Deflecting Ockham’s Razor: A Medieval Debate about Ontological Commitment

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MIND Pub Date : 2023-04-26 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzad007
Susan Brower-Toland
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Abstract

William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology.
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偏离奥卡姆的剃刀:关于本体论承诺的中世纪争论
奥卡姆的威廉(公元1347年)以其节俭的承诺和所谓的“剃刀”原则而闻名。但他同时代人试图转移他对剃须刀的使用,对此知之甚少。在本文中,我探索了一种这样的尝试。特别是,我认为奥卡姆的同时代年轻人沃尔特·查顿(公元1343年)对剃刀提出了一个巧妙的挑战。对奥卡姆来说,这一挑战涉及到一种进退两难的境地。查顿认为,根据奥卡姆对这一困境的反应,他的剃刀要么在确定本体论承诺时被证明是令人无法接受的迟钝,要么在确定某些神学教义所包含的承诺时被证实是令人难以接受的尖锐。虽然查顿的反对本身就很微妙和有趣,但这些思想家之间的辩论更广泛的意义在于它揭示了中世纪对形而上学方法论问题的态度。
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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