{"title":"Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitutiom","authors":"Soo Lam Wong","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2020.27406","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitution 505 Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":"27 1","pages":"504-521"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organon F","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27406","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the Fregean Monism: A Solution to the Puzzle of Material Constitution 505 Organon F 27 (4) 2020: 504–521 referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.
物质构成之谜至少可以用两种方式来表达。首先,构成物体和构成物体在物质和空间上重合,如何被视为不同的物体?第二,构成客体和构成客体在性质上是不同的,如何被视为相同的客体?一元论者认为,构成物和构成物是相同的,因为它们在物质和空间上是一致的,而两者之间的性质差异只是描述、视角或上下文的差异。相反,多元主义者认为,构成和构成的物体是不相同的,即使它们在物质和空间上是一致的,因为它们在质量上是不同的。本文提出了一种解决物质构成之谜的方法,称为“Fregean一元论”(FM),并表明它可以更好地解释构成物和构成物之间的性质差异,而不需要将它们视为两个不同的物体。在FM的观点中,物质构成之谜一部分是语义之谜,一部分是形而上学之谜,并展示了如何基于意义和指称之间的Fregean区别来解决谜题的语义部分,从而对谜题的形而上学部分产生令人满意的解决方案。关键思想是,虽然一个术语的引用既能挑出Fregean一元论:物质构成之谜的解决方案505 Organon F 27(4)2020:504–521指称对象和指称属性,但术语的意义决定了哪些指称属性被挑出。
期刊介绍:
Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.