Research on legal diffusion typically focuses on laws’ initial adoption and ignores their later evolution. We develop a typology of three subsequent diffusion patterns: convergence, when countries revise laws to move closer to leading regulators; customization, when countries revise laws to move away from leading regulators; and stagnation, when countries cease legislating, leaving initially adopted laws in place. We then propose a general theory suggesting that economic size and geographic distance from leading regulators predict which of the three patterns countries follow. We explore this theory with case studies on the dynamic diffusion of antitrust laws in Russia, Colombia, and Australia.
{"title":"Dynamic diffusion","authors":"Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae034","url":null,"abstract":"Research on legal diffusion typically focuses on laws’ initial adoption and ignores their later evolution. We develop a typology of three subsequent diffusion patterns: convergence, when countries revise laws to move closer to leading regulators; customization, when countries revise laws to move away from leading regulators; and stagnation, when countries cease legislating, leaving initially adopted laws in place. We then propose a general theory suggesting that economic size and geographic distance from leading regulators predict which of the three patterns countries follow. We explore this theory with case studies on the dynamic diffusion of antitrust laws in Russia, Colombia, and Australia.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142257706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) is an important stride forward, but its future is uncertain because of the embedded automatic termination clause. There is a substantial possibility that this provision comes into effect. It would be prudent to focus on how best to utilize the FSA before that scenario materializes. Most notably, international law jurisprudence and World Trade Organization precedents posit that panels can continue to review disputes and issue decisions even after the FSA is terminated as long as the disputes are brought to them before termination. The automatic termination clause is a unique, unprecedented feature, which may kill the hard-earned momentum of the fisheries subsidies regulation. If managed well, however, the potential damage can be controlled and the new agreement can be utilized for the ultimate success of global fisheries subsidies regulation.
{"title":"The automatic termination clause in the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement—brinkmanship for future negotiation or a time bomb for self-destruction?","authors":"Jaemin Lee","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae030","url":null,"abstract":"The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) is an important stride forward, but its future is uncertain because of the embedded automatic termination clause. There is a substantial possibility that this provision comes into effect. It would be prudent to focus on how best to utilize the FSA before that scenario materializes. Most notably, international law jurisprudence and World Trade Organization precedents posit that panels can continue to review disputes and issue decisions even after the FSA is terminated as long as the disputes are brought to them before termination. The automatic termination clause is a unique, unprecedented feature, which may kill the hard-earned momentum of the fisheries subsidies regulation. If managed well, however, the potential damage can be controlled and the new agreement can be utilized for the ultimate success of global fisheries subsidies regulation.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142269262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One crucial measure to curb global warming is the phasing out of fossil fuel production, but doing so can deprive the value of foreign investments in fossil fuels and amount to breaches of investment treaties. Normally, investment treaties are silent about the standards of compensation when treaty violations are established. Tribunals mostly refer to the ‘full reparation’ standard in general international law, potentially resulting in high amounts of compensation that place a significant burden on States implementing climate actions. This paper argues that the amount of compensation under the ‘full reparation’ standard can be reduced on four grounds: (i) depressed energy price in the peak demand era, (ii) unviability of fossil fuel projects, (iii) international environmental obligations, and (iv) international environmental principles. An interpretation document entered into by States can clarify the application of the ‘full reparation’ standard and ensure that these factors are taken into account in quantifying compensation.
{"title":"Rethinking the ‘Full Reparation’ standard in energy investment arbitration: how to take climate change into account","authors":"Yawen Zheng","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae033","url":null,"abstract":"One crucial measure to curb global warming is the phasing out of fossil fuel production, but doing so can deprive the value of foreign investments in fossil fuels and amount to breaches of investment treaties. Normally, investment treaties are silent about the standards of compensation when treaty violations are established. Tribunals mostly refer to the ‘full reparation’ standard in general international law, potentially resulting in high amounts of compensation that place a significant burden on States implementing climate actions. This paper argues that the amount of compensation under the ‘full reparation’ standard can be reduced on four grounds: (i) depressed energy price in the peak demand era, (ii) unviability of fossil fuel projects, (iii) international environmental obligations, and (iv) international environmental principles. An interpretation document entered into by States can clarify the application of the ‘full reparation’ standard and ensure that these factors are taken into account in quantifying compensation.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142178238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The impasse over the appointment of judges to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body shows no signs of abating, raising considerable doubt about the future of appellate review in WTO disputes. This paper examines the rationale for appellate review in the WTO, drawing on both the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the economic literature assessing the desirability of appellate review in judicial systems. It argues that the WTO does not present a compelling economic case for a two-stage judicial process. It further argues that if some form of appellate review is to be retained in the WTO, a discretionary ‘certiorari-like’ mechanism may be the best option.
{"title":"The utility of appellate review at the WTO and its optimal structure","authors":"Alan O Sykes","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae029","url":null,"abstract":"The impasse over the appointment of judges to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body shows no signs of abating, raising considerable doubt about the future of appellate review in WTO disputes. This paper examines the rationale for appellate review in the WTO, drawing on both the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the economic literature assessing the desirability of appellate review in judicial systems. It argues that the WTO does not present a compelling economic case for a two-stage judicial process. It further argues that if some form of appellate review is to be retained in the WTO, a discretionary ‘certiorari-like’ mechanism may be the best option.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142178237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital trade agreements have become integral fora for regulating cross-border digital commercial transactions, including data flows. Deeper commitments in the area of digital trade have however raised serious concerns over the erosion of countries’ regulatory autonomy, prompting the inclusion of an array of safeguards within these treaties. This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of these safeguard mechanisms, which include carve-outs, transition periods, the right to regulate, and exception clauses. By shedding light on the nuances of these safeguard provisions, as well as their complex interplay with commitments made, the article provides a deeper understanding of the evolving dynamics of digital trade governance and its implications for national regulatory autonomy. Based on existing jurisprudence and legal doctrine, the article also tests the scope of the provided policy space, the trade-offs between flexibility and legal certainty, and examines how future-proof the bounds of regulatory autonomy are, considering the highly fluid technological environment.
{"title":"Regulatory autonomy in digital trade agreements","authors":"Mira Burri, Kholofelo Kugler","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae025","url":null,"abstract":"Digital trade agreements have become integral fora for regulating cross-border digital commercial transactions, including data flows. Deeper commitments in the area of digital trade have however raised serious concerns over the erosion of countries’ regulatory autonomy, prompting the inclusion of an array of safeguards within these treaties. This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of these safeguard mechanisms, which include carve-outs, transition periods, the right to regulate, and exception clauses. By shedding light on the nuances of these safeguard provisions, as well as their complex interplay with commitments made, the article provides a deeper understanding of the evolving dynamics of digital trade governance and its implications for national regulatory autonomy. Based on existing jurisprudence and legal doctrine, the article also tests the scope of the provided policy space, the trade-offs between flexibility and legal certainty, and examines how future-proof the bounds of regulatory autonomy are, considering the highly fluid technological environment.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141772210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International investment arbitration is inhabited by actors who theorize the law as scholars and decide on it when arbitrating, which raises critical questions concerning their normative role within the legal system. This article explores empirically the influence of legal scholars on the development of inter-national investment law through a combined legal-empirical and sociological approach designed to capture the multidirectional nature of influence. It relies on a novel database of all citations to legal scholarship in International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) case law, which is analysed quantitatively and qualitatively and contextualized alongside interviews with 16 leading arbitrators and lawyers. The article firstly introduces the arbitrator/academic as an agent of international law, and then details the methodology. It then turns to provide an overview of citations to legal scholarship in ICSID case law, before considering why legal actors find it useful. The following parts show how legal scholarship influenced the development of the definition of an ‘investment’ in ICSID arbitration through an analysis of legal decisions and scholarship authored by arbitrators. The final part goes into conversation with the actors to further unravel how they manage competing and complementary obligations towards theory and practice, and the article concludes by reflecting on the ethical implications of their law-making function.
{"title":"The influence of legal scholars on the development of international investment law","authors":"William Hamilton Byrne","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae014","url":null,"abstract":"International investment arbitration is inhabited by actors who theorize the law as scholars and decide on it when arbitrating, which raises critical questions concerning their normative role within the legal system. This article explores empirically the influence of legal scholars on the development of inter-national investment law through a combined legal-empirical and sociological approach designed to capture the multidirectional nature of influence. It relies on a novel database of all citations to legal scholarship in International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) case law, which is analysed quantitatively and qualitatively and contextualized alongside interviews with 16 leading arbitrators and lawyers. The article firstly introduces the arbitrator/academic as an agent of international law, and then details the methodology. It then turns to provide an overview of citations to legal scholarship in ICSID case law, before considering why legal actors find it useful. The following parts show how legal scholarship influenced the development of the definition of an ‘investment’ in ICSID arbitration through an analysis of legal decisions and scholarship authored by arbitrators. The final part goes into conversation with the actors to further unravel how they manage competing and complementary obligations towards theory and practice, and the article concludes by reflecting on the ethical implications of their law-making function.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"158 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141198283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Countries increasingly adopt measures to make their economy more sustainable. These measures range from pricing carbon and protecting forests to promoting renewable energy and banning forced labour. This article examines how countries can effectively enforce such sustainability requirements on imports. Based on two case studies—the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR)—and other developments in EU customs law and practice, this article shows that customs inspection of elements that cannot be physically detected in the imported product as such is neither unique nor new. Similar challenges arise when dealing with massive inflows of small e-commerce consignments or having to check the origin or value of products. Indeed, for customs enforcement more generally, the trend is one away from physical inspection of products on a transaction basis at the point of entry, toward verification and control of firms before and especially after release of the goods. To implement this ‘product-to-firm’ shift, four back-up features are, however, crucial, focusing on data, penalties/circumvention, cooperation, and resources.
{"title":"Twenty-first century customs fraud: how to effectively enforce EU sustainability requirements on imports","authors":"Joost Pauwelyn","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae013","url":null,"abstract":"Countries increasingly adopt measures to make their economy more sustainable. These measures range from pricing carbon and protecting forests to promoting renewable energy and banning forced labour. This article examines how countries can effectively enforce such sustainability requirements on imports. Based on two case studies—the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR)—and other developments in EU customs law and practice, this article shows that customs inspection of elements that cannot be physically detected in the imported product as such is neither unique nor new. Similar challenges arise when dealing with massive inflows of small e-commerce consignments or having to check the origin or value of products. Indeed, for customs enforcement more generally, the trend is one away from physical inspection of products on a transaction basis at the point of entry, toward verification and control of firms before and especially after release of the goods. To implement this ‘product-to-firm’ shift, four back-up features are, however, crucial, focusing on data, penalties/circumvention, cooperation, and resources.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140930549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global economy is increasingly being weaponized. Citing security concerns from traditional defence to economic competitiveness, health emergency, and climate crisis, states are turning to sanctions, tariffs, export controls, investment screening, and subsidies. But while economic statecraft is becoming common, rules remain scarce. Questions about notice, duration, proportionality, harm minimization, compensation, retaliation, and/or rebalancing lack clear answers and seem almost theoretical. Once, we might have hoped the World Trade Organization (WTO) would play a role in developing such rules. But in the absence of an Appellate Body and in the face of state rejections of review, WTO’s deliberative processes have ground to a halt. This essay argues for a new approach, focused less on adjudicating security disputes than on developing best practices for invoking and using trade security measures. It explains why a new approach is necessary, detailing both how the WTO’s deliberative engine broke down and why dispute settlement is ill-suited to develop guidance now needed. It suggests where and how best practices might be developed, before considering an agenda for such a best practice process. In the end, the hope is a process that can develop expectations—expectations that might make a world of economic statecraft a bit less dangerous.
{"title":"Toward best practices for trade-security measures","authors":"Harlan Grant Cohen","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgad046","url":null,"abstract":"The global economy is increasingly being weaponized. Citing security concerns from traditional defence to economic competitiveness, health emergency, and climate crisis, states are turning to sanctions, tariffs, export controls, investment screening, and subsidies. But while economic statecraft is becoming common, rules remain scarce. Questions about notice, duration, proportionality, harm minimization, compensation, retaliation, and/or rebalancing lack clear answers and seem almost theoretical. Once, we might have hoped the World Trade Organization (WTO) would play a role in developing such rules. But in the absence of an Appellate Body and in the face of state rejections of review, WTO’s deliberative processes have ground to a halt. This essay argues for a new approach, focused less on adjudicating security disputes than on developing best practices for invoking and using trade security measures. It explains why a new approach is necessary, detailing both how the WTO’s deliberative engine broke down and why dispute settlement is ill-suited to develop guidance now needed. It suggests where and how best practices might be developed, before considering an agenda for such a best practice process. In the end, the hope is a process that can develop expectations—expectations that might make a world of economic statecraft a bit less dangerous.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unlike the WTO agreements, most investment treaties’ security exceptions do not further define the concept of ‘essential security interests’, creating significant uncertainty. Securitization theory illuminates conceptual problems associated with an expansive approach to security, security’s role in justifying extraordinary deontic powers, and securitization’s contingency on intersubjective agreement. As securitizing actors, states have put forward four paradigms of security, each significantly expanding the concept beyond its traditional contours. Investors have resisted with two counter-securitizing moves, each involving several tactics. Reacting to these moves and countermoves, tribunals have functioned as either empowering audiences or as nullifying audiences. The ambiguity of essentiality has also generated incongruent interpretations. States’, investors’, and tribunals’ approaches operate on three different planes, each with potential to significantly constrain security’s scope or even negate a successful securitization. Expansive and restrictive interpretations of security present competing implications that make defining it an invidious task, but some interpretations of essentiality are more tenable than others. Overall, tribunals’ narrow interpretations of the concept have operated to considerably limit states’ securitization attempts. While investors should keep a close eye on pending cases involving potentially self-judging security exceptions, they need not be overly concerned that security exceptions pose a significant threat to their interests.
{"title":"Whither security? The concept of ‘essential security interests’ in investment treaties’ security exceptions","authors":"Caroline Henckels","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae011","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike the WTO agreements, most investment treaties’ security exceptions do not further define the concept of ‘essential security interests’, creating significant uncertainty. Securitization theory illuminates conceptual problems associated with an expansive approach to security, security’s role in justifying extraordinary deontic powers, and securitization’s contingency on intersubjective agreement. As securitizing actors, states have put forward four paradigms of security, each significantly expanding the concept beyond its traditional contours. Investors have resisted with two counter-securitizing moves, each involving several tactics. Reacting to these moves and countermoves, tribunals have functioned as either empowering audiences or as nullifying audiences. The ambiguity of essentiality has also generated incongruent interpretations. States’, investors’, and tribunals’ approaches operate on three different planes, each with potential to significantly constrain security’s scope or even negate a successful securitization. Expansive and restrictive interpretations of security present competing implications that make defining it an invidious task, but some interpretations of essentiality are more tenable than others. Overall, tribunals’ narrow interpretations of the concept have operated to considerably limit states’ securitization attempts. While investors should keep a close eye on pending cases involving potentially self-judging security exceptions, they need not be overly concerned that security exceptions pose a significant threat to their interests.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"263 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140035490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the politics of money and central banking came to the forefront. Calls for repoliticizing central banking towards social goals such as inequality, poverty, and climate change have gathered much traction. Economists and political scientists have called for revisiting the long-lost developmental mandates of central banks and for understanding them as social institutions and as terrains of overlapping contestations. Yet, the role of law in framing the discourse on money and monetary policy has been less explored. In this paper, I argue that international law, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund), played a crucial role in the depoliticization of money in the 1970s and 1980s. Legal instruments of the Fund, including conditionality and surveillance, were operationalized to transpose ‘price stability’ and ‘central bank independence’ into the legal mandate of central banks worldwide. From a distinctly political enterprise, central banking became ‘technocratic’ endeavour operating strictly under the paradigm of rationality and neutrality. If, as this paper shows, the law has played a crucial role in depoliticizing money, the law can also be a tool in reorienting central banking towards progressive ends such as tackling poverty or inequality. This would require a careful re-evaluation of the legal institutions of global money, beginning with the Fund itself.
{"title":"Depoliticizing money: how the International Monetary Fund transformed central banking","authors":"Kanad Bagchi","doi":"10.1093/jiel/jgae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgae009","url":null,"abstract":"After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the politics of money and central banking came to the forefront. Calls for repoliticizing central banking towards social goals such as inequality, poverty, and climate change have gathered much traction. Economists and political scientists have called for revisiting the long-lost developmental mandates of central banks and for understanding them as social institutions and as terrains of overlapping contestations. Yet, the role of law in framing the discourse on money and monetary policy has been less explored. In this paper, I argue that international law, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund), played a crucial role in the depoliticization of money in the 1970s and 1980s. Legal instruments of the Fund, including conditionality and surveillance, were operationalized to transpose ‘price stability’ and ‘central bank independence’ into the legal mandate of central banks worldwide. From a distinctly political enterprise, central banking became ‘technocratic’ endeavour operating strictly under the paradigm of rationality and neutrality. If, as this paper shows, the law has played a crucial role in depoliticizing money, the law can also be a tool in reorienting central banking towards progressive ends such as tackling poverty or inequality. This would require a careful re-evaluation of the legal institutions of global money, beginning with the Fund itself.","PeriodicalId":46864,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economic Law","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140035497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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