘the average occurrence time is 100 months’) to represent continuous risky options. In this study, we examined the effect of the presentation format (i.e., the probability of occurrence per unit time vs. the average time of risk occurrence) on continuous risky decisions in the gain domain and further explored the underlying mechanism. In Study 1 (N = 122), we demonstrated the effect of presentation format on continuous risky decisions and the moderating effect of the magnitude of probabilities. Specifically, when the probabilities were relatively low, compared with the probability of occurrence per unit time, using the average time of risk occurrence to present the continuous risky options led to more risk-averse decisions. However, when the probabilities were relatively high, compared with the probability of occurrence per unit time, the presentation format of the average time occurrence led to more risk-seeking decisions. In Study 2 (N = 136), we found that the moderating effect of the option probabilities on continuous risky decisions was mediated by the subjective attribute-wise difference judgment. In Study 3 (N = 221), we replicated the effect of presentation format on continuous risky decisions in more natural scenarios. The study offered a deep understanding of the mechanism of continuous risky decision-making, and the results were conducive to further developing theories in relevant fields.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefanie Lindow, Anne Lehmann, David Buttelmann, Tilmann Betsch
Abstract A child’s world is full of cues that may help to learn about decision options by providing valuable predictions. However, not all cues are always equally valid. To enhance decision-making, one should use cue validities as weights in decision-making. Prior research showed children’s difficulty in doing so. In 2 conceptual replication studies, we investigated preschoolers’ competencies when they encounter a cue whose prediction is always correct. We assessed 5- to 6-year-olds’ cue evaluations and decision-making in an information-board-game. Participants faced 3 cues when repeatedly choosing between 2 locations to find treasures: A nonprobabilistic, high-validity cue that always provided correct predictions ( p = 1) paired with 2 probabilistically correct (Study 1: p = .34, p = .17) or 2 nonprobabilistic, incorrect cues (Study 2: p = 0). Participants considered cue validities—albeit in a rudimentary form. In their cue evaluations, they preferred the high-validity cue, indicating their ability to understand and use cue validity for evaluations. However, in their decision-making, they did not prioritize the high-validity cue. Rather, they frequently searched and followed the predictions of less valid (Study 1) and incorrect cues (Study 2). Our studies strengthen the current state of decision research suggesting that the systematic use of cue validities in decision-making develops throughout childhood. Apparently, having appropriate cue evaluations that reflect cue validities is not sufficient for their use in decision-making. We discuss our findings while considering the importance of learning instances for the development of decision competencies.
儿童的世界充满了线索，这些线索可能有助于通过提供有价值的预测来学习决策选项。然而，并非所有线索都同样有效。为了加强决策，我们应该在决策中使用提示效度作为权重。先前的研究表明，孩子们很难做到这一点。在两个概念重复研究中，我们调查了学龄前儿童在遇到预测总是正确的线索时的能力。我们在一个信息棋盘游戏中评估了5到6岁儿童的线索评估和决策。当参与者在两个地点之间反复选择寻找宝藏时，他们面临3个线索:一个非概率的、高有效性的线索，它总是提供正确的预测(p = 1)，另一个是非概率的、正确的线索(研究1:p = 0.34, p = 0.17)，或者两个非概率的、错误的线索(研究2:p = 0)。参与者考虑线索的有效性——尽管是基本的形式。在线索评价中，他们更倾向于高效度线索，这表明他们有能力理解和使用线索效度进行评价。然而，在他们的决策中，他们并没有优先考虑高效度的线索。相反，他们经常搜索和遵循不太有效的线索(研究1)和不正确的线索(研究2)的预测。我们的研究加强了决策研究的现状，表明在整个童年时期，决策中系统地使用线索效度。显然，有适当的线索评价来反映线索效度是不足以使其在决策中使用的。我们讨论了我们的发现，同时考虑了学习实例对决策能力发展的重要性。
{"title":"Preschoolers’ use of cue validities as weights in decision-making: Certainty does not substantially change the world","authors":"Stefanie Lindow, Anne Lehmann, David Buttelmann, Tilmann Betsch","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.36","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A child’s world is full of cues that may help to learn about decision options by providing valuable predictions. However, not all cues are always equally valid. To enhance decision-making, one should use cue validities as weights in decision-making. Prior research showed children’s difficulty in doing so. In 2 conceptual replication studies, we investigated preschoolers’ competencies when they encounter a cue whose prediction is always correct. We assessed 5- to 6-year-olds’ cue evaluations and decision-making in an information-board-game. Participants faced 3 cues when repeatedly choosing between 2 locations to find treasures: A nonprobabilistic, high-validity cue that always provided correct predictions ( p = 1) paired with 2 probabilistically correct (Study 1: p = .34, p = .17) or 2 nonprobabilistic, incorrect cues (Study 2: p = 0). Participants considered cue validities—albeit in a rudimentary form. In their cue evaluations, they preferred the high-validity cue, indicating their ability to understand and use cue validity for evaluations. However, in their decision-making, they did not prioritize the high-validity cue. Rather, they frequently searched and followed the predictions of less valid (Study 1) and incorrect cues (Study 2). Our studies strengthen the current state of decision research suggesting that the systematic use of cue validities in decision-making develops throughout childhood. Apparently, having appropriate cue evaluations that reflect cue validities is not sufficient for their use in decision-making. We discuss our findings while considering the importance of learning instances for the development of decision competencies.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136373897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philanthropic organizations experience difficulties in obtaining support from younger generations, highlighting the need for modern fundraising strategies. Advances in technology provide a potential solution by offering alternatives to traditional fundraising practices. In an experimental study in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), we investigated whether virtual reality (VR) could be harnessed to innovate fundraising. We customized a VR module developed by the ICRC and tested its effectiveness at eliciting donations compared to that of an on-screen version of the experience. In addition, we explored mechanisms that might drive this effect, namely the level of interactivity (active/passive) and the type of affect elicited by the module (positive—happy ending/negative—tragic ending), as well as subjective perceptions and emotions related to the experience. Our findings showed that VR, compared with an on-screen experience, led to both an increase in incentivized donations and a larger reported propensity to become regular donors. Investigating the mechanisms that might drive the effect, we found that the VR experience led to stronger emotional feelings (notably being moved and sadness) and improved quality of the experience (e.g., level of interest and vividness). We further found physiological evidence showing a significant increase in arousal for the VR condition compared with the on-screen condition, although this was not correlated with an increase in donations. Taken together, our study provides evidence that VR could be a viable tool to innovate fundraising and identifies some of the features that may make this medium more effective than traditional practices.
{"title":"Virtual reality for philanthropy: A promising tool to innovate fundraising","authors":"Nina M. Sooter, Giuseppe Ugazio","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.15","url":null,"abstract":"Philanthropic organizations experience difficulties in obtaining support from younger generations, highlighting the need for modern fundraising strategies. Advances in technology provide a potential solution by offering alternatives to traditional fundraising practices. In an experimental study in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), we investigated whether virtual reality (VR) could be harnessed to innovate fundraising. We customized a VR module developed by the ICRC and tested its effectiveness at eliciting donations compared to that of an on-screen version of the experience. In addition, we explored mechanisms that might drive this effect, namely the level of interactivity (active/passive) and the type of affect elicited by the module (positive—happy ending/negative—tragic ending), as well as subjective perceptions and emotions related to the experience. Our findings showed that VR, compared with an on-screen experience, led to both an increase in incentivized donations and a larger reported propensity to become regular donors. Investigating the mechanisms that might drive the effect, we found that the VR experience led to stronger emotional feelings (notably being moved and sadness) and improved quality of the experience (e.g., level of interest and vividness). We further found physiological evidence showing a significant increase in arousal for the VR condition compared with the on-screen condition, although this was not correlated with an increase in donations. Taken together, our study provides evidence that VR could be a viable tool to innovate fundraising and identifies some of the features that may make this medium more effective than traditional practices.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political divisions have become a central feature of modern life. Here, we ask whether these divisions affect advice-taking from co- and counter-partisans in a nonpolitical context. In an incentivized task assessing the accuracy of nonpolitical news headlines, we find partisan bias in advice-taking: Democratic participants are less swayed by (accurate) information that comes from Republicans compared to the same information from Democrats (Republican participants display no such bias). We then adjudicate between two possible mechanisms for this biased advice-taking: a preference-based account, where participants are motivated to take less advice from counter-partisans because doing so is unpleasant; versus a belief-based account, where participants sincerely believe co-partisans are more competent at the task (even though this belief is incorrect). To do so, we examine the impact of a substantial increase in the stakes, which should increase accuracy motivations (and thereby reduce the relative impact of partisan motivations). We find that increasing the stakes does not reduce biased advice-taking, hence no evidence to support the bias is driven by preference. Consistent with the belief-based account, we find that Democratic participants (incorrectly) believe their co-partisans are better at the task, and this incorrect belief is much less severe among Republican participants. Further supporting the notion that the stated beliefs are sincere, raising the stakes of the belief elicitation of relative partisan competence does not affect the stated beliefs. Finally, participants—instead of ignoring the feedback—actually substantially update in favor of their counter-partisans given feedback that suggests counter-partisans are competent.
{"title":"Sincere or motivated? Partisan bias in advice-taking","authors":"Yunhao Zhang, David G. Rand","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.28","url":null,"abstract":"Political divisions have become a central feature of modern life. Here, we ask whether these divisions affect advice-taking from co- and counter-partisans in a nonpolitical context. In an incentivized task assessing the accuracy of nonpolitical news headlines, we find partisan bias in advice-taking: Democratic participants are less swayed by (accurate) information that comes from Republicans compared to the same information from Democrats (Republican participants display no such bias). We then adjudicate between two possible mechanisms for this biased advice-taking: a preference-based account, where participants are motivated to take less advice from counter-partisans because doing so is unpleasant; versus a belief-based account, where participants sincerely believe co-partisans are more competent at the task (even though this belief is incorrect). To do so, we examine the impact of a substantial increase in the stakes, which should increase accuracy motivations (and thereby reduce the relative impact of partisan motivations). We find that increasing the stakes does not reduce biased advice-taking, hence no evidence to support the bias is driven by preference. Consistent with the belief-based account, we find that Democratic participants (incorrectly) believe their co-partisans are better at the task, and this incorrect belief is much less severe among Republican participants. Further supporting the notion that the stated beliefs are sincere, raising the stakes of the belief elicitation of relative partisan competence does not affect the stated beliefs. Finally, participants—instead of ignoring the feedback—actually substantially update in favor of their counter-partisans given feedback that suggests counter-partisans are competent.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are life’s biggest decisions? In Study 1, I devised a taxonomy comprising 9 decision categories, 58 decision types, and 10 core elements of big decisions. In Study 2, I revealed people’s perceptions of and expectations for the average person’s big life decisions. In the flagship Study 3, 658 participants described their 10 biggest past and future decisions and rated each decision on a variety of decision elements. This research reveals the characteristics of a big life decision, which are the most common, most important, and most positively evaluated big life decisions, when such decisions happen, and which factors predict ‘good’ decisions. This research contributes to knowledge that could help people improve their lives through better decision-making and living with fewer regrets.
{"title":"An investigation of big life decisions","authors":"Adrian R. Camilleri","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.30","url":null,"abstract":"What are life’s biggest decisions? In Study 1, I devised a taxonomy comprising 9 decision categories, 58 decision types, and 10 core elements of big decisions. In Study 2, I revealed people’s perceptions of and expectations for the average person’s big life decisions. In the flagship Study 3, 658 participants described their 10 biggest past and future decisions and rated each decision on a variety of decision elements. This research reveals the characteristics of a big life decision, which are the most common, most important, and most positively evaluated big life decisions, when such decisions happen, and which factors predict ‘good’ decisions. This research contributes to knowledge that could help people improve their lives through better decision-making and living with fewer regrets.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56718033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jianmin Zeng, Yujie Yuan, Ziyun Gao, Ying He, Tao Wang, Jie Xu
Suppose you need to complete a task of 5 steps, each of which has equal difficulty and pass rate. You somehow have a privilege that can ensure you pass one of the steps, but you need to decide which step to be privileged before you start the task. Which step do you want to privilege? Mathematically speaking, the effect of each step on the final outcome is identical, and so there seems to be no prima facie reason for a preference. Five studies were conducted to explore this issue. In Study 1, participants could place the privilege on any of steps 1–5. Participants were most inclined to privilege step 5. In Study 2, participants needed to pay some money to purchase the privilege for steps 1–5, respectively. Participants would pay most money for step 5. Study 3 directly reminded participants that the probability of success of the whole task is mathematically the same, no matter on which step the privilege is placed, but most of the participants still prefer to privilege the final step. Study 4 supposed that the outcomes of all steps were not announced until all steps were finished, and asked how painful participants would feel if they passed all steps but one. People thought they would feel most painful when they failed at the final step. In Study 5, an implicit association test showed that people associated the first step with easy and the final step with hard. These results demonstrated the phenomenon of the final step effect and suggested that both anticipated painfulness and stereotype may play a role in this phenomenon.
{"title":"The final step effect","authors":"Jianmin Zeng, Yujie Yuan, Ziyun Gao, Ying He, Tao Wang, Jie Xu","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose you need to complete a task of 5 steps, each of which has equal difficulty and pass rate. You somehow have a privilege that can ensure you pass one of the steps, but you need to decide which step to be privileged before you start the task. Which step do you want to privilege? Mathematically speaking, the effect of each step on the final outcome is identical, and so there seems to be no prima facie reason for a preference. Five studies were conducted to explore this issue. In Study 1, participants could place the privilege on any of steps 1–5. Participants were most inclined to privilege step 5. In Study 2, participants needed to pay some money to purchase the privilege for steps 1–5, respectively. Participants would pay most money for step 5. Study 3 directly reminded participants that the probability of success of the whole task is mathematically the same, no matter on which step the privilege is placed, but most of the participants still prefer to privilege the final step. Study 4 supposed that the outcomes of all steps were not announced until all steps were finished, and asked how painful participants would feel if they passed all steps but one. People thought they would feel most painful when they failed at the final step. In Study 5, an implicit association test showed that people associated the first step with easy and the final step with hard. These results demonstrated the phenomenon of the final step effect and suggested that both anticipated painfulness and stereotype may play a role in this phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Several papers have challenged the robustness of loss aversion, claiming that it is context-dependent and disappears for small stakes. These papers use a behavioral definition of loss aversion that may be confounded by diminishing sensitivity and probability/event weighting under the new version of prospect theory (PT). We perform a new theory-based test of loss aversion that controls for these confounds. We found significant loss aversion for both small stakes and high stakes. The overall loss aversion coefficient varied between 1.25 and 1.45, less than commonly observed. Loss aversion decreased slightly for small stakes, but the effect was small and usually insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that, under PT, loss aversion is robust to stake size.
{"title":"Prospect theory’s loss aversion is robust to stake size","authors":"H. Bleichrodt, Olivier L’Haridon","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.2","url":null,"abstract":"Several papers have challenged the robustness of loss aversion, claiming that it is context-dependent and disappears for small stakes. These papers use a behavioral definition of loss aversion that may be confounded by diminishing sensitivity and probability/event weighting under the new version of prospect theory (PT). We perform a new theory-based test of loss aversion that controls for these confounds. We found significant loss aversion for both small stakes and high stakes. The overall loss aversion coefficient varied between 1.25 and 1.45, less than commonly observed. Loss aversion decreased slightly for small stakes, but the effect was small and usually insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that, under PT, loss aversion is robust to stake size.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many collaborative online projects such as Wikipedia and OpenStreetMap organize collaboration among their contributors sequentially. In sequential collaboration, one contributor creates an entry which is then consecutively encountered by other contributors who decide whether to adjust or maintain the presented entry. For numeric and geographical judgments, sequential collaboration yields improved judgments over the course of a sequential chain and results in accurate final estimates. We hypothesize that these benefits emerge since contributors adjust entries according to their expertise, implying that judgments of experts have a larger impact compared with those of novices. In three preregistered studies, we measured and manipulated expertise to investigate whether expertise leads to higher change probabilities and larger improvements in judgment accuracy. Moreover, we tested whether expertise results in an increase in accuracy over the course of a sequential chain. As expected, experts adjusted entries more frequently, made larger improvements, and contributed more to the final estimates of sequential chains. Overall, our findings suggest that the high accuracy of sequential collaboration is due to an implicit weighting of judgments by expertise.
{"title":"Expertise determines frequency and accuracy of contributions in sequential collaboration","authors":"Maren Mayer, Marcel Broß, D. Heck","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.3","url":null,"abstract":"Many collaborative online projects such as Wikipedia and OpenStreetMap organize collaboration among their contributors sequentially. In sequential collaboration, one contributor creates an entry which is then consecutively encountered by other contributors who decide whether to adjust or maintain the presented entry. For numeric and geographical judgments, sequential collaboration yields improved judgments over the course of a sequential chain and results in accurate final estimates. We hypothesize that these benefits emerge since contributors adjust entries according to their expertise, implying that judgments of experts have a larger impact compared with those of novices. In three preregistered studies, we measured and manipulated expertise to investigate whether expertise leads to higher change probabilities and larger improvements in judgment accuracy. Moreover, we tested whether expertise results in an increase in accuracy over the course of a sequential chain. As expected, experts adjusted entries more frequently, made larger improvements, and contributed more to the final estimates of sequential chains. Overall, our findings suggest that the high accuracy of sequential collaboration is due to an implicit weighting of judgments by expertise.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56718013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Past research has shown that perceived scientific consensus (or lack thereof) on an issue predicts belief in misinformation. In the current study (N = 729), we investigated how perceived consensus among both experts and laypeople predicts beliefs in localized and specific conspiracy theories in Turkey, a non-WEIRD country. Participants in our study were found to overestimate consensus among both experts and laypeople regarding baseless conspiracy theories surrounding the alleged secret articles of the Lausanne Treaty and unused mining reserves in Turkey. Notably, conspiracy believers exhibited a higher tendency to overestimate consensus compared to non-believers. Furthermore, perceived expert consensus had a stronger association with conspiracy beliefs than perceived laypeople consensus. We also explored the correlates of conspiracy beliefs and perceived consensus, including socioeconomic factors, worldview, cognitive sophistication, and personality. The results further indicate that the correlations between belief and perceived consensus manifest with comparable magnitudes, irrespective of the specific conspiracy theories under consideration. These findings support the potential of perceived consensus as an important factor for understanding conspiracy beliefs.
{"title":"Perceived expert and laypeople consensus predict belief in local conspiracy theories in a non-WEIRD culture: Evidence from Turkey","authors":"Sinan Alper, Büşra Elif Yelbuz, Kivanc Konukoglu","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.33","url":null,"abstract":"Past research has shown that perceived scientific consensus (or lack thereof) on an issue predicts belief in misinformation. In the current study (N = 729), we investigated how perceived consensus among both experts and laypeople predicts beliefs in localized and specific conspiracy theories in Turkey, a non-WEIRD country. Participants in our study were found to overestimate consensus among both experts and laypeople regarding baseless conspiracy theories surrounding the alleged secret articles of the Lausanne Treaty and unused mining reserves in Turkey. Notably, conspiracy believers exhibited a higher tendency to overestimate consensus compared to non-believers. Furthermore, perceived expert consensus had a stronger association with conspiracy beliefs than perceived laypeople consensus. We also explored the correlates of conspiracy beliefs and perceived consensus, including socioeconomic factors, worldview, cognitive sophistication, and personality. The results further indicate that the correlations between belief and perceived consensus manifest with comparable magnitudes, irrespective of the specific conspiracy theories under consideration. These findings support the potential of perceived consensus as an important factor for understanding conspiracy beliefs.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56718082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Frederic Becker, M. Wirzberger, Viktoria Pammer-Schindler, S. Srinivas, Falk Lieder
Short-sighted decisions can have devastating consequences, and teaching people to make their decisions in a more far-sighted way is challenging. Previous research found that reflecting on one’s behavior can boost learning from success and failure. Here, we explore the potential benefits of guiding people to reflect on whether and how they thought about what to do (i.e., systematic metacognitive reflection). We devised a series of Socratic questions that prompt people to reflect on their decision-making and tested their effectiveness in a process-tracing experiment with a 5-step planning task ( $N=265$ ). Each participant went through several cycles of making a series of decisions and then either reflecting on how they made those decisions, answering unrelated questions, or moving on to the next decision right away. We found that systematic metacognitive reflection helps people discover adaptive, far-sighted decision strategies faster. Our results suggest that systematic metacognitive reflection is a promising approach to boosting people’s decision-making competence.
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