The consequences of escalated politicization in the US regulatory process

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-03-25 DOI:10.1177/1783591719836874
K. Costello
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

To some observers, public utility regulation has expanded its domain far beyond its original mandate and what is socially optimal. Their view is that regulators should stick to setting just and reasonable rates and taking other actions that improve the long-term welfare of utility consumers. After all the raison d’etre for public utility regulation is to protect consumers from “monopoly” utilities. Utilities provide essential services to both individuals and society. When left unregulated, these services would presumably be excessively priced with no guarantee of availability for those who want it and willing to pay for it. Diverting from this focus—driven by escalating politics—risks regulators’ ability to achieve their core objective of protecting consumers. One positive aspect of politicization is that it allows regulators to have access to more diversified information from stakeholders that could result in better decisions. One criticism of regulation is that it tends to stay with its policies and practices too long in spite of changing market and technological conditions. Additional stakeholders in the regulatory process could push regulators toward changes that are in the public interest but would not pursue on their own.
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美国监管程序政治化升级的后果
在一些观察人士看来,公用事业监管的范围已经远远超出了其最初的授权和社会最优的范围。他们的观点是,监管机构应该坚持设定公正合理的费率,并采取其他措施,改善公用事业消费者的长期福利。毕竟,公用事业监管存在的理由是保护消费者免受“垄断”公用事业的侵害。公用事业为个人和社会提供基本服务。如果放任不管,这些服务可能会定价过高,而那些想要并愿意付费的人却无法保证获得这些服务。在不断升级的政治驱动下,偏离这一重点,将危及监管机构实现保护消费者这一核心目标的能力。政治化的一个积极方面是,它使监管机构能够从利益相关者那里获得更多样化的信息,从而做出更好的决策。对监管的一种批评是,尽管市场和技术条件不断变化,但监管往往坚持其政策和做法的时间过长。监管过程中的其他利益相关者可能会推动监管机构进行符合公众利益但不会自行追求的变革。
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来源期刊
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (all)
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
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