{"title":"Rights and obligations in Cambridge social ontology","authors":"Yannick Slade-Caffarel","doi":"10.1111/jtsb.12332","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47646,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jtsb.12332","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jtsb.12332","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution.
期刊介绍:
The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour publishes original theoretical and methodological articles that examine the links between social structures and human agency embedded in behavioural practices. The Journal is truly unique in focusing first and foremost on social behaviour, over and above any disciplinary or local framing of such behaviour. In so doing, it embraces a range of theoretical orientations and, by requiring authors to write for a wide audience, the Journal is distinctively interdisciplinary and accessible to readers world-wide in the fields of psychology, sociology and philosophy.