Creature Construction and the Morality of Shared Agency: Response to Bratman

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Journal of the American Philosophical Association Pub Date : 2022-04-20 DOI:10.1017/apa.2021.25

Margaret Gilbert

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I start by emphasizing two aspects of Michael Bratman's approach to shared agency and contrast it with my own in those respects. I conclude with some related remarks on the relation of morality and joint commitment.

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

生物建构与共享代理的道德性:对布拉特曼的回应

我首先强调了迈克尔·布拉特曼（Michael Bratman）共享代理方法的两个方面，并在这些方面与我自己的方法进行了对比。最后，我就道德和共同承诺的关系作了一些相关的评论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文去求助

来源期刊

Journal of the American Philosophical Association PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Appearing quarterly in print and online, the Journal of the American Philosophical Association provides a platform for original work in all areas of philosophy. The Journal aims to publish compelling papers written in a way that can be appreciated by philosophers of every persuasion and to review papers quickly (typically within 30 days of submission) and fairly (using a triple anonymous review system), encouraging succinct, constructive reports. Papers are published online early via FirstView (typically within 8 weeks of acceptance).

期刊最新文献

What Do Beginning Students Think about Philosophy before Their First College Course? Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege Doing Moral Philosophy Without ‘Normativity’ Explanation and the Right to Explanation How to Disrupt a Social Script