Loss aversion for the value of voting rights: WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot

Abstract

What is the subjective value of voting rights? This article presents an empirical demonstration of people’s loss aversion for the value of voting rights. By way of vignette experiments using scenarios of the 2020 U.S. presidential election (Studies 1 and 2, with U.S. citizens) and a fictitious direct premier election in Japan (Study 3, with Japanese citizens), the present research measured the willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA) and the willingness-to-pay price (WTP) for a ballot(s) in political elections. A great disparity between WTA and WTP was found regardless of the electoral setting, the proportion and width of ballot alteration, and the initial status. Specifically, the observed WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot(s) were within the range of 5.00–27.36, which is much larger than the ratios for ordinary market goods (about 1.5–2.5) and which is comparable to the ratios for other non-market goods. In addition, WTA for a mere 10% dilution of voting rights is still higher than WTP for full voting rights; the powerful effect of loss aversion might help explain universal barriers against suffrage extension.