Ownership structure of oil revenues: Political institutions and financial markets in oil-producing countries

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Multinational Financial Management Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.mulfin.2022.100760
Jabir Ibrahim Mohammed , Vera Ogeh Fiador , Amin Karimu , Joshua Yindenaba Abor
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the ownership structure of oil revenues on financial markets and institutions, and the intermediating role of political institutions. Using the fixed-effects model and GMM for robustness, we analyse data from 82 oil-producing countries. We find several key results. Firstly, government ownership of oil revenues undermines the efficiency of financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak, but enhances their efficiency when political institutions are strong. Secondly, the impact of private ownership of oil revenues is negative on the depth of and access to financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak, but positive when political institutions are strong. We observe similar threshold effects for the depth of and access to financial markets in the subsample of developing countries. We conclude that oil-producing countries need solid political institutions to benefit from oil wealth and to boost financial development.

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石油收入的所有权结构:石油生产国的政治制度和金融市场
本研究考察了石油收入的所有权结构对金融市场和机构的影响,以及政治机构的中介作用。我们使用固定效应模型和GMM进行稳健性分析,分析了82个石油生产国的数据。我们发现了几个关键的结果。首先,当政治制度质量较弱时,政府对石油收入的所有权会破坏金融机构的效率,而当政治制度较强时,政府对石油收入的所有权会提高金融机构的效率。其次,当政治制度的质量较弱时,石油收入私有制对金融机构的深度和获取的影响是负面的,但当政治制度较强时,石油收入私有制的影响是积极的。我们观察到,在发展中国家的子样本中,金融市场的深度和准入也存在类似的门槛效应。我们的结论是,产油国需要稳固的政治制度,才能从石油财富中获益,并促进金融发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
4.80%
发文量
25
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.
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