Can Cyberattacks Reassure? Half Measures as a De-Escalation Strategy

Abstract

How can states de-escalate a crisis and avoid spiraling toward war? Doing so requires the actors to reassure each other of their willingness to issue and commit to concessions. Yet reassurance is fundamentally difficult: states have incentives to misrepresent their aims as moderate in order to dupe the other into offering concessions and drawing down its military readiness, only to renege and issue further demands in the future. Thus, credible signaling mechanisms are essential for peaceful crisis resolution. Adding to a growing literature on credible reassurance, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan offer an intriguing new theory of crisis de-escalation built around the distinct properties of cyber technology. They argue that states caught in an escalatory spiral can use cyberattacks to signal their willingness to compromise and give the opponent an opportunity to reciprocate. Thus, a seemingly provocative action can instead convey restraint and alleviate tensions. Two features of cyberattacks underpin this counterintuitive claim: they are relatively harmless compared to other military operations, and their origins are ambiguous, which facilitates plausible deniability. The “low harm” aspect signals restraint because the attacker foregoes more destructive coercive tools at its disposal. Because an attacker with maximalist goals would