{"title":"Réflexions critiques sur les notions d’abolition et d’altération de la faculté à discerner","authors":"Mathieu Garcia","doi":"10.1016/j.meddro.2020.12.001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Inasmuch as the constitution of the <em>mens rea</em> of any offence remains suspended to its integrity, the capacity for discernment represents a condition of accountability whose definition responds to issues that are as much technical – with respect to psychiatric and psychological penal expertise – as they are theoretical – with respect to our conception of criminal responsibility and the psychological prerequisites that underlie it. Now, the fact is that since its introduction in 1992 with article 122–1 of the Penal Code, this notion of discernment is characterized by a certain conceptual inconsistency, giving rise to a damaging plurality of meanings making the verb <em>discern</em> the condensed version of a heterogeneous network of distinct psychological functions. The polysemic term of <em>discernment</em> thus gives rise to a fundamental indetermination as to the nature of the faculty that must be examined in order to decide on its abolition or its preservation at the moment of the act. This is not without favouring the appearance and persistence of arbitrary interpretations, and consequently discordant expert conclusions. Even more problematic, however, is the idea of an <em>alteration</em> of discernment, given the irreducible discrepancy between the continuous nature of an alteration and the discontinuous nature of the conclusion to which the agent is subject, in that the legal demand requires a decision – in a discretization of what is continuous – between the presence and absence of <em>something</em> that is lacking. We will in fact show in what way this concept of alteration as it applies to discernment tends to be either meaningless, or redundant – and therefore useless – in relation to that of abolition. So much so that the only conceivable solution to maintain a certain gradation of degrees of non-accountability seems to consist in having to specify the different types of abolition of discernment potentially observed, and then to propose a hierarchization according to their greater or lesser compatibility with the conservation of a criminal responsibility. .</p></div>","PeriodicalId":41275,"journal":{"name":"Medecine & Droit","volume":"2021 167","pages":"Pages 25-29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.meddro.2020.12.001","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Medecine & Droit","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1246739120301263","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"MEDICINE, LEGAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Inasmuch as the constitution of the mens rea of any offence remains suspended to its integrity, the capacity for discernment represents a condition of accountability whose definition responds to issues that are as much technical – with respect to psychiatric and psychological penal expertise – as they are theoretical – with respect to our conception of criminal responsibility and the psychological prerequisites that underlie it. Now, the fact is that since its introduction in 1992 with article 122–1 of the Penal Code, this notion of discernment is characterized by a certain conceptual inconsistency, giving rise to a damaging plurality of meanings making the verb discern the condensed version of a heterogeneous network of distinct psychological functions. The polysemic term of discernment thus gives rise to a fundamental indetermination as to the nature of the faculty that must be examined in order to decide on its abolition or its preservation at the moment of the act. This is not without favouring the appearance and persistence of arbitrary interpretations, and consequently discordant expert conclusions. Even more problematic, however, is the idea of an alteration of discernment, given the irreducible discrepancy between the continuous nature of an alteration and the discontinuous nature of the conclusion to which the agent is subject, in that the legal demand requires a decision – in a discretization of what is continuous – between the presence and absence of something that is lacking. We will in fact show in what way this concept of alteration as it applies to discernment tends to be either meaningless, or redundant – and therefore useless – in relation to that of abolition. So much so that the only conceivable solution to maintain a certain gradation of degrees of non-accountability seems to consist in having to specify the different types of abolition of discernment potentially observed, and then to propose a hierarchization according to their greater or lesser compatibility with the conservation of a criminal responsibility. .
期刊介绍:
The Scientific Committee of the journal Médecine et Droit includes professors of medicine, professors of law, magistrates, lawyers, court medical experts, and specialists in compensation for physical injury. Médecine et Droit provides: • rigorous and clear support for informative and educational matter • a tool for reflection and actualisation of knowledge • an essential link between doctors and lawyers. Médecine et Droit informs: • doctors on different aspects of law and regulations encountered in their profession • lawyers on the specific problems of the medical profession and important bio-ethical issues