Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

Although practice theory has significantly contributed to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social change, it does not take a position or advocate for particular meso-macro changes, such as responsible management, because it is a theory wedded to ontological understanding. How people choose to ‘get along’ in life and manage their goods is all part of the practices, which fall under the theorist's microscope. On other hand, the applied field of leadership-as-practice is tied to change as its definitive property; in fact, leadership is defined by turning points occurring in the spaces between people, which, in turn, can lead to changes in the trajectory of the flow of practice. After narrowing the definition of social change in this paper as social action and—institutionally—as responsible management, the paper turns to a comparison between how practice theory contributes to our understanding of the evolution of social action and how leadership-as-practice, relying on the former's erstwhile elucidation, attempts to initiate and facilitate such action. The latter discussion of leadership-as-practice includes an accounting of the impetus for change initiation, its diffusion and prefigured processes, and the post-institutional applications afforded through its link with practice theory. The essay concludes by pointing out the principal contribution of the paper that social change need not rely on exclusive individual direction but on the collective capacity of the agents affiliated with the practice deriving the means to produce more just and sustainable lives.

In moral psychology, many suggestions have been given regarding the nature of morality as a personality trait and as a biological phenomenon. Discussing both historical and contemporary theories, a bottom-up genetically influenced theoretical synthesis for morality is proposed. At the centre are the four pillars of morality: the dual moral emotion systems found in empathetic distress and the rage and fear systems and the two modulators found in executive control and openness. These are evolutionary safe bets, that is, genetically influenced adaptations that enable moral development and that help shape and push the learning process forward. More specifically, while the emotion systems serve as the moral domain, the modulators affect moral learning by directing attention, controlling thought and making us crave exploration of the internal and external moral universe. The result is a mature disposition, that is, passionate yet controlled and curious, while firmly rooted in the moral emotions.

Across different domains, justice is considered either from a perspective concerning mind-independent features of a situation or from a perspective related to mind-dependent motives, traits or emotions. Although these approaches have generated valuable insights, they remain largely disconnected from each other. What is missing is an integrative framework that can explain how the objective features of situations are translated into subjective experiences and, ultimately, into defensible moral judgements. In this paper, we propose a physiological account of justice perception that explains how the ontologically objective features of a situation are translated into epistemically objective moral judgements. We argue here that the brain's predictive processing and interoceptive systems register unwarranted energy costs imposed by others as a salient, ontologically subjective state of negative affect through prediction errors elicited in specifically social contexts. This affective signal, in turn, provides the motivational and phenomenological basis for the cognitive judgement—mediated by Theory of Mind—that constitutes a specific moral emotion, such as indignation or outrage. Our naturalistic framework thus illuminates the embodied foundations of justice without reducing moral judgement to a mere physiological response. Although we are proposing a neurophysiological mechanism for justice perception, the content of the cognitive judgement (what counts as ‘unjustified’ or a norm of ‘fairness’) is also shaped by cultural, sociological and anthropological context. Thus, rather than replacing existing philosophical, legal or psychological theories, this naturalistic framework complements them by revealing the embodied cognitive processes that underlie our justice judgements across diverse contexts and cultures.

Pierzynski and Joseph explain the Russo-Ukrainian war through systemic and individual-level accounts but argue these are incomplete without addressing Russia's internal structure, which they term ‘patrimonial imperialism’. While their taxonomy mirrors the traditional IR ‘levels of analysis’, I suggest it obscures relational and historical dynamics. In this rejoinder, I also critique their rigid distinction between the actual and the real and between process and structure. Causal complexes are historically grounded relational processes. Alongside metatheoretical argumentation, I outline a process-ontological and holistic critical realist explanation of the Russo-Ukrainian war—one that situates it within global political-economic dynamics, while also invoking concepts such as world time. This perspective allows for a nuanced attribution of responsibility and broadens the scope of normative considerations.

Humanity seems stuck on different ways to fail to meet the challenge posed by a declared climate emergency and manifest the problems of ecological breakdown. Rather than reprise these failures, we use the Fermi Paradox and simulation hypothesis to make a simple point about agency. The argument unfolds in two sections. I first introduce the Fermi Paradox and in a series of subsections I explore its different aspects. In the following section and its subsections, I do the same regarding the simulation hypothesis. The guiding question for both is, ‘should we be worried?’ Among other things, I point out that it is unwarranted fatalism to infer from the former (Fermi) that we are doomed or because of the latter (simulation) that nothing matters. At the same time, we are acting as though we are doomed and as if it didn't matter. I conclude with some brief comment on agency and hope.

Does the digital/virtual have a reality? For a critical realist, there is no doubt it does, since what can cause something is real. But what kind of reality is it? The article argues that this reality is a relational quidditas. The diffusion of new AI-based technologies increasingly blends analogue and virtual realities, making it essential to understand the causal processes of exchange between them. Digital/virtual reality is constituted by the relationships it designs, and these relationships are increasingly programmable through incentive structures that optimise engagement and control. Using a critical realist lens, the author distinguishes the lifeworld (D1), hybrid/virtual environments (D2) and AI-based technical systems (D3) and analyses the exchanges between them. He argues that current systems excel at simulating first-person experience and signalling sociality, but lack second-person relational reflexivity (mutual respect, responsibility, shared normativity). This absence, combined with the capitalist incentives of platforms, generates asymmetrical ‘companionship’ relationships. that risk degrading relational assets (trust, reciprocity, care). It is necessary to clarify the process of colonization as one through which digital rationalities replace analogue and embodied relationships. Claims about augmented and virtual reality must, however, be evaluated, emphasising their limited and uneven adoption.