{"title":"State Capitalism in the GATT/WTO Legal Order","authors":"P. Mavroidis, A. Sapir","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgad001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Originally, the multilateral trading regime did not address state capitalism in a comprehensive manner, since none of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade founders had espoused this form of economic governance. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did contain specific provisions dealing with state trading and with subsidies, but nothing more. This situation has remained unchanged over the years, except for tightening the screws in areas already regulated (like subsidies), even though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership has become more and more heterogenous, with some members being overtly state capitalists. This was the case because these new members were either too small to really matter (e.g. Hungary) or because it was hoped that bigger players would transform into market economies (e.g. China). In hindsight, this has proved to be a grave error, since many of the difficulties that the world trading system currently faces originate in the unsatisfactory disciplining of state intervention in the workings of the economy of World Trade Organization members.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Economic Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgad001","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Originally, the multilateral trading regime did not address state capitalism in a comprehensive manner, since none of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade founders had espoused this form of economic governance. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did contain specific provisions dealing with state trading and with subsidies, but nothing more. This situation has remained unchanged over the years, except for tightening the screws in areas already regulated (like subsidies), even though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization membership has become more and more heterogenous, with some members being overtly state capitalists. This was the case because these new members were either too small to really matter (e.g. Hungary) or because it was hoped that bigger players would transform into market economies (e.g. China). In hindsight, this has proved to be a grave error, since many of the difficulties that the world trading system currently faces originate in the unsatisfactory disciplining of state intervention in the workings of the economy of World Trade Organization members.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of International Economic Law is dedicated to encouraging thoughtful and scholarly attention to a very broad range of subjects that concern the relation of law to international economic activity, by providing the major English language medium for publication of high-quality manuscripts relevant to the endeavours of scholars, government officials, legal professionals, and others. The journal"s emphasis is on fundamental, long-term, systemic problems and possible solutions, in the light of empirical observations and experience, as well as theoretical and multi-disciplinary approaches.