Racial Hierarchy and Jurisdiction in U.S. Status of Forces Agreements

Abstract

Abstract Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) establish when and how the domestic laws of host governments are applied to American soldiers. Why does the United States share jurisdiction under some SOFAs but not others? I argue that U.S. SOFAs project a racialized conception of host state capacity for governance over American troops on foreign soil. It is through the notion of “capacity” that non-white host partners are stereotyped as possessing inferior courts and legal values. The United States is less likely to share jurisdiction with non-white majority host countries. I motivate my argument with primary accounts of racial discrimination in debates over U.S. SOFA policy. Then, I code U.S. SOFA jurisdiction and estimate its determinants. The results suggest that the United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly white host states, allowing these peer countries to try U.S. personnel, while withholding this same right from most non-white host partners, ceteris paribus. I conclude with a discussion of implications for understanding international law and security from its racial underpinnings.